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I  
Legal framework and method 
1 Presentation of the subject 
The IMO Oil Pollution Conventions consist of two sets of Conventions. The 
first is composed by the CLC 92
1
, the 1992 Fund Convention
2
 and the 2003 
Supplementary Fund Protocol,
3
 and regulates a third party's right to 
compensation for oil pollution damage caused by tankers. The second set 
consists of the Bunkers Convention of 2001,
4
 which introduces an international 
regime to govern the right to compensation for oil pollution damage caused by 
non-tankers. Prior to 21 November 2008, this was a legal area in which the 
injured parties were at the mercy of national regulation.  
Even though these Conventions contain substantial rules made to create 
rights and obligations for both private and public legal subjects, they will only 
constitute an obligation of the Contracting State until they have been properly 
enacted into national law through incorporation. A different practice would 
inflict with the States' sovereignty. When a Convention first has become part of 
the national law, it will also be subject to the interpretation and application of 
domestic courts. In the course of these procedures, it is likely that each 
Contracting State will affect the original uniformity of the Conventions by their 
method of incorporation, or by the interpretation and application supplied by 
both national principles of interpretation and substantial rules of law.  
In order to further analyze these aspects, I will compare the Norwegian legal 
regime on an injured party's right to compensation for oil pollution damage 
caused by ships with the one of another Contracting State to the Oil Pollution 
Conventions. The reason why I have chosen Spain does not only lie in their 
accession to the same, amended versions of the Conventions, but also in several 
                                           
1
 1992 Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
1969 (the consolidated text as amended by the 1992 Protocol is referred to as CLC 92). 
There are still some Contracting States to the CLC 69, see footnote 26 on p. 3. 
2
 1992 Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishing of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (The consolidated text as amended 
by the 1992 Protocol is referred to as 1992 Fund Convention) 
3
 The 2003 Protocol establishing an International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Supplementary Fund 
4
 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001 
(Bunkers Convention) 
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aspects of their legal system that might make this an interesting analysis. These 
aspects do in principle reflect the difference between a legal method based on 
statutory and non-statutory principles, the relationship between national and 
international law in terms of monism and dualism, the status of incorporated, 
international provisions, the organization of the legislative material on maritime 
law, and the different national provisions supplementing the Oil Pollution 
Convention. Yet another thing is that the numerous oil spills in Spanish waters 
have resulted in both prosecutions and civil claims for compensation. The spills 
of the Urquiola (1976), the Aegean Sea (1992) and the Prestige (2002) are the 
incidents that have caused the most recent large scale oil spills,
5
 and they all 
polluted the Galician coast in north-western Spanish. Even though many 
Spanish claimants have presented their claim directly to the 1971/1992 Funds,
6
  
many have also chosen to take theirs to court in order to have it assessed in the 
criminal process. As all these incidents have resulted in criminal processes 
before a domestic court, the Spanish experience can be used as a practical 
example on the coordination of rules with both national and international 
origin.
7
  
 
2 Problem description and limitation 
The components and application of the Oil Pollution Conventions, as well as 
problems related to low limits of liability is well and thoroughly discussed in the 
available, updated literature.
8
 My intention is not to make a complete 
presentation of the applicable, international rules, but to see how the internal 
legal regimes of the Contracting States affect their original uniformity in 
relation to their principal purpose, namely to ensure that injured third parties 
receives prompt and adequate compensation for oil pollution damage.  
The national impact can be divided into the underlying, methodical aspects 
that lie in the incorporation as such, and the phase in which international 
measures are put into practice through the national legislation. The method of 
incorporation decides how the content of the conventions are expressed within 
the national legal regime, as well as their hierarchical status among other 
                                           
5
  See the illustrative map in Annex I 
6
 See Annual Report 2008. Report on the activities of the International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Funds in 2007. London, IOPC Funds, 2009. http://www.iopcfund.org/ 
npdf/AR08_E.pdf [1 June 2009] 
7
  See Chapter IV10.3.1 
8
 See for instance de la Rue, Colin and Charles B. Anderson. Shipping and the Environment: 
Law and Practice. 2. ed. Series: Lloyd's Shipping Law Library. London, 2009 
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sources of law. When put into practice, the incorporated measures will be 
interpreted and applied by national courts together with adjacent, internal 
legislation, and to some extent also supplied by internal rules. Nevertheless; 
differences between the contracting States to one single convention may also be 
caused by the possibility to make reservations and enact optional clauses.  
These factors boil down to one, principal problem of discussion: Do the 
national incorporation and interpretation of the Oil Pollution Conventions 
cause divergence between the Norwegian and Spanish rules on a third party's 
right to compensation for oil pollution damage caused by ships? 
Even though the title and the problem of discussion give way for a wide range 
of interesting topics, I am obliged to keep this thesis within the strict limit of 
40 000 words and a couple of months of combined research and writing. On 
this background, I will only be discussing the national context provided by the 
Norwegian and Spanish legal regime. I will also seek to maintain the focus on 
the purely national aspects that might have an impact on the injured party's 
right to compensation for oil pollution damage. However, in order to locate 
domestic aspects in their larger frame of reference, I will make brief comments 
on adjacent topics that could have been further discussed if time and space had 
allowed. Without prejudice to these in-context references, the thesis will be 
delimited from discussing problems resulting from different conventions and 
liability limits being applicable throughout the world, as well as international 
and national
9
 rules obliging States or ship owners to take measures to prevent 
or deal with marine incidents. Neither will I focus explicitly on penal 
measures
10
 nor administrative
11
 sanctions for oil spill pollution.
12
   
                                           
9
 See Sections 7, 28, 74 and 76 of the Norwegian Pollution Control Act of 13 March 1981 
No. 6 (Forurensningsloven, NPCA), NOU 2002:15 Ansvar for oppryddingstiltak etter 
sjøulykker Chapter 3.4, St.meld.nr.14 (2004-2005) Chapter 8.18 and Sections  20 and 28 et 
seq. of the Harbour Act of 8 June 1984 No. 51 (Havneloven).  
10
 Case C-440/05 (OJ C 315, p. 9) was preceded by two legislative measures: Directive 
2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law (OJ 2008 L 328, p. 
28) and the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship source pollution and on the introduction of 
penalties for infringements (COM(2008)134). This Proposal has not been adopted. 
Directive 2005/35/CE has been carried out in the Spanish legislation through the State 
Ports and Merchant Shipping Act (Ley 27/1992, LPEMM), R.D. 1398/1993, 
R.D. 1772/1994, R.D 91/2003 and R.D. 394/2007. As for penal measures for pollution 
damage under Norwegian law, see Section 78 NPCA, cf. Sections 152 b and 48 a-b of the 
General Civil Penal Code (Lov av 22/05/1902, Straffeloven).  
11
 Within the Spanish legislation, the regime of administrative fines for causing oil pollution 
damage is governed by the LPEMM (Ley 27/1992), see Art 115.b. If an action is subject to 
both an administrative remedy and a penal sanction, only the latter will apply, see 
Art 119.3 LPEMM.  
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3 Outline of the thesis 
Part II contains a presentation of the legal framework and method which is 
meant to provide the reader with a preliminary overview of the international, 
Spanish, Norwegian and to a certain extent also Community secondary 
legislation that will form the base for the further analysis. Part III is devoted to 
the first part of the principal problem of discussion, namely whether the 
national incorporation of the Oil Pollution Conventions cause divergence 
between the Norwegian and Spanish rules on a third party's right to 
compensation for oil pollution damage caused by ships. The analysis is 
continued in Part IV, in which I will focus on the interpretation of the Oil 
Pollution Conventions within the Norwegian and Spanish legal context. This 
part of the thesis relates to the second part of the principal problem, namely 
whether the national interpretation of the Conventions cause divergence 
between the Norwegian and Spanish rules. Any differences between the 
national regimes will be consecutively commented on, and some final lines will 
be drawn in the conclusive remarks of Part V. 
I have also included an Annex I, which does not form part of the thesis as 
such. Neither shall it be subject to assessment. The reason why it is included is 
merely to give an example on particular national measures that might be 
adopted to ease the process of obtaining compensation for the injured third 
parties. 
As for the translation of legal documents, I will seek to apply published 
translations whenever available.
13
 Unfortunately, most Spanish legal sources, 
except their Constitution,
14
 are not available in an English version. In these 
cases, I will do my best to express an accurate translation. I have however 
chosen to use some original Spanish words, and rather explain their content in 
English. 
                                                                                                                               
12
  Both the sinking of the Aegean Sea (1992) and of the Prestige (2002) was followed by 
criminal proceedings before Spanish courts. According to Article 109.1 of the Spanish 
Criminal Code (Ley Orgánica 10/1995, CP), every person who is criminally responsible is 
also liable for the civil damages caused by commission of the offence. However, the 
application of this particular internal rule in combination with the incorporated Oil 
Pollution Conventions give grounds for some particular problems of discussion which are 
discussed in Chapter IV10.3.1. 
13
 The English translation of the Norwegian Maritime Code (NMC) was originally made by 
Peter Bilton at the request of the Ministry of Justice, and thereafter further elaborated by 
Trond Solvang and Erik Røsæg, available from .http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-
19940624-039-eng.pdf [1 June 2009]. Other public translations of Norwegian legislation 
can be found on http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulov/english.html [1 June 2009] 
14
 http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/enlaces/documentos/ConstitucionINGLES.pdf  
[1 June 2009]. 
 9
II  
Legal framework and method 
4 The international legal framework 
4.1 The IMO Oil Pollution Conventions 
Prior to 1967, the civil liability for oil pollution damage caused by ships was 
governed by national law. The applicable legislation would in general be 
ordinary rules of tort law, or whatever regulation governing claims in tort law 
against a ship or her owners.
15
 Nevertheless; when the oil tanker Torrey 
Canyon ran aground between the Isles of Scilly and the British coast in March 
1967 loaded with 121 000 tonnes of crude oil,16 the inadequacy of tradition 
legal principles based on national rules and ordinary tort law became evident.
17
 
As the tanker was surrounded by a corporate veil and damage had been caused 
in both UK and France, some of the problems related to determining the 
jurisdiction and choice of law. The potentially applicable national legal regimes 
all represented diverging rules on the limitation of claims, and the problems 
related to choice of law extended to the question whether the owners would be 
entitled to limit their liability; and if so to what amount. The same problems of 
uncertainty arouse in relation to the scope of compensatory losses. Even though 
it was clear that this particular oil spill had been caused for negligent navigation 
for which the owners were liable, a requirement of fault could make it difficult 
to impose liability on other occasions.
18
 This marked the start of an 
international cooperation on the regulation of civil liability and other financial 
measures in order to compensate oil pollution damage to third parties caused 
by ships.19 
Today there are two international systems regulating the right to 
compensation for damages caused by oil spill from ships; the US Oil Pollution 
                                           
15
 de la Rue (2009) p. 7, García, José Luis Gabaldón and José María Ruiz Soroa. Manual de 
derecho de la navegación marítima. 3. ed. Madrid, 2006, p. 789 
16 http://www.cedre.fr/en/spill/torrey/torrey.php [1 June 2009] 
17
 de la Rue (2009) p. 12 
18
 de la Rue (2009) p. 11-12, García (2006) p. 788 
19  Falkanger, Thor and Hans Jacob Bull. Innføring i sjørett. 6th ed., Oslo, 2004 p. 174 
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Act of 1990 (OPA 90),
20
 and the set of Conventions developed under the 
auspices of the International Maritime Organization.
21
 Whilst the OPA 90 
applies in the US, the basic Conventions of the IMO regime cover more than 
100 States worldwide.
22
  
As already mentioned, the Oil Pollution Conventions consist of two sets. The 
first covers pollution damage caused by the discharge or escape of persistent oil 
from sea-going vessels constructed or adapted to carry oil in bulk as cargo23 and 
consists of the Civil Liability Conventions of 1969 and 1992, the 1992 Fund 
Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. When the Bunker 
Convention entered into force on 21 November 2008, the IMO regime was 
extended from covering oil pollution from loaded tankers to also include 
bunker oil from all24 types of vessels. The CLC 92 and 1992 Fund Convention 
are both amended versions of the Conventions adopted in the wake of the 
Torrey Canyon incident.
25
 The CLC 69 is still in force in some States,
26
 but as 
Norway and Spain both are Contracting States to the Oil Pollution 
Conventions as amended,
27
 these are the Conventions that will be discussed in 
the following.  
The CLC 92 is the first tier of three28 and imposes a strict liability for 
pollution damage - regardless of fault - on the owner of a ship. This liability 
might be excluded in an exhaustively listed number of cases related to force 
majeure,29 and is also limited to an amount calculated by reference to the 
tonnage of the ship. In order to ensure the financing of the owner's liability, the 
CLC 92 imposes a system of compulsory liability insurance, and provides the 
                                           
20 
For full text, see http://thomas.loc.gov/ [1 June 2009]. See also de la Rue (2009) chapter 4 
and Foley, Vincent J. and Christopher R. Nolan. The ERIKA Judgement – Environmental 
liability and Places of Refuge: A Sea Change in Civil and Criminal Responsibility That the 
Maritime Community Must Heed. In: Tulane Maritime Law Journal Vol. 33 (2008) pp. [40-
]-78, pp. 48-49 
21
 http://www.imo.org/Legal/mainframe.asp?topic_id=358  [1 June 2009]  
22
 This coverage correspond to the CLC 92 and the 1992 Fund Convention, see 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247  [1 June 2009] 
23 
Art I.1 CLC 92, Art 1.2 1992 Fund Convention, Art 1.6 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol 
24 
See the definition in Art 1.1 Bunkers Convention 
25
 See de la Rue (2009) p. 7-19 for an overview of the historic development of the 
Conventions.  
26
 As of 30 April 2009, the CLC 69 had 38 Contracting States, see http://www.imo.org/ 
Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247 [1 June 2009] The principal difference between 
the original and amended version is that the CLC 92 provides for compensation up to 
higher limits.  
27
 See Chapter II6.2 and Chapter II7.2 
28
 See Figure 9.7.1 in Chapter IV10.7 
29
 Art III CLC 92 
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injured parties with a right to bring his claims directly against the insurer. The 
second and third tiers of compensation are provided by the 1992 Fund 
Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. These Conventions 
establish the two organizations jointly known as the International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds),30 which will make supplementary funds 
available for claimants that have not been fully compensated by the owner and 
his insurer. The ordinary reason for their application tends to be that the 
admissible claims exceed the applicable limit of limitation under the CLC 92.31 
Claims may be presented directly to the IOPC Funds, and most claims are 
settled out of court.
32
 The IOPC Funds are both finances by contributions levied 
on receivers of oil by sea transport in Contracting States.33  
The Funds are also financed, on a voluntarily basis, by the International Group of P&I Clubs 
through the private agreements STOPIA 2006 and TOPIA 2006 which entered into force on 20 
February 2006. These are contracts between owners of tankers and their respective P&I Club, 
which increases the limitation amount applicable to the tanker under the CLC 92. The effect of 
STOPIA 2006 is that the maximum amount payable by the owner of all ships of a tonnage of 29 
548 or less is 20 million SDR, while TOPIA 2006 entitles the 2003 Supplementary Fund right to 
indemnification of 50% of the compensation paid to claimants. Through these agreements, the 
risk for oil pollution damage is more evenly distributed between ship-owning and cargo 
interests.
34
 However, as the total amount of compensation available under the IMO regime 
remains the same, the Agreements do not represent any additional rights for the injured party.
35
  
Though there are some important differences, the Bunkers Convention follows 
a pattern very similar to the CLC 92 with strict but limited liability, compulsory 
insurance and the injured party's right to direct action against the owner's 
liability insurer. Besides the fact that the Bunkers Convention applies to oil 
pollution damage caused by all vessels except tankers as defined in the CLC 92, 
the two main differences between the two Conventions is that the Bunker 
Convention is a single-tier compensation regime and further that it does not 
                                           
30
 See Art 2.1 1992 Fund Convention, Art 2.1 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol and de la 
Rue (2009) p. 137 
31
 de la Rue (2009) p. 81 
32
 See the Annual Report 2008 (IOPC Funds) 
33
 See Art 10 1992 Fund Convention, Art 10 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol and the 
Annual Report 2008 p. 37-41 
34
 See STOPIA 2006 and TOPIA 2006 Explanatory Note, issued to the IOPC Fund by The 
International Group of P&I Clubs  and included in the IOPC Document 
92FUND/A/ES.10/13; SUPPFUND/A/ES.2/7 of 1 February 2006, Annex IV. See also 
Tsimplis, Dr. Michael N. Marine pollution from shipping activities. In: The Journal of 
International Maritime Law, Volume 14, Issue 2, March – April 2008, p. [101]–152 p. 122. 
35
 See the Annual Report 2008 p. 42-43 and the STOPIA 2006 and TOPIA 2006 Explanatory 
Note. 
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provide its own liability limits: There are no provisions for supplemental 
compensation above the owner's liability limit from an additional source 
comparable to the IOPC Funds, and the liability limit is linked to whatever 
national or international regime that might apply in the corresponding 
contracting State. The Convention itself suggests the Convention on the 
Limitation of Maritime Claims of 1976 as amended by the Protocol of 1996 
(LLMC 76/96), and this is also the regime made applicable to liability incurred 
under the Bunkers Convention in Norwegian and Spanish law.
36
 
4.2 Interpretation of the Conventions  
The Oil Pollution Conventions may be interpreted and applied within the 
national context of each of the Contracting States.
37
 As part of the national 
legislation, they will be subject to the general principles of interpretation 
applying in each of the States. However, the manner in which international 
provisions are interpreted, even within national law, will often differ from the 
method applied to internal, national provisions. The reason for such differential 
treatment reflects the attempt to establish uniform rules which is a prerequisite 
for any international regime that seeks to establish identical rights and 
obligations throughout its contracting States.  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT), Articles 31 - 
33 provides general rules on interpretations of international conventions. Spain 
is party to this Convention,
38
 and its provisions will thus be directly applicable.
39
 
Even though it has not been ratified by Norway, it will be applicable as a 
codification of existing customary international law in accordance with the 
Norwegian principle of presumption.
40
 Based on this, it is clear that an 
international convention «shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
                                           
36
 See Chapters II6.2 and II7.2. 
37
 They may also be applied by the ship owner's insurance company an the IOPC Funds in 
the process of assessment and compensation of claims.  
38 
BOE núm. 142 de 13/06/1980 
39
 See Chapter III8.2. See also Art 2-2 of the draft law «Proyecto de Ley General de 
Navegación Marítima»; Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales (BOCG), Congreso de los 
Diputados, parte IX Legislatura, de 19/12/2008, núm. 14-1 (PLGNM), which states that 
the court must be conscious of the international conventions applying within the material 
covered by the act, and be determined to promote uniformity through its interpretation and 
application. http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L9/CONG/BOCG/A/A_014-01.PDF      
[1 June 2009]. This draft law is further commented in Chapter II7.2. 
40 
See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Reports 1997 p. 7, as well as 
Ruud, Morten and Geir Ulfstein. Innføring i folkerett. 3. ed. Oslo, 2006 p. 92, and 
Andenæs, Johs. and Arne Fliflet. Statsforatningen i Norge. 10. ed. Oslo, 2006 p. 308. See 
also Chapter III8.1. 
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the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose»
41
 - both in Norway and Spain. This would 
also follow from the fact that the actual wording is the result of a political 
process in which many interests are coordinated.
42
   
Further guidance on interpreting the provisions of the IMO Oil Pollution 
Conventions can also be found within the IOPC Funds Claims Manual.
43
 As the 
governing bodies of the IOPC Funds consists of representatives from the 
Contracting States, it is possible that the practice of the Fund as described in 
the Claims Manual might be regarded as subsequent practice or agreement 
between the contracting parties on the interpretation and application of their 
provisions, cf. Article 31.2 (a) and (b) of the VCLT.
44
 
 
5 Community law 
Even though the European Union provides measures within the field of 
maritime safety and pollution prevention, there is no particular instrument that 
explicitly regulates an oil pollution victim's right to compensation damage 
caused by ships.
45
 The Member States have however undertaken to ratify the 
LLMC 76/96 and other relevant IMO Conventions within 1 January 2012. This 
means that the Member States as such will continue as individual Contracting 
States to the IMO Conventions. At the same time, they will establish uniformity 
within the EU throughout the accession of the same Conventions.
46
 
                                           
41
 Art 31.1 VLCT 
42
 Ruud & Ulfstein (2006) p. 93  
43 
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/claimsman-en.pdf [1 June 2009] 
44
 de la Rue (2009)  p. 368. See also Art 235.3 of the United Nations Convention of the Law 
of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) which provides for States to «co-operate in the 
implementation of international law relating to responsibility and liability for the 
assessment of and compensation for damage and the settlement of related disputes (…). »  
45
 See the summaries of legislation on http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s13003.htm [1 June 
2009], and the unpublished but adopted measures embraced by the Erika III-package on 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/safety/third_maritime_safety_package_en.htm [1 
June 2009]. Rules on liability is provided in Directive 2004/35/CE on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (OJ 2004 L 
143, p. 56), but these do not apply to damage covered by the Oil Pollution Convention, see 
its Art 4.2 cf. Annex IV. 
46
 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament concerning the 
Common Position of the Council on the adoption of a Directive on the civil liability and 
financial guarantees of shipowners, COM(2008)846. 
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Through the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the civil 
liability and financial guarantee of shipowners,
47
 the Commission aimed at harmonizing, at 
Community level, the regime of civil liability of ship owners and the related limits of liability, 
and at introducing a compulsory insurance scheme and financial guarantees for seafarers in 
case of abandonment.
48
 However, according to the Council, specific Community rules in 
parallel to international rules on the same matter would result in a contradictory situation 
without promoting a more effective coverage of the interests of the victims.
49
 The directive that 
finally was adopted by the Parliament on 11 March 2009 was an amended version of the 
Proposal called the directive on the insurance of ship owners for maritime claims.
50
 Even 
though it will require all owners to maintain insurance against damage to third parties caused 
by their ships in respect of the applicable limits under the LLMC 76/96,
51
 it does not provide 
the third parties with a better right to compensation in form of higher limits of liability. 
Nevertheless; as a consequence of the judgment delivered by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) on 24 June 2008 as a reference for a preliminary ruling,52 
the owner of spilled oil cargo may in the future be held liable as the «previous 
holder» of «waste», cf. (EC) Directive 75/442 on waste.
53
 This basis for liability 
is briefly discussed in Chapter IV10.4.2. This is a legal measure that also will be 
applicable in Norway due to the EEA Agreement.
54
 
Besides this potential basis for liability outside the Oil Pollution Conventions, 
the EC Council Regulation 44/2001
55
 (Brussels I Regulation) will have direct 
impact on the IMO regime within the area of jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement of judgments. This Regulation only applies to EU Member States, 
and is further discussed in Chapter IV10.8. 
 
                                           
47
 COD (2005) 0242 
48
 Common Position (EC) No 29/2008 adopted by the Council on 9 December 2008 with a 
view to the adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
insurance of shipowners for maritime claims, OJ 2008 C 330, p. 11 
49
 OJ 2008 C 330, p. 11 
50
 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/safety/third_maritime_safety_package_en.htm [1 
June 2009] 
51
 The adopted legislative text has yet to be published in the OJ but a summary is available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/safety/doc/2009_03_11_package_3/fiche07_en.pdf  
[1 June 2009]. 
52
 Case C-188/07 Commune de Mesquer v Total France SA and Total International Ltd., 
[2008] ECR 4501, [2008] Lloyd's rep. 672 
53
 Council Directive 91/156/EEC amending Directive 75/442/EEC on waste – later partly 
amended by Directive 2006/12/EC on waste (OJ 1991 L 78, p. 32/ OJ 2006 L 114, p. 9), 
but the relevant provisions in this context remain the same. 
54
 The main EEA Agreement applies as Norwegian law; see Art 1 of the Norwegian EEA Act 
(Lov av 27. november 1992 nr. 109 (EØS-loven). The main Agreement includes a Chapter 
3 on Environment, which comprises Directive (EC) 75/442 on waste – and Directive 
2006/12/EC; see Art 74 of the EEA Agreement, cf. Annex XX. 
55 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1) 
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6 The Norwegian legal framework 
6.1 An introduction to Norwegian legal method 
The question of legal method reflects the scope of sources on which the 
solution of legal problems may be based, as well as the process of their 
interpretation and application to a specific legal problem.  
Even though most legal areas within Norwegian law are statutory regulated - 
at least to a certain extent,
56
 the provisions will often have a wording designed 
to cover many different cases, and thus be of a general or vague character. 
Another thing is that the text may be ambiguous and difficult to apply in a 
specific case without being coordinated with other legal sources. Within 
Norwegian law there is no exhaustive list of applicable legal sources, nor any 
statutory principles on their interpretation and application. One might however 
separate between the principal legal sources  applying directly as legal basis for 
the solution of a legal problem, sources like a statutory act or non-statutory 
principles on tort law evolved through case law; and the legal sources from 
which arguments are extracted in order to interpret an unclear, principal legal 
source.
57
 
An illustrating example can be found in the judgment «Tsesis».
58
 Even though 
it was delivered by the Swedish and not the Norwegian Supreme Court, it is 
still representative for the Norwegian legal method of interpretation within civil 
law because of the Nordic legal cooperation within this field.
59
 The case 
concerned a Soviet tanker which hit an unmarked, submerged rock in Swedish 
waters on 26 October 1977. Her bottom was damaged by the impact, and about 
600 tonnes of heavy fuel oil escaped the ship and caused extensive pollution 
damage.
60
 The Swedish State claimed the Soviet owners for compensation, but 
these argued that they were to be exonerated from liability by virtue of the 
                                           
56
  Principles of general tort law are developed through case law and are only to a certain 
extent made statutory; see the Act relating to compensation in certain circumstances (Act 
of 13 June 1969 No. 26, Skadeserstatningsloven/ SKL). 
57
  Eckhoff, Thorstein and Jan E. Helgesen. Rettskildelære. 5. ed, Oslo, 2001 p. 20 and 23. The 
term «source of law» might be slightly misleading, as the term applied by Eckhoff & 
Helgesen is «rettskildefaktor», which reflects that neither of the sources provides complete 
solutions, but material for further reasoning and considerations, see p. 23  
58
 Nordiske Domme i Sjøfartsanliggender ND-1983-1/ Swedish Supreme Court NJA 1983-1 
59
 See the Art 4 of the Treaty of Cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden 1962 (The Helsinki Treaty); «The High Contracting Parties shall continue 
their cooperation in the field of law with the aim of attaining the greatest possible 
uniformity in the field of private law». See also Falkanger & Bull (2004) p. 4. 
60
  ND 1983 p. 1, p. 1 
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Swedish act implementing the CLC 69, and especially because the ship only ran 
aground and consequently caused the damage because of the negligence of the 
Swedish Government in respect of the maintenance of «other navigational 
aids», cf. Article III.2(c).
61
 The Court found that it was negligent of the 
Government not to mark the shoal on the chart, and the question was whether 
a marine chart qualified as a «navigational aid» within the meaning of the 
Convention.
62
 In their interpretation, the Court did not only seek arguments 
from the wording of the Swedish implementing provision, its legislative context 
and the national preparatory works,  but also from the original text of the 
convention, and its preparatory works.
63
 Besides, since the provision was a 
result of an English proposal, it was also sought interpreted in the light of legal 
English, their legislative method and particular English principles of 
interpretation as discussed in domestic legal literature and by the national 
courts.
64
 However, as the English legal theory and case law rendered the 
conditions and scope of application of the principle in question unclear (the 
ejusdem generis rule), and it also lacked an equivalent in continental law, the 
Court found that the this interpretation would not be valued as a very 
important argument in the process of clarifying the extent of the Swedish 
provision in this particular matter.
 65
 In the following, the Court resorted to the 
natural understanding of the term «navigational aid» which they considered to 
include marine charts – and ended up with this as a final conclusion because of 
the importance of the wording, and the fact that such an interpretation was 
found to be in accordance with the with the purpose of the provision as such, 
and with the convention as a whole. In the preceding process of clarifying the 
relationship between such an interpretation and the purpose, the Court sought 
for arguments in the international preparatory works, in statements from the 
people participating in the drafting of the CLC, in the position taken in the 
Norwegian preparatory works and in general policy considerations.
 66
 
This example shows that a wide range of different sources might be 
considered relevant for the interpretation of a provision; be it national, foreign, 
international, statutory or non-statutory. It also illustrates that the decisive 
aspect lies in the final weighing of the relevant sources respective importance, 
                                           
61
  ND 1983 p. 1, p. 1 
62
  ibid. p. 19 
63
  ibid. p. 20 
64
  ibid. p. 22-23 
65
  ibid. p. 24-25 
66
  ibid. p. 25-26 
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or «weight».
67
 This aspect depends on the underlying principles of 
interpretation developed through case law – and the other types of legal sources 
providing guidance on the particular problem in question.
68
 
As described under Chapter II4.2, particular consideration applies to the 
interpretation and application of incorporated international law. The referred 
«Tsesis» judgment gives an example of the scope of legal sources that might be 
relevant their interpretation, and the relationship between Norwegian law and 
international law – denominated by the term dualism – is further discussed 
under Chapter III8.1.   
6.2 The Norwegian framework on an injured party's 
right to compensation for oil pollution damage 
caused by ships 
The principle legislation within the field of maritime law is assembled in the 
Norwegian Maritime Act of 1994 (NMC).
69
 Because of the international 
cooperation within the area of shipping, the content and structure of the Act is 
to a great extent shaped after ratified international conventions. The Act can 
also be described as a Nordic project, as it has been developed in cooperation 
with other Scandinavian countries as part of the referred Nordic legal 
cooperation.
70
 
The Oil Pollution Conventions are all enacted into Norwegian law through 
Chapter 10 NMC. Part I
71
 covers the implementation of the Bunkers 
Convention and part II
72
 of the CLC 92. The 1992 Fund Convention and the 
2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol are also enacted through Chapter 10 Part 
II, but apart from a few provisions,
73
 they are incorporated by referral in 
Section 201 NMC (Chapter 10, part II).
74
 The link between the implemented 
Bunkers Convention and the limits pursuant to the LLMC 76/96 as the 
selected
75
 regime on the global limitation of claims for compensation for bunker 
                                           
67
  Eckhoff (2001) p. 22-30, see also Boe, Erik. Grunnleggende juridisk metode. En 
introduksjon til rett og rettstenkning. Oslo, 2005, p. 84-85.  
68
  This topic is thoroughly discussed in Eckhoff (2001). 
69
  Lov om sjøfarten (sjøloven) av 24. juni 1994 nr. 39 
70
 Falkanger & Bull (2004) p. 4; see also footnote 59  
71
 Sections 183 – 190 NMC 
72
 Sections 191 – 209 NMC 
73
 See Section 202 NMC on oil receivers' duty to contribute to the IOPC Funds and Section 
204 NMC on the jurisdiction of Norwegian courts in civil action against the IOPC Funds.   
74
  The reason for applying different methods of incorporation is discussed in Chapter III8.1. 
75
 Art 6 Bunkers Convention 
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oil pollution damage resulting from the same incident is established through 
Section 185.2 NMC. This provision states that Chapter 9 NMC; through which 
the substantial rules of the LLMC 76/96 are implemented, shall apply in 
regards of the limitation of the ship owner’s liability.  
General rules on civil liability for pollution damage can also be found in 
Chapter 8 of the Norwegian Pollution Control Act 1981 (NPCA). Even if this 
Act in principle is applicable to oil spill pollution damage, Section 53 NPCA 
states that it will lack applicability whenever there are other, particular rules 
regulating the pollution liability (lex specialis). This is the case with most of the 
components within the question of compensation for oil pollution damage 
caused by ships, as Chapter 10 NMC regulate which is the liable subject, the 
liability,
76
 its limitation and the channelling of liability. However, the question 
of the damage or interests subject to compensation after a spill is not 
thoroughly regulated in the NMC and might be supplied by Sections 57 and 58 
NPCA.
77
  
In regard of the regulation of the liability for oil pollution damage outside the 
scope of the incorporated Oil Pollution Conventions, the Norwegian legislator 
has opted for an extension of the international measures so that they apply as 
internal legislation. As a result, general principles of tort law will only 
supplement the interpretation of the statutory provisions regulating the civil 
liability for oil pollution damage caused by ships.
78
  
 
 
 
7 The Spanish legal framework 
7.1 An introduction to the legal method applicable in 
Spain  
Spanish law is principally supported by statutory law in a broad sense (codes, 
laws and other regulations) and to a lesser extent by judicial decisions and 
customs. In contrast to the Norwegian, unlimited material of legal sources, the 
                                           
76
 By referral to Chapter 9 in regards of claims subject to the implemented Bunkers 
Convention, see Section 185.2 NMC 
77
 Falkanger & Bull (2004) p. 178. See Chapter IV10.2. 
78
  See however the discussion in Chapter IV10.4.2 on the vicarious State liability pursuant to 
Section 2.1 SKL as a potential base of liability outside the CLC 92 and the Bunkers 
Convention. 
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Spanish sources of law are exhaustively listed in the Article 1.1 of the Civil 
Code (CC)
79
. The included sources consist of law as a written rule created by 
the State, custom rules, and general principles of law.
80
 The definition law as a 
written rule does not only embrace rules created by the State's legislative 
power, but also rules created by the Government and the Public Administration 
in the exercise of their executive power. «Ley, thus, is any written rule of law 
created by the State. »
81
  
Case law is not listed in the Article 1.1 CC, and is not formally considered to 
be an ordinary source of law. However, according to Article 1.6 CC, any 
decision containing principles established by the Spanish Supreme Court in 
relation to the interpretation and application of the ordinary body of laws, 
custom rules and general principles of law will be a complementary source of 
law.  This means that in contrast to the sources included in the Article 1.1 CC, 
case law does not create law, but establish norms of interpretation.
82
 These legal 
solutions affirmed throughout a number of judgments are called doctrina 
jurisprudencial.83 Even though the CC has not given these principles a central 
position within the sources of law, they still have gained an important position 
within practical Spanish legal method.
84
  
Just as the Art 1 CC list the applicable sources of law, some general principles 
on their interpretation and application are also found within the first Chapter 
of the Code. The central principal is that all legal provisions must be interpreted 
according to the normal understanding of its wording, within the context, the 
legislative history and the social reality of the time in which it is to be applied.
85
 
Even though the Spanish legal method formally has a more restrictive definition 
                                           
79
 Código Civil de 24 de julio 1889. BOE núm. 206 de 25/07/1889. 
80
  The CC itself is considered to be a subsidiary source of law, see Art 4.2 CC and Merino-
Blanco (2006) p. 3. 
81 
Merino-Blanco, Elena. Spanish Law and Legal System. 2. ed. Sweet & Maxwell, London 
2006, pp. 31 – 32. For an English explanation of the various types of law, see Merino-
Blanco (2006) pp. 32 – 42. 
82 
There is an ongoing discussion in Spain on whether or not case law can be regarded as a 
source of law. See for instance Benítez, Óscar Daniel Ludeña. El valor vinculante de la 
jurisprudencia antes y después de la Ley 1/2000, de Enjuiciamiento Civil. In: Noticias 
Jurídicos/ Artículos Doctrinales: Derecho Procesal Civil (online) with further references on 
http://noticias.juridicas.com/articulos/60-Derecho%20Procesal%20Civil/200201-
75572901022280.html [1 June 2009] 
83
 Nieto García, Alejandro. Valor Legal y Alcance Real de la Jurisprudencia. In: Teoría y 
realidad constitucional. Madrid, núm. 8-9, 2001-2002, p. 103-116; p. 104. 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/trcons/cont/8/art/art5.pdf [1 June 
2009] ] 
84
 Arroyo Ignacio. Curso de derecho marítimo. 2. ed. Madrid, 2005, p. 65, Nieto García 
(2001) p. 110-111 
85
  Art 3.1 CC 
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of legal sources than the Norwegian method, this principle indicates that the 
process of interpretation might be quite similar in both States. Even though a 
preparatory work will not be considered as a source of law, a statement 
provided in such a document might have effect on the final interpretation of the 
actual source of law as part of its legislative history. Another example of this 
resemblance between the systems is that the Spanish legal method, in contrary 
to the Norwegian, does not denominate policy considerations as a source of 
law. Article 3.2 does however provide for a principle of interpretation called 
«equidad», which refers to the justice of the case. This principle will only apply 
to the interpretation performed by a court, and implies that it must adapt the 
rule of law to the circumstances of the actual case.
86
 The application of this type 
of policy considerations even seems to go further than in Norwegian law, as the 
principle also refers to a potential mitigation of the consequences of the rule of 
law in a particular case.
87
 Other examples on the resemblance of the Norwegian 
and Spanish legal method are the principles on the collision of rules which are 
commented on in Chapter III9.  
Another aspect of the Spanish legal method is the impact of Community law, 
and the division of legislative and executive competence is between the Central 
Public Authorities and independent areas called Autonomous Communities.
88
 
The latter division is of no current interest to the topic of this thesis, while the 
impact of Community law on the interpretation and application of the Oil 
Pollution Conventions will be discussed in relation to the topics mentioned in 
Chapter II5. 
The relationship between Spanish law and international law which is 
characterized as a system of monism will be discussed in chapter III8.2. 
7.2 The Spanish framework on an injured party's right 
to compensation for oil pollution damage caused by 
ships 
Even though maritime trade has been important to the Spanish community for 
centuries, maritime law is not a legislative autonomous legal area, and the 
applicable legislation is spread out in many different acts of law. Because of the 
commercial aspect of maritime law, the core legislation is still found in the 
                                           
86
  See Merino-Blanco (2006) p. 54-55 
87
  Merino-Blanco (2006) p. 54-55 
88 
Art 2 CE and Arts 143 – 158 CE («De las Comunidades Autónomas»). See Vaquer, Antoni. 
Spain. In: Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law/ edited by Jan M. Smits. Cheltenham; 
Edward Elgar Publishing 2006, p. [672]-676,  p. 672 – 673. 
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Commercial Code, promulgated in 1885.
89
 Other applicable provisions are 
found within the classical legal disciplines civil, administrative and criminal 
law.
90
 Because of the extent international cooperation within maritime law, a 
great part of the corresponding legislation consists of incorporated international 
conventions.
91
 The current legislative situation has however been subject to 
revision,
92
  and the draft law will be commented upon below.  
The Spanish legal system follows a monistic approach to international 
conventions, and the CLC 92,
93
 the 1992 Fund Convention,
94
 the 2003 
Supplementary Fund Protocol,
95
 the Bunkers Convention,
96
 and the LLMC 
76/96
97
 have all been incorporated throughout their publication in the official 
State gazette Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE).98 It is the conventions as such 
that form part of the national legislation, and their provisions will be of direct 
application. This is possible because Spanish is one of the authentic languages 
in which the IMO Conventions are drafted.
99
 When international provisions 
have been enacted in the Spanish legislation through their publication, the self-
executing rules will create rights and obligations which can be invoked by all 
natural and legal persons. Some provisions may however lack a character 
suitable for direct application, and will thus require further legal elaboration. 
This task usually
100
 corresponds to the Parliament as State Legislator, and the 
supplementary provisions will usually be adopted in a Real Decreto; a Royal 
                                           
89
  Código de Comercio de 22 de agosto de 1885, BOE núm. 289 de 29/12/1978. The text is 
based on the Commercial Code of 1829. The main difference between the Codes is the 
adoption of means suitable for ships driven by steam, not sails.  
90
  Fontestad, Portalés, Leticia. El transporte marítimo de mercancias y sus incidencias 
procesales. Doctorate thesis, directed by Juan Antonio Robles Garzón. Universidad de 
Málaga, España, 2004, http://www.sci.uma.es/bbldoc/tesisuma/16698836.pdf [1 June 
2009] p. 461 
91
  For a detailed overview of the legislative situation in Spanish maritime, law, see Arroyo 
(2005) p. 85-102  
92
  «Proyecto de Ley General de Navegación Marítima» (PLGNM) 
93
  BOE núm. 225 de 20/09/1995 
94
  BOE núm. 244 de 11/10/1997 
95
  BOE núm. 28 de 02/02/2005 
96
  BOE núm, 43 de 19/02/2008 
97
  BOE núm. 50 de 28/02/2005   
98
  This process if further discussed in Chapter III8.2. 
99
 See for instance Art 18 of the 1992 Protocol to the CLC 69, Art XXI CLC 69, Art 19 
Bunkers Convention, Art 23 LLMC 76 and Art 15 LLMC 96. 
100
 If the material in question affects the constitutional competence of the Autonomous 
Communities, cf. Art 148 CE, the further elaboration will be carried out by the 
autonomous legislator, see Díez de Velasco Vallejo, Manuel. Instituciones de Derecho 
Internacional Público. 16. ed., Madrid, 2007, p. 254.  
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decree. One example is the R.D. 1795/2008
101
, through which the Government 
establishes norms of the handling and control of certificates attesting that 
insurance or other financial security is in force in accordance with Art 7 of the 
Bunkers Convention. A similar decree was adopted in relation to the CLC 92 
which also demands the use of such certificates.
102
  
As of today, there is no particular Spanish regulation regarding the liability 
for damage caused by maritime accidents.
103
  Any liability for damage falling 
outside the scope of the Oil Pollution Conventions, will be subject to provisions 
of a general character, such as the general rule of fault within tort law,
104
 civil 
liability deriving from a criminal offence,
105
 and the rules on the strict liability of 
the Spanish Public Authorities for the wrongful functioning of public services.
106
 
According to Article 139 LRJAP, all individuals have a right to compensation 
for damage suffered in relation to their property or rights, whenever such 
damage is the result of the operation of public services and not of force 
majeure. This particular rule on the State's strict liability will be commented 
upon and compared to the corresponding Norwegian rule on vicarious State 
liability in Chapter IV10.4.3. 
                                           
101 
R.D. 1795/2008, de 3 de noviembre, por el que se dictan normas sobre la cobertura de la 
responsabilidad civil por daños causados por la contaminación de los hidrocarburos para 
combustible de los buques. BOE núm. 278 de 18/11/2008 
102 
CLC 92 Art VII, and Real Decreto 1892/2004, de 10 de septiembre, por el que se dictan 
normas para la ejecución del Convenio Internacional sobre la responsabilidad civil 
derivada de daños debidos a la contaminación de las aguas del mar por hidrocarburos. 
This R.D. has later been amended in order to correspond better to the rules of R.D. 
1795/2008, see the R.D. 1795/2008, first final disposition. 
103
 Castro Rey, Consuelo. El Derecho marítimo y los sistemas compensatorios: a propósito del 
Prestige. Discurso para las 1as primeras Jornadas Científicos-Técnicas de lucha contra la 
contaminación marítima, 26 – 27 de octubre, 2006 (Galicia). 
http://www.mpr.es/NR/rdonlyres/8FAC325B-CD71-4283-8795-
CBAE34A7BC81/81466/JavierSu%C3%A1rezElDerechomar%C3%ADtimoylossistemasco
mpensat.pdf  [1 June 2009] p. 3 
104
 Art 1902 CC: «Whoever causes damage to another with fault or negligence is obliged to 
repair the damage caused»; translation taken from Merino-Blanco (2006) p. 251.  
105
  Arts 119 -121 CP; see also Chapter IV10.3.1 
106
 Art 139 et seq of Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de Régimen Jurídico de las 
Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común (LRJAP); BOE 
núm. 285 de 27/11/1992. See also Pulido, Juan L. Compensation by the Coast States – The 
Prestige Disaster. In: Prevention and Compensation, edited by Basedow/ Magnus, in series: 
Hamburg studies on maritime affairs vol. 10, Berlin 2007, p. [151]–169, p. 164 and 
Coderch, Pablo Salvador … [et al.]. El Derecho Español de Daños en 2005: Características 
Diferenciales. In: Global Jurist Topics, Volume 6/1 2006 (online). Published by The 
Berkeley Electronic Press. http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/ [1 June 2009] p. 1 [Coderch 
(2006) B].  This basis of liability is discussed in Chapter IV10.4.2. 
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7.3 Preparations for a Spanish Maritime Code 
The entire Spanish body of legislation related to maritime law has been subject 
to revision for the past years, and on 19 December 2008, the Congress 
approved on a Draft Law for a General Spanish Maritime Code (PLGNM). 
Since then, it has been awaiting the reading and potential amendments of the 
Senate.
107
 
If adopted, the new Maritime Code will gather and update the Spanish 
legislation within maritime law.
108
 In contrast to the national, maritime 
legislation which will be fully implemented in the new Code, any ratified 
Convention will continue to be an individual source of law. The situation with a 
multitude of sources might however improve if the majority of the 
supplementary, national sources are found in one single act. 
The main features of the PLGNM within the scope of civil liability for 
pollution damage is that the concept of the CLC 92 in respect of strict 
liability,
109
 mandatory insurance and the right of direct action against the 
insurer
110
 is extended to a wide range of different types of marine pollution 
caused by ships and other maritime constructions.
111
 The scope of 
compensatory damage is however defined in accordance with the CLC 92.
112
 As 
these provisions only aim to supply the Oil Pollution Conventions113 the Code 
will not have any direct effect of their interpretation and application. However, 
in regard of oil pollution damage outside their scope of application,
114
 these 
provisions will provide a similar regime as the one applicable under Norwegian 
law. 
 
 
 
                                           
107
  The closing date has been extended on a weekly basis since February 2009, and is currently 
2. June 2009, see BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados, seria A Proyectos de ley, de 
27/05/2009, núm. 14-16. 
108
  Preliminary Recitals (PLGNM) p. 3 
109
  Art 415 PLGNM 
110
  Art 418 PLGNM 
111
  Art 413 cf. 62 PLGNM 
112
  Art 417 PLGNM 
113
  Art 420.1 PLGNM. The provisions will also supply the International convention on 
liability and compensation for damage in connection with the carriage of hazardous and 
noxious substances by sea of 1996 (HNS) which is not yet in force. 
114
  See Chapter IV10.1 
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III  
International and national law    
International conventions can be said to possess a double legal dimension. This 
is reflected in the fact that they for one oblige a Contracting State to comply 
with the agreed material in relation to other contracting States, and secondly by 
the circumstance that these States will need to enact any ratified convention in 
their national legislation in order to fulfil their international duty. The 
execution of this latter dimension is governed by internal rules, and can cause 
divergence between Contracting States in terms of methodical aspects related to 
the interpretation and application of international provisions. In the following I 
will discuss the national methods applied when ratified international 
conventions are converted into National and Spanish law and later coordinated 
with internal provisions. 
 
8 The national approach to international law 
8.1 Norwegian law and international law: dualism 
The Norwegian approach to the implementation of international conventions is 
based on duality between national and international law. This means that 
Norwegian law and international law in principle are two separate legal 
systems.
115
 Even if the State is legally bound by its ratification of a convention, 
the provisions do not automatically govern Norwegian natural or legal persons. 
If a national norm should be divergent from a provision in a ratified but not 
implemented international treaty, the starting point is that the national rule will 
be given precedence over the international rule. The content of the conventions 
will have to be implemented through national law by Norwegian legislators in 
order to obtain the same status as the rest of the national legal acts. 
                                           
115
  Andenæs (2006) p. 31, Ruud & Ulfstein (2006), NOU 1972:16 Gjennomføring av 
lovkonvensjoner I norsk rett p. 32, Rt-2007-234 paragraph (54), cf. Rt-2000-1811 
«Finanger I», Rt-2000-996 «Bøhler» p. 2006 and Rt-1997-580 «OFS» 
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The impact of this starting point is however diminished by the principle of 
presumption, which is developed through case law and implies that Norwegian 
legislation is presumed to be in accordance with international law.
116
  
If the application of a Norwegian provision interpreted in accordance with its 
wording should result in divergence with applicable international law, the court 
will apply a restrictive interpretation of the internal provision so that the final 
application is in accordance with the corresponding international law.
117
 This 
method does however presuppose that the provision can be interpreted in 
different ways, and that the legislator has not intended for the internal rule to 
diverge from the international.
 118
  
The impact of this principle on national legislation will further depend on the international 
provision and of the legal area to which the national rule belongs. Generally it can be said that 
the Norwegian rule will be considered to have little impact if it collides with an international 
obligation protecting citizens from the intervention of the State, while the impact of the 
national rule will be quite strong if the international obligation intervene in the legal 
relationships of private parties.119  
However, these problems of interpretation are easily avoided by enacting the 
international provisions in the Norwegian system through the decision of a 
competent body of the State. This task is usually completed by the legislative 
body; the Parliament. Two of the most applied methods of implementation 
consist of either to include the substantial content of the national convention in 
a national act of law (transformation/ implementation), or by stating, within the 
wording of a national law, that the international treaty shall be applicable as 
Norwegian law (incorporation). A third method is called «sector monism», 
which means that a national act will be subject to the limitations recognised in 
international law, or to limitations deriving from an agreement made with a 
                                           
116 
See Ruud & Ulfstein (2006) Chapter 5, and Fleischer, Carl August. Folkerett. 8. ed. Oslo, 
2005, p. 360. The principle of presumption has traditionally only included general 
international law, and not ratified but not incorporated treaties. It is disputed whether the 
principle of presumption can justify an interpretation in conformance with ratified but not 
enacted international law, see Fleischer (2005) p. 361, Andenæs (2006) p. 32 and 
Ot.prp.nr.79 (1991-1992) Om lov om endringer i lov 20. juli 1893 nr. 1 om sjøfarten mm., 
p. 3. Nevertheless; based on the wide understanding of relevant sources of law within the 
Norwegian legal method, a court might place emphasis on the existing international 
obligation when interpreting an internal provision - without resorting to the principle of 
presumption.  
117
 Ot.prp.nr.79 (1991-1992) p. 3  
118 
Mestad, Ola. Rettens kilder og anvendelse. In: Knophs oversikt over Norges rett, 13th ed., 
Oslo 2009 p. 22, Ruud & Ulfstein (2006) p. 64, Eckhoff (2001) p. 317, see also 
Rt-2000-1811 «Finanger I» p. 1831, paragraph 7 
119 
See Rt-2000-1811, p. 1829 
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foreign State.
120
 This method is not applied in the incorporation of any of the 
Oil Pollution Conventions, and will not be further discussed.  
An example of active transformation is the implementation of the Bunkers 
Convention and the CLC 92 into the NMC Chapter 10 parts I and II 
respectively. The international provisions establishing rights or obligations are 
reproduced in Norwegian, and adapted to fit in with the rest of the NMC. In 
contrast, notwithstanding that some of the provisions under the Funds 
Conventions are separately implemented in Chapter 10.II NMC, the 1992 Fund 
Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol are incorporated 
through referral in Section 201 NMC. The provision reads: 
«In addition to the damages an injured party can obtain [from the owner/insurer], 
he or she is entitled to damages according to the provisions of the 1992 Fund 
Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. Both the 1992 Fund 
Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol have statutory force. » 
When the CLC 69 and 1971 Fund Convention were enacted in Norwegian law, 
the decision to implement the first and incorporate the latter was justified by 
the nature of the respective Conventions, see NOU 1973:46 p. 16.  One of the 
principal reasons for which the CLC 69 was implemented, was that its 
provisions would be of interest to all potential injured parties as well as the 
liable persons, and secondly that some of the rules under the Convention could 
be hard to comprehend in its original form. Another objective was to facilitate 
the extension of some of the international provisions.
121
 As for the 1971 Fund 
Convention, it was upheld that its provisions would only apply on very few 
occasions. Another argument for incorporating this Convention by reference 
was that many of its provisions governed the rights and obligations of the 1971 
IOPC, and consequently had little impact on the national level. The few 
provisions that were implemented, related to the oil receivers' contribution to 
the Fund, as well as rules on jurisdiction.
122
 The same considerations apply 
today.   
  
                                           
120 
Section 4 of the Norwegian Criminal Procedures Act and Section 1-2 of the Norwegian 
Dispite Act are examples of provisions establishing sector monism. These internal acts are 
among other things influenced by incorporated human rights conventions and the Lugano 
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters of 1988 (Lugano Convention)  
121
 See Chapter IV10.1 
122
 See Sections 278 and 280 of the Maritime Act of 1893, annulled by the entry in force of the 
NMC and the current Sections 202 and 204 NMC. 
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8.2 Spanish law and international law: monism 
The relationship between Spanish, internal law and international law follows 
the monistic system. In contrast to the Norwegian system, the Spanish 
Constitution has made this approach statutory. Article 96.1 CE reads:  
«Validly concluded international treaties, once officially published in Spain, shall form 
part of the internal legal order. (…)» 
The wording of this provision implies that no further action from the national 
legislator or from any other body of the State is required in order to confer 
binding force on an international agreement.
123
 When the State has ratified a bi- 
or multilateral convention, it is in principle applicable on the same level as 
other national law. However, it is a requirement that the ratified convention 
must be «officially published». The same condition is repeated in Article 
1.5 CC, through the statement that no legal rules provided in an international 
treaty will be of direct application in Spain before it has been «integrally 
published»
124
 in BOE. The act of publication corresponds to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.
125
 Based on this, one could characterize the 
Spanish system as moderately monistic.
126
 
When international provisions have been enacted in the Spanish legislation 
through their publication, the self-executing rules will create rights and 
obligations which can be invoked by all natural and legal persons. Some 
provisions may however lack a character suitable for direct application, and 
will thus require further legal elaboration.
127
 This task usually
128
 corresponds to 
the Parliament as State Legislator.
129
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Merino-Blanco p. 34 
124
 Meaning that it is not only the text of the conventions that must be published, but also the 
instrument of adhesion and all other annexes or documents related to the treaty, cf. 
Decreto 801/1972, de 24/03, sobre ordenación de la actividad de la Administración del 
Estado en materia de Tratados Internacionales, BOE núm. 85 de 08/04/1972. 
125
 See Decreto 801/1972 and Real Decreto 1124/2008, de 4 de julio, por el que se desarrolla 
la estructura orgánica básica del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, BOE 
núm. 165 de 09/07/2008. 
126
  Díez de Velasco (20007) p. 246  
127
 See examples under Chapter II7.2 
128
 If the material in question affects the constitutional competence of the Autonomous 
Communities, cf. Art 148 CE, the further elaboration will be carried out by the 
autonomous legislator, see Díez de Velasco (2007) p. 254.  
129
 Whenever the competence lies with the Parliament, they have a general constitutional right 
to «delegate to the Government the power to issue rules with the force of an act of the 
Parliament on specific matters (…) », cf. Art 82.1 CE. The only exception is the material 
that need to be adopted in a Ley orgánica, which covers «the implementation of 
fundamental rights and public freedoms, those approving the Statutes of Autonomy and 
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8.3 Does the dualist and monist approach as such 
represent any substantial difference between the 
regimes? 
The different methods applied as a consequence of Spanish monism and 
Norwegian dualism results in international conventions being directly 
applicable as Spanish law following their publication in BOE, while the 
corresponding Norwegian source will consist of either the Convention as 
incorporated by referral, or national provisions rendering the content of the 
Conventions through the method of implementation. When the different 
methods of incorporation are seen in connection with the seemingly 
adversative systems of monism and dualism, it might be reasonably to assume 
that the two systems represent clear differences. In my opinion it is however the 
applicable national legal method and other substantial rules of law - not the 
systems of monism or dualism, that ultimately might result in a divergent 
interpretation of the same international provision.
130
 
The clear difference between the Spanish direct application and the 
Norwegian incorporation lies in the Spanish incorporation being carried out 
through the Government's publication of the Convention and the Norwegian 
dualism's requirement of the convention being enacted by the Parliament as 
legislator. This results in the direct applicability of the convention in Spain, 
while a Norwegian court would have to go by way of the internal incorporating 
provision.
131
 Nevertheless; as this connecting link between national law and 
international law usually will lack substantial content other than providing for 
the incorporation, the final result will be that a court in both Norway and Spain 
would resolve directly to the convention as such.
132
 At the same time, the 
convention will constitute a national source of law in both States, and may thus 
be subject to the national legal method when it comes to interpreting unclear 
provisions. However, even though the Norwegian legal method prescribes an 
interpretation based on an unlimited range of relevant sources, the court will 
probably be conscious of the international nature of the rules and thus apply an 
interpretation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969 (VCLT), Articles 31 – 33. Even though this international 
                                                                                                                               
the general electoral system and other laws provided for in the Constitution.», cf. Art 81.1 
CE 
130
 See also NOU 1972:16 p. 16  
131
 Such as Section 201 NMC which incorporates the CLC 92 and the 2003 Supplementary 
Fund Protocol. 
132
 NOU 1972:16 p. 63 
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Instrument has not been ratified by Norway, it will be applicable as a 
codification of existing customary international law in accordance with the 
principle of presumption.
133
 Spain is a Contracting Party to the VCLT,
134
 and 
the particular rules on the interpretation of international conventions are 
directly applicable.
135
 
It is likely that the same type of interpretation will be applied to provisions 
enacted in Norwegian law through the method of implementation. The 
principal reason for why the interpretation should not correspond to the 
international regime is that the emphasis of the provisions as international 
measures might disappear when they are integrated within the context of 
internal provisions regulating the same material. However, unless the 
implementing provision provides otherwise, there is no reason for why a 
Norwegian court should not apply an interpretation in accordance with 
international general principles. A factor that might affect the interpretation is 
that the international provision will be interpreted in accordance with the 
context in which it is implemented. Still, this is not a consequence of the system 
of dualism, as the Spanish legislator also may have adopted measures that affect 
the interpretation of an international convention. The impact of the internal 
legislation is a topic that will be discussed in relation to the Oil Pollution 
Conventions in Part IV, and must be kept separate from the effects caused by 
the system of monism and dualism as such.  
Even though courts in both Norway and Spain will seek to apply an 
interpretation of enacted international provisions that support a uniform 
application of the international regime, the final result may in theory be affected 
by the hierarchical position of the incorporated provision within the national 
legislation. This aspect is not a result of monism or dualism, but of general 
national principles on the collision of rules, and will be discussed below. 
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See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Reports 1997 p. 7, as well as 
Ruud & Ulfstein (2006) p. 92, Andenæs (2006) p. 308 and NOU 1972:16 p. 63. See also 
Chapter II4.2. 
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 BOE núm. 142 de 13/06/1980 
135
 See also the Art 2-2 of the draft law Proyecto de Ley General de la Navegación Marítima, 
which states that the court must be conscious of the international conventions applying 
within the material covered by the act, and be determined to promote uniformity through 
its interpretation and application.  
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9 International provisions in a national context 
The existence of both internal and incorporated international provisions within 
a national legal system might create situations in which a legal problem seems 
to be governed by two different sets of rules.
 136
 In such a case, the applicable 
provisions must be interpreted in accordance with internal principles on the 
coordination of international provisions within national law. As incorporated 
international provisions form part of the national law, these principles will to a 
certain extent be the same that applies to other national legislation. However, 
the nature of international conventions as a tool applied to coordinate the 
rights and obligations within certain legal areas call for particular measures to 
protect the uniformity from national degrading. In this Chapter, I will look at 
the level of protection provided by the Norwegian and Spanish legal system.  
The discussion will relate to the stage by which it is clear that the national and 
the incorporated provisions cannot be interpreted in accordance with one 
another; a situation referred as «total inconsistency» in Norwegian legal 
literature.
137
  This term refers to two or more inconsistent provisions governing 
exactly the same legal problem so that neither of them can be subject to a 
restrictive interpretation.  
In order to decide which of the two provisions that shall prevail and thus 
apply to the legal problem in question, both the Norwegian and the Spanish 
court will apply the principles of lex superior, lex posterior and lex specialis.138 
These are all non-statutory guidelines under Norwegian law, while the principle 
of lex superior and lex posterior have been made statutory through the Spanish 
Civil Code.
139
 The principle of lex specialis has been established as a part of the 
Spanish legal method through the case law of the Supreme Court.
140
 As 
mentioned in Chapter II7.1, case law may establish norms of interpretation 
even though it does not constitute a source of law.
141
 
According to the principle of lex posterior, new legislation will be given 
supremacy over an older regulating the same material. This starting point is 
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 This situation differs from the situation in which Norwegian law is sought to be interpreted 
in accordance with non-incorporated international law.  
137
 Eckhoff (2001) p. 346  
138 
See Eckhoff (2001) p. 343 and Boe (2005) p. 170 
139 
See Art 1.1 (Lex superior) and Art 2.2 (Lex posterior)  
140 
Tardío Pato, José Antonio. El principio de especialidad normativa (lex specialis) y sus 
aplicaciones jurisprudenciales. In: Revista de administración pública No. 162, 2003, p. 
[189] – 225.  http://www.cepc.es/rap/Publicaciones/Revistas/1/2003_162_189.pdf [1 June 
2009] p. 189. See for instance STS 28/02/2001.  
141 
Art 1.1 cf. Art 1.6 CC  
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amended by the principle of lex superior which implies that the new provision 
only will be able to derogate from the already existing one if it has been 
adopted by the same or higher authority and therefore possess the same or 
higher hierarchical status as the old act. A situation like this will normally be 
the case with ordinary acts of law adopted by the Parliament. Due to the 
principle of lex specialis, a new provision of the same or higher hierarchical 
status may however be prevented from derogating from an existing provision if 
the older provides regulation on a particular material, while the more recent 
one is of a general nature.
142
  
Pursuant to the principle of lex superior, the provision with the highest 
hierarchical status will prevail if the same legal material is governed by two 
provisions of different status. This means that an incorporated provision can be 
protected from later amendments by internal law if the legislator provides it 
with a higher hierarchical status.  
Under Norwegian law, the enacted, international provisions will obtain the 
same hierarchical position as the legal source through which it is transformed 
or incorporated.
143
 The implementing provision will normally be an ordinary act 
of law, even though an international obligation of the State theoretically may be 
enacted through a norm of lower or higher hierarchical status.
144
 It would also 
have been possible to implement a convention on a constitutional level, but this 
would require the cumbersome procedure of amending the Constitution.
145
  
Nevertheless, in relation to the incorporation of some international measures, 
the Norwegian legislator has Stated that these shall supersede ordinary 
legislation in case of divergence. This special rule applies to the incorporated 
Human Rights Conventions listed in Section 2 of the Norwegian Human Rights 
                                           
142
 Section 53 NPCS expresses the principle of lex specialis by stating that the rules on liability 
in Chapter 8 NPCS only will apply if no other legislation or contracts regulate the question 
of liability for environmental damage. The incorporated provisions of the CLC 92 and the 
Bunkers Convention in Chapter 10 NMC is therefore given precedence, see Chapter II6.2. 
Even though the Norwegian Pollution Control Act was adopted in 1981 and thus would 
not prevail the incorporated provisions of CLC 92 and the Bunkers Convention based on a 
interpretation in accordance with the principle of lex posterior, the precursory CLC 69 was 
implemented and in force at the time the NPCA was adopted. As a result, this can still 
apply as an illustrative example of the coherence between the principles of lex superior and 
lex posterior.  
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Eckhoff (2001) p. 310  
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See NOU 1972:16 p. 35 
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Section 112 NC. See also Section 110 c, which in general terms instructs the State to 
respect and secure human rights, but at the same time states that the implementation of 
human rights conventions must be carried out through an ordinary act of law. 
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Act,
146
 and provisions adopted to fulfil Norway's obligation under the EEA 
Agreement.
147
  
Even though this special rule does not apply to the Oil Pollution Conventions at the moment, 
one could ask what the situation would have been if the EU as an organ could and did become 
a contracting party to these Conventions. Would such an action cause the implemented 
provisions to gain supremacy over ordinary Norwegian legislation based on their nature as 
norms fulfilling Norway's obligations under the EEA Agreement?
148
 The answer relies on 
whether the content of the conventions can be said to form part of the main EEA Agreement, 
cf. Art 1 of the Norwegian EEA Act. The main Agreement includes a Chapter 3 on 
Environment, which embraces the "polluter pay" principle, and already embraces Directive 
(EC) 75/442 on waste – which might apply as legal basis for imposing liability on an oil cargo 
owner for oil pollution liability caused by the ship carrying the oil; see Article 74 of the EEA 
Agreement, cf. Annex XX. On this background, it is not unlikely that the implemented 
provisions the Oil Pollution Conventions would become part of the Agreement, and thus gain 
supremacy over ordinary, internal legislation. Likewise could one wonder whether an EEA 
relevant convention incorporated by reference also would have been given higher status than 
an ordinary act of law - even though no additional provisions had been adopted in order to 
fulfil Norway's obligation under the Conventions. These problems are highly theoretical, and 
are only meant to illustrate some of the implications that would have been caused on matters of 
legal technique if the EU as such was to become a Contracting Party to the Oil Pollution 
Conventions. 
As long as an international convention is not implemented into the Norwegian 
legislation on a constitutional level, Norwegian courts are entitled to perform a 
constitutional review in order to declare if the content of the incorporated 
international provisions contradicts the Constitution.
149
 This is a constitutional 
practise, affirmed through case law as provided by the Norwegian Supreme 
Court.
150
 The constitutional review is applicable to all legislation adopted by the 
Parliament, as well other substantial legislative acts like royal decrees
151
 and 
delegated legislation.
152
  
Within the Spanish regime, it is the Constitution alone that regulates the 
hierarchical position of all international provisions forming part of the national 
law. Article 95.1 CE establishes the rule that international conventions will 
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Cf. Section 3 of the Norwegian Human Rights Act (Menneskerettsloven av 21. mai 1999 
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Section 2 of the EEA Act (EØS-loven av 27. november 1992 nr. 109)  
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 Section 2 EEA Act 
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 The courts also have a right to perform a judicial review on the constitutionality as well as 
legality of decisions made by the Public Administration; see Andenæs (2006) p. 359 et seq. 
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See Andenæs (2006) p. 345 et seq. and Rt-2007-1308, especially section 35 – 42 with 
further references. 
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 Section 17 NC 
152
 Andenæs (2006) p. 357 
 33
have a status inferior to the Constitution, as «the conclusion of an international 
treaty containing stipulations contrary to the Constitution shall require prior 
constitutional amendment. » In accordance with Article 78.1 of the Ley 
Orgánica153 on the Constitutional Court (LOTC),154 The Constitutional Tribunal 
may give a judgement related to  
« (…) the existence or nonexistence of contradiction between the Constitution and 
the provisions of an international treaty which text is finally set, but to which the 
State has not given its consent to be bound. » 
Even though this provision describes a control prior to the ratification, an 
interpretation by negative implication is not to be applied: All international 
provision will pass as a part of the Spanish legal system through its publication 
in BOE, and consequently be subject to the same control that the Tribunal has 
the power to exercise over all Spanish legislation, cf. Article 161 CE and Article 
27.2 LOTC.
155
 If the Tribunal declares that all or some provisions of a treaty are 
unconstitutional and so inapplicable, the Government will have to take 
measures in order to modify the international obligations of the State.
156
 
In contrast to the Norwegian system in which enacted provisions get the 
same hierarchical status as their implementing source of law, the Spanish 
Constitution separates between passive and active legal impact of incorporated 
provisions. Besides inferiority to the Constitution, all enacted international 
provisions possess a passive or resistant legal force on the internal legislation in 
the sense that they cannot be derogated by domestic law.157 This ensures a 
convention's supremacy over both prior and subsequent legal acts,158 and 
implies that if a provision of a convention and an internal rule are in conflict, 
the international provision will prevail.159 However, in order for an international 
provision to obtain active legal impact and thus having the power to abrogate 
or modify a domestic legal provision, the convention as such must have been 
                                           
153
 See footnote 129 on p. 3 
154
 Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional de 03/10/1979, BOE núm. 239 de 05/10/1979. 
See also Art 95.2 CE.   
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 See Díez de Velasco (2007) p. 249, Merino-Blanco (2006) p. 36 
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 Merino-Blanco (2006) p. 36 
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 Art 96.1 CE 
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 Díez de Velasco (2007) p. 249 
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 Merino-Blanco (2006) p. 36. See also González Cabrera, Inmaculada. La limitación de la 
responsabilidad del naviero: Una aproximación al ámbito de las normas internas y las 
normas convencionales. In: Revista de Derecho Privado No. 10/2002, p. [725]-753; p. 790 
for further references to case law confirming the supremacy of International conventions 
over internal law. 
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approved by the Parliament prior to its ratification.160 This rule results from the 
interpretation of the Articles 94 and 96 CE. Article 94 CE lists the cases in 
which «the giving of the consent of the State to enter any commitment by 
means of treaty or agreement shall require prior authorization of the Cortes 
Generales». Among other specific cases listed, Article 94.1 States that this 
requirement will apply in general to «treaties or agreements which involve 
amendment or repeal of some law or require legislative measures for their 
execution».
161
 If this rule is seen in context with Article 96 which establishes the 
passive legal impact on domestic legislation of all incorporated international 
conventions, one may by deduction see that when the conclusion of an 
international agreement lies within the exclusive competence of the 
Government, their provisions will not obtain any active legal impact on 
domestic law.
162
 In other words: the Parliament's approval can be considered as 
an extension or delegation of the legislative powers.
163
 The Norwegian 
Constitution also contains rules on the Parliaments approval prior to 
ratification,
164
 but these are not connected with the hierarchical position an 
incorporated convention is given after its ratification and incorporation. 
This review has shown that while international provisions incorporated into 
the Norwegian legislation holds a status equal to the implementing norm, the 
Spanish regime assigns such provisions with a status higher than the ordinary 
legislation. If an existing incorporated provision and a more recent internal 
measure adopted through an ordinary act of law were to regulate the exact 
same material, these findings will result in the prevalence of the internal 
provision within Norwegian legislation, and of the international under Spanish 
law. However, even though the isolated application of the principle of lex 
superior indicates that the Spanish regime provides a better protection of the 
uniformity of international conventions, it would be wrong to say that it is 
jeopardised by the Norwegian method: One must also take into consideration 
the minimal risk of contradictory provisions as a result of the Norwegian 
legislator's aim to adopt laws in conformity with the State's international 
obligations.
165
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 Royo, Javier Pérez. Las Fuentes del Derecho. 5. ed., Madrid 2007, p. 170 and Merino-
Blanco (2006) p. 36  
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 Art 94.1.e CE 
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 Royo (2008) p. 170 - 171 
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  Sections 26.2 and 93 NC 
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 Even though this discussion is based on a situation with «total inconsistency» between the 
internal and incorporated provision, it can be noted that the incorporated provisions of the 
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IV  
Interpretation and application 
10 The Conventions within the national context  
Even though the Norwegian and Spanish methods of incorporation do not 
seem to represent any notable difference on the interpretation and application 
of incorporated international conventions, it is likely that this procedure will be 
affected by substantive, internal regulations. 
In this chapter I will focus on the interpretation of the Oil Pollution 
Conventions within the Norwegian and Spanish legal context. The discussion is 
related to the second part of the principal problem, namely whether the 
national interpretation of the Oil Pollution Conventions cause divergence 
between the Norwegian and Spanish rules on a third party's right to 
compensation for oil pollution damage caused by ships. I have divided this 
chapter into 9 subchapters in an attempt to reflect the central aspects of the 
Conventions. These chapters deal with both requirements for them to apply, 
and to the legal consequences of their application.  
Although the right to compensation from the 1992 Fund Convention and the 
2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol mainly relies on the fulfilment of 
conditions identical to the ones applying under the CLC 92, these Funds are 
independent organizations and subject to somewhat different rules on liability 
than the strict civil liability applying to the ship owner and his insurer under the 
CLC 92. These aspects will be separately commented on in Chapter IV10.7. I 
will also include a short discussion on the possibility to obtain compensation 
from legal persons who are not explicitly protected under the channelling 
rules.
166
  
In relation to the enactment of the IOPC Funds Conventions into Norwegian 
law,
167
 the applied method of incorporation has resulted in the wording of the 
Norwegian measures being the same as in the Conventions themselves. Even 
though this basically is the same method applied under Spanish law, I will focus 
                                                                                                                               
CLC 92 and the Bunkers Convention would prevail a more recent general provision on the 
liability for environmental damage – just as they prevail the provisions of Chapter 8 NPCS. 
166
 See Chapter IV10.4 
167
 Section 291 NMC. The only exceptions relate to the provision on an oil receiver's duty to 
contribute to the IOPC Funds, and in relation to Norwegian courts' jurisdiction in civil 
actions against the Funds, cf. Sections 202 and 204 NMC. 
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more on of the fully implemented rules of the CLC 92 and the Bunkers 
Convention in the following. Any particular problems arising in relation to the 
IOPC Funds will be addressed in Chapter IV10.7. 
Each of these subchapters will begin with a reference to the applicable 
international provisions and continue with their expression as part of the 
Norwegian and Spanish legal framework. Any differences between the national 
regimes will be consecutively commented on. 
10.1 Scope of application 
The application of the Oil Pollution Conventions requires the fulfilment of both 
geographical and objective elements.
168
 The geographical aspect refers to the 
location of the oil pollution damage, while the objective elements include 
characteristics of the ship and of the spilled oil.  
10.1.1 The geographical conditions 
All the Conventions apply to «pollution damage caused in the territory, 
including the territorial sea» and the «exclusive economic zone» or equivalent 
of a Contracting State. The rules do not separate between incidents of national 
or international origin; both are included as long as the damage arises within 
the listed areas. The incident as such could even occur on the High Sea, as long 
as the pollution damage arises within the geographical scope of the 
Conventions.
169
 Nevertheless, the damage must be caused during the following 
six years from the incident, as this is the absolute time bar for claims.
170
 Besides 
this, «preventive measures, wherever taken» will also be covered if the 
remaining conditions are met.
171
  
Even though the geographical aspect of the scope of application is the same 
for both the CLC 92 and the Bunkers Convention, it is separately regulated 
under the corresponding part of the NMC; see Section 190 and Section 206 
NMC. Both Sections do however cover the same geographical area as the 
Conventions. The only difference between the Conventions and the Norwegian 
regulations lies within the wording, as Section 190 and 206 NMC separate 
between damages incurred within the Norwegian territory or EEZ and within 
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 García (2006) p. 790 
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 Arroyo (2005) p. 756 
170
 Art VIII CLC 92, Art 6 1992 Fund Convention, Art 6.1 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol 
and Art 8 Bunkers Convention; see also Chapter IV10.9. 
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 Art II CLC 92, Art 2 1992 Fund Convention, Art 3 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol and 
Art 3 Bunkers Convention 
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the territory or EEZ of another Contracting State.172 This does not change the 
rules of application, and is probably done just to make the provision more 
accessible to the reader.
173
  
As the CLC 92 was incorporated into Spanish law by the publication of the 
Instrument of Adhesion to the 1992 Protocol of the CLC 69,
174
 the definitions 
concerning the geographical scope are directly applicable. However, as there is 
no Spanish EEZ
175
 in the Mediterranean Sea, «an area beyond and adjacent to 
the territory sea of that State, determined by the State in accordance with 
international law and extending no more than 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured»
176
 has been 
established through the Common Declaration of Spain, France and Italia on 
the application of the CLC 92 and the 1992 Fund Convention.
177
 This 
declaration is made strictly for the purpose of the application of the 
Conventions, and will not «prejudice present or future disputes and legal views 
of any Party (…) concerning the law of the sea and the nature and extent of 
coastal and flag State jurisdiction».
178
 
So far, it seems like the two States have made the Conventions applicable to 
the same geographical areas. However, pollution damage caused on the high 
sea wherever national tort law is applicable, including the continental shelf 
situated outside the EEZ remains outside the Conventions regulation. If such 
damage should occur, the applicable rules must be found within the national 
legislation. Additionally, if the spill is caused by a tanker, the national rules 
must not only govern the grounds for liability, but also the rules on its 
limitation. This loophole is created by Article 3 (b) LLMC 76/96, which 
prevents the responsible party from invoking any limitation pursuant to the 
Convention if the claim is related to oil pollution damage «within the meaning 
of» the CLC 92: 
                                           
172
 Section 206 (1) a), b) and Section 190 (1) a), b).   
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«The rules of this Convention shall not apply to: (…) claims for oil pollution 
damage within the meaning of the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage, dated 29 November 1969 or of any amendment or Protocol 
thereto which is in force». 
This rule has been implemented into the Norwegian legislation through Section 
173.1.2 NMC,
179
 and is directly applicable as Spanish law.
180
  
The NMC contains two provisions regulating the liability for damage caused 
outside the scope of application of the Oil Pollution Conventions: Section 207 
applies to damage caused by tankers which is not covered by neither the 
CLC 92 nor the LLMC 76/96, while Section 208 deals with other oil spill. 
Pursuant to Section 207, the owner of a tanker will be liable for oil pollution 
damage caused «on the part of the Norwegian continental shelf situated outside 
the Norwegian EEZ, or on the high sea wherever Norwegian tort law is 
applicable. » This rule covers the cases in which neither the CLC 92 nor the 
LLMC 76/96 apply, and the Norwegian solution has been to  extend the rules 
of the CLC 92 regarding strict liability, compensatory losses, exemption of 
liability and limitation of liability to this area regulated merely by national law. 
As of the moment the Bunkers Convention entered into force on 21 
November 2008, both pollution damage caused by oil spill from tankers and 
from non-tankers were covered by international liability rules. Prior to this 
situation, the spill of bunker oil from non-tankers was regulated under Section 
208 NMC. Today this Section covers whatever area of jurisdiction that might 
not be covered by the Bunkers Convention. These areas are basically the same 
as the ones explicitly governed by Section 207 NMC; the part of the Norwegian 
continental shelf situated outside the Norwegian EEZ, or on the high sea 
wherever Norwegian tort law is applicable. The liability limits are subject to the 
ones in the LLMC 76/96,
181
 which is implemented as the general limitation 
regime of maritime claims in Chapter 9 NMC.  
Spain does not have any particular regulation on the geographical area of 
application beyond the rules in the incorporated Convention. Liability for oil 
pollution damage falling outside the CLC 92 and the Bunkers Convention 
would thus be subject to ordinary provisions on tort law, such as the general 
rule in Article 1902 CC on liability based on fault or negligence, the strict 
liability of the Spanish Public Authorities for the wrongful functioning of public 
services pursuant to Articles 139 ff. LRJAP, or the rules on civil liability deriving 
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from the commission of a criminal offence in Articles 119-121 CP. The regime 
governing the limitation of claims will in principle be the rules established in 
the LLMC 76/96,
182
 but a problem arises as these rules do not cover claims 
related to oil pollution damage «within the meaning of» the CLC 92.
183
 The 
result seems to be, as there is no particular regulation for oil spill caused by 
tankers on the high sea wherever national tort law is applicable, that a party 
responsible under national tort law will be unlimitedly liable for all claims 
arising from such a spill.  
10.1.2 The objective conditions  
Besides the geographical conditions, the application of the Oil Pollution 
Conventions also depends on the fulfilment of criteria regarding the vessel, the 
incident and the oil causing the damage.   
(a) «Ship» 
The CLC 92, the 1992 Fund Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund 
Protocol apply to oil pollution damage caused by a «ship» within the meaning 
of  
«any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or 
adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided that a ship capable of 
carrying oil and other cargoes shall be regarded as a ship only when it is actually 
carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any voyage following such carriage unless it 
is proved that it has no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard. » 
In short, the CLC 92 and the IOPC Funds Conventions are applicable to oil 
spill damage caused by oil tankers containing, at least, residues of oil carried in 
bulk as cargo.  
The rules of the Bunkers Convention apply to «any seagoing vessel and 
seaborne craft, of any type whatsoever». This definition does however have its 
exceptions, one of them being that the Convention never will apply to 
«pollution damage as defined in the [CLC 92] ».
184
 The result is that the 
Bunkers Convention in principle is applicable to all vessels not covered under 
the CLC 92.  
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Another exception, which also applies to ships covered by the CLC 92 and 
the IOPC Fund Conventions, is that the Conventions will not apply to pollution 
damage caused by «warships» «or other ships owned or operated by a State 
and used, for the time being, only on Government non-commercial service. »
185
 
In respect of ships owned by a Contracting State and actually being used for 
«commercial purposes», the Conventions include a provision stating that «each 
State shall be subject to suit (…) and shall waive all defences based on its status 
as a sovereign State».
186
 The Contracting States cannot evade this provision by 
reservation. However, any claim resulting from oil spill damage caused by a 
State Ship on Government non-commercial service is excluded from the 
application of the international provisions. 
At this point, the rules provided for in the CLC 92-regime and in the Bunkers 
Convention are not entirely the same. The difference is caused by Article 4.3 of 
the Bunkers Convention which provides each of the Contracting States with 
the option of applying the Convention to oil spill pollution caused by an 
incident with one of their own ships performing a Government non-
commercial service.
187
 Besides this particular rule, neither of the Conventions is 
applicable to oil spill damage caused by ships on a Government non-
commercial service if owned or operated by a foreign State. The liability for 
such damage is subject to internal regulation, and has met different solutions 
under Norwegian and Spanish law respectively. Nevertheless, as the regulations 
on compensation from the IOPC Funds is subject to the international rules laid 
down in the 1992 Fund Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund 
Protocol, the internal legislation is only applicable to the civil liability incurred 
within the State's jurisdiction.  
Under Norwegian law, the equivalent of Article XI.1 CLC 92 on the 
exclusion of non-commercial State ships from its application is found in 
Section 206.3 NMC, and supplemented by Section 207.1 NMC. The latter 
Section governs the liability for oil pollution damage caused outside the scope 
of the CLC 92. As described in Chapter IV10.1.1, this provision extends the 
central rules of the CLC 92 to incidents in which ordinary oil-tankers are 
included but where the pollution damage arise outside the geographical scope 
of application of the Convention.
 188
 However, the wording of Section 207.1 
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does also State that such extension will be applicable to «ships as described 
under Section 206.3, whenever oil pollution damage occurs within the 
[Norwegian] territory or within the Norwegian EEZ», as well as preventive 
measures taken to «avoid or limit such damage». In other words; oil pollution 
damage or preventive measured caused by a ship owned or operated by a State 
and used, for the time being, only on Government non-commercial service, will 
be subject to the same rules as spill covered by the CLC 92, provided that it 
occurs within the Norwegian territory or EEZ. 
In relation to the Bunkers Convention, Norway has made use of the option 
given in Article 4.3 of the Convention, which makes the Convention applicable 
to oil spill damage caused by Norwegian ships performing a Government non-
commercial service.
189
 As any damage caused by a ship owned by another 
Contracting State and used for commercial purposes will be covered due to 
their obligation under the Bunkers Convention to «waive all defences based on 
its status as a sovereign State»
190
, the only remaining loophole is oil spill 
damage caused by foreign State ships on Government non-commercial 
service.
191
 Article 4.3 of the Bunkers Convention is implemented through 
Section 190.3 NMC, first clause. However, just like the method applied to cover 
the same loophole under the CLC 92, the Norwegian legislator has extended 
the rules of the Bunkers Convention so that they cover pollution damage 
caused by these ships whenever the damage occurs «within the [Norwegian] 
territory or within the Norwegian EEZ», as well as preventive measures, cf. the 
second clause of Section 190.3 NMC.  
The cited rules of Sections 207.1 cf. 206.3 and 190.3 NMC do not separate 
between Norwegian and foreign ships. A question is however if the principle of 
immunity applying to non-commercial State ships may prevent their legal 
enforcement, as the owning State may invoke a defence based on this principle 
before a court, and thus impede the execution of any claim for compensation.
192
 
This rule of immunity is a widespread principle of international law. It is not 
only upheld by Article 3 of the International Convention for the unification of 
certain rules concerning the immunity of State-owned ships of 1926, as 
amended by the Protocol of 1934 (The 1926 Brussels Convention), but also 
recognised in the Law of the Sea Convention
193
 and in many more of the 
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multilateral Conventions regulating seagoing vessels,
194
 including the Oil 
Pollution Conventions. On this background, it must be reasonable to consider 
the principle of immunity for State Ships on Government non-commercial 
service as customary international law. Besides, Norway is a Contracting Party 
to the 1926 Brussels Convention, and the substantial rule on the immunity of 
State ships is implemented through the Norwegian Act relating to enforcement 
of claims, Section 1-6. The general rule expressed in the first paragraph is 
applicable to all foreign States,
195
 and States that  
«No legal enforcement shall be promoted in respect of warships or other ships 
owned, operated or chartered entirely by a foreign State, whenever the ship is being 
used for Government non-commercial service only. »
196
 
This means that Norway is obliged by both international law and national law 
to refrain from promoting legal enforcement of any claim for compensation for 
oil pollution damage caused by a non-commercial State ship.   
Nevertheless, according to Statements propound in the preparatory works 
related to the ratification and implementation of the CLC 69 and the 1971 
Funds Convention, the Committee
197
 behind the draft law were well aware of 
this issue.
198
 Their motive for including rules on liability applying to foreign 
non-commercial State ships does not seem to be based in the prospect of 
actually carrying out such enforcement within Norwegian jurisdiction, but to 
support a Norwegian oil pollution victim facing legal proceedings within a 
court of the flag State. Even though the flag State will have jurisdiction in these 
cases, it is likely that the rules of international private law will prescribe 
Norwegian law as the applicable choice of law, for instance by the theory lex 
loci delicti, which refers to that liability should be governed by the law of the 
place where the wrongful act was committed.
199
 If this is the case, a Norwegian 
rule imposing strict liability to the owner of non-commercial State ships might 
influence the foreign court's evaluation of the question of liability.
200
 In regard 
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of incidents occurring within the territorial sea, Article 31 UNCLOS must also 
be taken into consideration. The provision reads: «The flag State shall bear 
international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting 
from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for 
non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State 
concerning passage through the territorial sea (…) ». 
In contrast to the Norwegian regime, the Spanish legislator has not adopted 
any particular provisions in order to supply the Conventions in the material of 
pollution damage caused by non-commercial State ships. Besides, Spain has 
opted not to make the Bunkers Convention applicable to oil pollution damage 
caused by a Spanish ship performing a Government non-commercial service.
201
 
This will not have much effect on a third party's right to compensation within 
the Spanish jurisdiction, as the liability of the Spanish State for damage caused 
by a national non-commercial State ship would be subject to the rules on the 
vicarious civil liability deriving from the commission of a criminal offence cf. 
Article 109 and 121 CP, or the strict vicarious liability of Public Authorities 
pursuant to Articles 139 ff. LRJAP
202
 The liability of foreign States resulting 
from oil pollution damage caused by their non-commercial State ships would 
however be subject to ordinary rules of tort law such as Article 1902 CC. In 
both cases would the States' right to limit their liability depend on the 
applicability of the LLMC 76/96.
203
 If the damage resulted from the escape or 
discharge from oil from a tanker, their liability would be unlimited.
204
 
(b) «Oil » and «incident» 
The second and third objective conditions to be met relates to the «incident» 
that leads to the escape or discharge of oil, and the type of «oil» being spilled 
and thus causing the pollution damage.  
All the Oil Pollution Conventions apply to the same type of «incident», 
which may consist of «any occurrence, or series of occurrences having the same 
origin, which causes pollution damage» or that «creates a grave and imminent 
threat of causing such damage. »
205
 From the wording it can be deducted that 
pollution damage only will be sustained as a result of an «incident» if there is a 
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link of causation between the damage and occurrence(s).
206
 The definition as 
such is directly applicable in Spanish law through the incorporated 
Conventions. The Norwegian legislator has not implemented this definition 
through an independent provision, but its content is nevertheless expressed 
through Sections 191.2 (b) and 183.2 (b) as part of the definition of preventive 
measures.   
When it comes to the type of «oil» causing the pollution damage, the 
definition is not the same under the CLC-regime and Bunkers Convention. The 
CLC 92 and the IOPC Fund Conventions apply to  
« … persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil 
and lubricating oil, whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of [a 
tanker] ». 
207
 
As the wording indicates, the rules pursuant to the CLC 92 and the IOPC 
Funds Conventions will not only be applicable to damage caused by oil carried 
as cargo, but also to persistent hydrocarbon mineral whenever carried on board 
in the bunkers. The fundamental condition for such application is however that 
the vessel qualifies as a «ship» within the meaning of the CLC 92-regime,
208
 
which implies that the oil must come from an oil tanker containing at least 
residues of oil carried in bulk as cargo. 
Even though the CLC 92 only applies to persistent oil, it does not define the 
meaning of «persistent». According to the 1992 Fund's Claims Manual of 
December 2008,
209
 the examples Stated in the Convention refers to versions of 
persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil that are slow to dissipate naturally, and 
therefore likely to spread and require cleaning up. Damage caused by spills of 
non-persistent mineral oil is not covered, as oil such as gasoline; light diesel oil 
and kerosene tend to evaporate quickly, without requiring any clean-up 
operation.
210
 
The Bunker Convention applies to pollution damage caused by «Bunker oil», 
in the sense of  
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«… any hydrocarbon mineral oil, including lubricating oil, used or intended to be 
used for the operation or propulsion of the ship [the non-tanker], and any residues 
of such oil».
211
  
Within the Norwegian legislation, conditions on the covered oil under both the 
CLC 92 and the Bunkers Convention appear to be quite literally copied 
through the implementation in Section 191 NMC (CLC 92) and Section 183 
NMC (Bunkers Convention). The international regime is supplemented by the 
internal provision Section 208 NMC, which extends the rules of CLC 92 on 
strict liability, compensatory losses and exemption of liability to oil spill damage 
caused by any other type of oil. Such liability would however be subject to the 
liability limits of the LLMC 76/96, see Section 208.4 cf. 208.3 NMC.  
The Spanish legislation consists of the directly applicable provisions of the 
incorporated Conventions, and does not amend the international regime in any 
way at this point.   
10.2 Compensatory losses 
The definition of «pollution damage» is the same in all the Oil Pollution 
Conventions. For this reason, the concept should be interpreted the same way 
independent of whether the claim is against the owner or his insurer under the 
CLC 92, or against the IOPC Funds under the 1992 Fund Convention and the 
2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol.
212
 At an international level the exact 
definition of «pollution damage» is partly explained through the wording of the 
Oil Pollution Conventions, and further guidance is given in the IOPC Fund's 
Claims Manual
213
. This Manual is to be considered a practical guidance to 
claims that most likely will be approved by the IOPC Funds, and not as an 
authoritative interpretation of the Conventions.
214
  
Whenever a pollution claim is assessed by a claimants' domestic court, the 
applicable provisions of the Oil Pollution Conventions will not be purely 
international, but incorporated, national law. This means that the court will 
interpret the Conventions and thereby also the scope of the compensatory 
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«pollution damage» in accordance with other corresponding internal law. Even 
though the Conventions qualify as national law once they are incorporated, 
they still form part of a larger, international regime. All injured parties and their 
claims should be treated the same way, independent of the Contracting State 
where the damage was sustained. Besides the focus on equity, it is important to 
remember that the clean-up operations and other claims in one State will be 
paid by the oil industry in one of the other Contracting States whenever the 
IOPC Funds are involved. The interpretation of the Conventions should stay 
consistent and uniform in order to avoid any risk for political tension between 
the Contracting States that could jeopardise the compensation system.
215
 Yet 
another reason is that the liability limits are designed to cover certain types of 
damage. If the national courts should allow claims for additional damage, it 
would hamper the system. This is why uniform interpretation of the definition 
«pollution damage» is essential.
216
  
All the Conventions apply to «pollution damage»
217
 in the terms of  
« (a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the 
escape or discharge of [bunker
218
] oil from the ship, wherever such escape or 
discharge may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the 
environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to 
costs of reasonable measures of reinStatement actually undertaken or to be 
undertaken; and 
(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures.»
219
 
The definition of «pollution damage» even covers the costs of preventive 
measures taken in the absence of an actual oil spill, if only they were taken in 
relation to an occurrence qualifying as an «incident» to «prevent» the 
realization of a «grate and imminent threat of pollution damage».
220
 All these 
aspects of the definitions are incorporated into Norwegian and Spanish law 
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respectively without any national supplements.
221
 The basis for the further 
analysis is therefore that the statutory basis is the same, except from the 
language. The potentially broader interpretation of compensatory damage will 
first be expressed when the national court applies the incorporated provisions 
in the assessment of different types of claims for oil pollution damage.  
Even without national courts extending the definition, «pollution damage» 
covers a wide range of different claims. The main categories are property 
damage, clean-up operations on shore and at sea, preventive measures 
wherever taken, consequential loss, pure economic loss, reasonable measures of 
reinstatement of the environment, and to some extent the use of advisers 
assisting in the presentation of claims.
222
 Besides the nature of the cost or 
damage, it must also result from the escape or discharge of [bunker] oil, or from 
the impairment of the environment, the damage must actually have incurred 
(«caused»), and it must be quantifiable.
223
 As the damage must result from the 
escape or discharge of oil, the Conventions will not cover any damage caused 
by other consequences of an incident such as explosion of fire. 
Although there is no controversy related to the listed types of damage,
224
 the 
wording defining the term does not exclude the possibility of interpreting 
«pollution damage» to cover more types of damage in accordance with 
potential, internal provisions.
225
 The main controversy is related to general, 
unquantifiable damage to the environment.
226
  
The wording of the Conventions clearly provides that compensation under 
the Conventions only will be available to cover the costs of reasonable 
measures of «reinstatement». Accordingly, the wording affirms the position that 
assessments of damage to the environment's intrinsic value arrived at by using 
abstract mathematical models or contingent valuation cannot be 
compensated.
227
 However, the wording does not clearly preclude Contracting 
States from interpreting the provisions in accordance with internal principles 
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that might open for compensation of pure, ecological damage.
228
 In accordance 
with the particular principles of interpretation applying to international 
provisions,
229
 the national court should bear in mind that the wording as such 
do not open for such claims directly under the Conventions, and that this sort 
of claim was not intended to be covered when the Conventions were 
adopted.
230
 
Nevertheless; when it comes to the Norwegian and Spanish principles on 
compensatory losses within tort law, there are no indications that pure 
ecological damage would be covered. Within the Norwegian tort law, the main 
principle is that the injured party has the right to full compensation for his 
entire, economical loss; see Section 4-1 SKL231. Non-pecuniary losses are in 
principle not compensated.
232
 This means that pure ecological loss would not be 
considered as a compensatory damage. An exception is found in Section 58 
NPCA,
233
 which will supplement the interpretation of the incorporated 
provisions in the NMC.
 234
 According to this provision, compensation may be 
claimed for 
« (…) pollution that is not permitted and that hinders, impedes or limits the benefit 
of exercising rights of common for non-commercial purposes; provided that this 
applies to reasonable costs of restoring the environment so that rights of common 
can as far as possible be exercised as before. »
235
 
Such a claim can be made by the municipal or county pollution control 
authority, but also by a private organization or an association with a «legal 
interest»
236
 in the matter.
237
 However, the compensation awarded shall accrue 
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to the pollution control authority so that reinstating measures can be taken.
238
 
This is an exception from the main rule, and in contrast to the Oil Pollution 
Conventions, the provision does not cover all reasonable measures of 
«reinstatement»; only to the extent that the rights of common as far as possible 
can be exercised as before. On this basis, it is safe to conclude that the Oil 
Pollution Conventions go further that the Norwegian legislation in the field of 
ecological damage.  
Spanish law seems to be even more restrictive in relation to compensation for 
ecological damage. There are no general, statutory rules on losses qualifying as 
compensatory damage. Such principles are however found in the doctrina 
jurisprudencial, which is evolved by scholars, based on Spanish case law.239 The 
main rule seems to be that traditional Spanish tort law may only be used to 
indemnify individual rights and interests, and does consequently not protect 
collective or fragmented interests.
240
 This would again imply that the 
environment as such only may be protected if an environmental damage harms 
an individual right or asset.
241
 Even though Spanish tort law recognize both 
pecuniary
242
 and no-pecuniary damage
243
 as compensatory,
244
 the compensation 
of pure ecological damage is barred by the demand for a loss clearly connected 
to private rights or interests. If there was an exception like the Norwegian 
Section 58 NPCA, this could perhaps have been solved by assigning a national 
pollution control authority or a private association with the necessary right of 
action. As for now, there are no such exceptions.
 245
    
                                           
238
 Section 58.4 NPCA 
239
 Nieto García (2001) p. 104 
240
 Del Olmo, Pedro. Tort and Regulatory Law in Spain. In: Tort and regulatory law (…) 
Wien, 2007, p. [251]-293; p. 270-271 
241
 Del Olmo (2007) p. 269 
242
 Ponce de León, Luis Díez-Picazo y. Derecho de daños. Madrid, 1999, p. 308, 324  
243
 Non-pecuniary losses are accepted if they qualify as «daño moral», a concept referring to 
the compensation of phycological consequences that does not lead to any economical loss. 
The Spanish Tribunal Superior has also referred to this concept as «el precio del dolor»; 
the price of the pain, which to some extent can compensate the suffering, sorrow, 
bitterness and sadness resulting from the injurious action, see STS 1291/2001, Sala de lo 
Penal, of 29 June 2001. See also Pérez, Carlos Granado. Daño civil derivado del delito. In: 
La responsabilidad civil y su problemática actual, edited by Juan Moreno Martínez, Madrid 
2007, p. [337]-372, p. 344, Coderch (2006) p. 22-26 and Ponce de León (1999) p. 324. 
244
 See also Asúa González (1996) p. 462-464 
245
 Gonzáles, Albert Ruda. El daño ecológico puro. La responsabilidad civil por el deterjo del 
medio ambiente. Doctorate thesis. Supervised by Miquel Martín i Casals. Universitat de 
Girona, España, 2006. Available from http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/tesis?codigo=7626  
[1 June 2009], p. 143-144 
 50 
Based on these observations, it seems like an injured party would have the 
same right to compensation for his claim when it comes to the types of 
pollution damage accepted. The Oil Pollution Conventions accepts more types 
of claims than the national law of both States.  
10.3 Rules on liability under the Conventions 
One of the main features of the CLC 92 and the Bunkers Convention is the 
strict but limited liability applying to «the owner of a ship» for causing oil 
pollution damage within the scope of the Conventions.
246
 Even though the 
owner might be exempted from his obligation if he can prove that the pollution 
damage results from a situation he could not possibly control; situations which 
are exhaustively listed in Article III of the CLC 92 and Article 3 of the Bunkers 
Convention, this rigid rule facilitates the injured party's possibility of obtaining 
compensation for his loss. Otherwise, as a result of the often obscure causal 
link between the incident, the responsible parties and the pollution damage, it 
could have been very difficult for the injured party to identify the liable persons 
and establish their claims.
247
 However, the system is not unfair: If someone is to 
be blamed for the incident causing the damage, the Conventions as such
248
 do 
not prejudice any right of recourse the owner has against third parties.
249
 They 
only intend to make the process easier for the injured party, while the owner is 
referred to a process of recourse in order to recover his expenses. Even though 
it is the«owner» who is liable, the Conventions also require the owner of large 
ships to maintain particular liability insurance in the sums fixed by applying the 
liability limits of the applicable regime.
250
  
The person or persons on who liability is imposed, depends on the applicable 
Convention. Even though both refer to the owner, or to be accurate; the 
«owner of a ship»
251
 and the «shipowner»
252
 respectively, the definition 
included in the Bunkers Convention includes more persons than the CLC 92. If 
no «registered owner» can be found, the liability under the CLC 92 will be 
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imposed on «the person owning the ship».
253
 According to Article 1.3 of the 
Bunkers Convention, «'shipowner' means the owner, including the registered 
owner, bareboat charterer, manager and operator of the ship». Nevertheless, 
the most important person is the «registered owner», as this is the only one in 
need of mandatory liability insurance.
254
 
In Article I.1 of the CLC 92, it is stated that «the owner of a ship of the time 
of an incident (…) shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by the ship 
as a result of an incident». The wording of the corresponding provision in the 
Bunkers Convention reads: «the shipowner at the time of an incident shall be 
liable for pollution damage caused by any bunker oil on board or originating 
from the ship (…) ».
255
 Independent of the slight differences in the wording, 
they both express that the owner will incur strict liability by the mere fact that 
he qualifies as «owner» under the Conventions. There is no need for fault or 
causal connection between his actions or omission and the pollution damage;
256
 
the only link necessary is the one established between «the incident» and the 
«pollution damage».  
As already mentioned, the strict liability does not come without exceptions. 
The Conventions presents identical, exhaustive lists on causes exempting the 
owner from liability. The burden of proof does however lie with the owner; in 
order to avail himself of the exception provided, he needs to «prove» that the 
damage was caused or resulted from one of the following alternatives: 
« (a) [the damage] resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or 
a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or  
(b) [the damage] was wholly caused by an act or omission done with the intent to 
cause damage by a third party; or 
(c) [the damage] was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any 
Government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other 
navigational aids in the exercise of that function»
257
 
If the owner proves that one of these conditions is met, the result is that «no 
liability (…) shall attach». Besides the possibility of full exoneration, the 
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Conventions also present another exception related to the acts or omission of 
an injured party, which, if fulfilled, may exonerate the owner «wholly or partly» 
from liability «to such person». The applying condition for such exemption is 
that the owner is able to prove «that the pollution damage resulted wholly or 
partially from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by the 
person who suffered the damage or from the negligence of that person».
258
   
If more than one ship was involved in the incident causing pollution damage,  
« (…) the [ship]owners of all the ships concerned, unless exonerated [under Article 
III of the CLC 92 or Article 3 of the Bunkers Convention), shall be jointly and 
severally liable for all such damage which is not reasonably separable.»
259
 
As for the implementation of the rules on the liable subject, the strict liability 
and its exceptions under the CLC 92 into Norwegian legislation, Section 
191 NMC provides that «Regardless of fault, the owner of a ship is liable for oil 
pollution damage. » The Section also reproduces the rules of the CLC in terms 
of incidents consisting of a series of occurrences having the same origin, in 
which the liability shall attach to the owner at the time of the first 
occurrence,
260
 as well as the rule on jointly and severally liable owners in the 
case of incidents involving two or more ships. As for the exemption of liability, 
the alternatives are listed in Section 192. In the case of an injured party having 
contributed to the pollution damage by intent or negligence and this is proved 
by the owner, it is Stated in Section 192.2 that Norwegian tort law
261
 will be 
applicable when deciding to whether or not, or to which extent he may be 
exonerated from liability. The CLC 92 does not give any guidelines on this 
assessment, and as the consequences of the implementation of an international 
provision is that it becomes part of the Norwegian legislation, it is only natural 
that the provision is supplied by the national rules on tort law. 
The implementation of the rules on the liable subject, the strict liability and 
its exceptions under the Bunkers Convention is to some extent carried out 
through a referral to the rules in Chapter 10.II NMC, which implements the 
corresponding provisions under the CLC 92. The principal rule, regarding the 
liable ship owner, is however independently expressed in Section 183.1 NMC: 
«Regardless of fault, the owner of a ship is liable for pollution damage caused 
by bunker oil. » The term «the owner of a ship» is further defined as  
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« (…) owner, including the registered owner, rederi
262
, bareboat charterer, manager 
and operator of the ship, or others who are in charge of central functions relating            
to the operation of the ship. »
263
 
This definition is in accordance with the persons embraced by the term «owner 
of a ship» under Article 1.3 of the Bunkers Convention. The only difference lies 
in the word «rederi», which is a term in lack of an English equivalent. 
However, as any «rederi» would equip and run the ship for their own account; 
independent of the title owner or bareboat charterer, it can not be considered 
as a particular supplement to the definition under the Bunkers Convention.  
 In continuation, Section 193.1 NMC States that «Section 191.1, second and 
third clause, also applies». The referred clauses concern the incidents consisting 
of a series of occurrences, and the ones involving two or more ships. The same 
method has been applied in relation to the rule of exemption of liability: 
Section 184 merely refer to Section 192 NMC, stating that the same rules shall 
apply to the provisions implementing the Bunkers Convention.  
In relation to the rules on the liable subject, the strict liability and its 
exceptions under the CLC 92 and the Bunkers Convention, the Spanish 
legislation does not contain any substantial rules supplying the directly 
applicable, incorporated provisions of these Conventions. As for the evaluation 
on the wholly or partly exemption of the owner from liability in the event of the 
injured party's contribution to the damage, the applicable guidelines consist of 
doctrina jurisprudencial,264 which to some extent has been codified265 within 
particular legal areas.
266
 
Even though the Conventions provide rules obliging the owner to 
compensate the injured parties, they also protect him from being liable under 
any other legal regime applicable under internal law by impeding third parties 
from establishing claims against him under any other rules than the ones 
provided in the Conventions themselves. In other words; the owner may benefit 
from immunity outside the Bunkers Convention.  This immunity is expressed 
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through the wording «No claim for compensation for pollution damage shall be 
made against the [ship]owner otherwise than in accordance with this 
Convention».267  
The wording of the Norwegian provisions implementing this rule into the 
national legislation appears to be a word for word translation, except from the 
fact that they refer to the Norwegian provisions implementing the Conventions 
in stead of the Conventions as such, see Sections 193.1
268
 and 185.1
269
  NMC. 
Within the Spanish legislation, the incorporated, directly applicable 
international provisions are not supplemented in any way by internal 
legislation.  
Besides providing the only legal ground on which compensation can be 
claimed from the owner, the CLC 92 also contain a provision on the 
channelling of liability. This means that an injured party's right to claim 
compensation from an extent list of persons that might be connected to the ship 
or the salvage operations – on any legal basis - is barred, with few exceptions. 
This way, claims for pollution damage under the CLC 92 can only be made 
against the registered owner of the ship, which basically means that the liability 
is channelled to the owner's insurer. Article III.4, second clause, reads:  
« (…) no claim for compensation for pollution damage under this Convention or 
otherwise may be made against: 
(a) the servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew; 
(b) the pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew, 
performs services for the ship; 
(c) any charterer (howsoever described, including a bareboat charterer), manager 
or operator of the ship; 
(d) any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner or on 
the instructions of a competent public authority; 
(e) any person taking preventive measures; 
(f ) all servants or agents of persons mentioned in subparagraphs (c), (d) and (e)"
270
 
An important exception is that the listed parties will lose their protection 
against an injured party's claims for compensation if  
« (…) the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with the 
intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage 
would probably result. »
271
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In the case of a person incurring liability under this provision, it must also be 
reasonable to assume that he will be liable for the entire claim, without the 
right to limit his liability in accordance with Article V.1.
272
 This presumption is 
based on the fact that the ship owner himself will «not be entitled to limit his 
liability under this Convention» if it is proved that he caused the damage 
recklessly or by intent, and with knowledge that such damage would probably 
result.
273
 
It is also important to note that the channelling rules only apply to the 
injured party's claim for compensation, not the owner's claim for recourse.
274
 
Such a claim would be presented before a national court, and, depending on 
the relation between the owner and his opponent, be subject to rules on 
contractual or extra contractual liability (tort law).
275
 
One problem of particular interest is that the Article III.4 of the CLC 92 does 
not cover all the parties that might have contributed to the incident causing the 
pollution damage. These omissions include cargo owners, a coast State 
intervening in the process leading up to the incident, and classification societies 
certifying wrecked ships as «in class» prior to their final voyage. The possibility 
to claim such legal entities for compensation outside the CLC 92 and the 
Bunkers Convention is briefly discussed in Chapter IV10.4.  
The Bunkers Convention lacks rules channelling the liability to the owner, 
which means that the injured party is entitled to claim any person connected 
with the incident for compensation. These claims would have to be based in 
ordinary tort law or legal provisions other than the Bunkers Convention, as the 
particular ground for liability pursuant to the Convention only applies to the 
persons within the definition of «shipowner».
276
 It is only the registered owner 
who is obliged to keep mandatory liability insurance,
277
 and it is likely that his 
insurer will cover the claims, and thus prevent them from being enforced 
against other parties. Still, until a claim has been paid, there will be nothing to 
stop claimants from bringing proceedings jointly against other parties as well as 
the owner.  
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Even though the Bunkers Convention as such does not embrace any rules on 
the channelling of liability, it is supplemented by both Norwegian and Spanish 
law. These national provisions do not only affect the injured party's right to 
claim persons other than the owner for compensation, but under Norwegian 
law, it also hampers the owner's right to recourse under both the CLC 92 and 
the Bunkers Convention. In continuation, I will give an overview of the 
national provisions implementing and to some extent supplementing the rules 
on the channelling of liability, then move on to the owner's right to recourse. 
Even though the international rules on the owner's right to recourse lacks 
influence on a third party's right to compensation, it is still an important 
component of the international regime. A short passage on their interpretation 
within in the national context will contribute to the big picture, and work as 
background material in the final analysis on the injured party's right to 
compensation.  
The starting point when it comes to the relationship between the injured 
party and persons connected to the ship or the salvage operation, is that the 
CLC 92 contains rules on the channelling of liability, while the Bunkers 
Convention allows the injured party to claim any person connected with the 
incident for compensation, as long as the legal basis for the claim is found 
outside the Convention.  
Within the Norwegian legislation, the rules on the channelling of liability 
under the CLC 92
278
 are implemented through Section 193.2:  
«Claims for compensation for oil pollution damage can not be made against:  
a) a member of the crew, employee of the owner or others for whom the owner is 
liable, 
b) the pilot or any other person performing services for the ship, 
c) the reder or manager if they do not own the ship, and any charterer, sender, 
shipper, owner or receiver of the cargo, 
d) anyone engaged in salvage operations with the consent of the ship or on the 
instructions of a public authority, 
e) anyone taking steps to prevent or limit pollution damage or loss embraced by 
Section 191 , or 
f) employees of persons mentioned in letters b, c, d and e, or others for whom 
persons mentioned in letters b, c, d or e are liable, except for persons who have 
themselves caused damage by willful intent or gross negligence, and in the 
understanding that such damage would probably occur.» 
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The persons included in subparagraphs (a) and (b) are congruent with the ones 
mentioned under Article III.4 subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the CLC 92. 
However, Section 193.2 (c) differs from the corresponding provision of the 
CLC 92 by adding the legal persons «rederi
279
 [if it does ] not own the ship», as 
well as the «sender, shipper, owner or receiver of the cargo». As the «rederi» 
only will be protected by the channelling rules if the company does not own the 
ship, the term is fully congruent with the definition «any charterer howsoever 
described, including a bareboat charterer».
280
 The supplement lies in the 
internal rule including the «sender, shipper, owner or receiver of the cargo» as 
protected parties under the channelling rules. This is a supplement that can be 
dated back to the implementation of the rules on the channelling of liability 
under the CLC 69.
281
 When the 1992 Protocol to the CLC 69 was implemented, 
the Ministry of Justice and the Police assumed that the rules of the Convention 
did not preclude internal provisions from broadening the scope of application 
of the channelling rules.
282
  
Even though the wording slightly differs, subparagraphs (d) and (e) of Section 
193.2 refer to the same persons as the corresponding provisions under the CLC 
92. The difference is merely a result of the legislative method applied in the 
process of implementing the CLC 92: Instead of simply stating that no claims 
for compensation shall be made against «any person taking preventive 
measures», subparagraph (e) instructs that no such claim shall be made against 
«anyone taking steps to prevent or limit pollution damage or loss as embraced 
by Section 191». As mentioned under Chapter IV10.2, Section 191.2 defines the 
term «pollution damage». Under the Convention, pollution damage does not 
only consist of loss or damage caused outside the ship, but it also embraces the 
cost of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive 
measures. This division has also been followed under the implementation of the 
CLC 92, so that the equivalent of «preventive measures»
283
 is defined in Section 
191.2 (b). The point is that this particular part of the Norwegian legislation 
does not represent any supplement to the rules of the Convention.  
This is not the case with subparagraph (f), which extends the list of 
employees linked to the persons explicitly exempted from receiving claims for 
compensation under the list included in Section 192.2 and Article III.4 CLC 92. 
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The addition to the circle of protected people under the Convention, consist of 
employees of the pilot or any other person performing services for the ship, as 
well as «others for whom persons mentioned in [Section 193.2] letters b, c, d or 
e are liable». According to the Ministry of Justice and the Police, the internal 
supplement is based on the opinion that the motives justifying the exemption of 
the employees listed under Article III.4 (f) also apply in the case of other 
employees.
284
 However, the general exception under Article III.4, which applies 
if the «damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with 
intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such 
damage would probably result», is also implemented in Section 193.2 NMC.  
In regard of the rules on the channelling of liability under the CLC 92, the 
Spanish legislation does not represent any exception or supplement to the 
international regime. The incorporated rules of the CLC 92 will be directly 
applicable. 
As for the Bunkers Convention, which do not contain any rules on the 
channelling of liability, the internal rules of both Norway and Spain represents 
a supplement impairing the right of the injured party to seek compensation for 
pollution damage caused by bunker oil from a non-tanker.  
Within the Norwegian legislation, the amendment is found in Section 185.1, 
within the second and third clause:  
«The provisions on channelling of liability etc. in Section 193 second (…) 
paragraph[s] appl[ies] correspondingly to liability pursuant to Sections 183 to 190. 
However, the provision that liability cannot be invoked, cf. Section 193, are not 
applicable to persons embraced by the definition of the “ship’s owner” in Section 
183 fifth paragraph. » 
The referral to Section 193.2 is also a referral to the channelling rules under 
the implemented rules of the CLC 92. In accordance with Section 185.1 second 
clause, these rules will apply «to liability pursuant to Sections 183 to 190». As 
Sections 183 to 190 implement the Bunkers Convention, the referral in Section 
185.1 means that the rules on the channelling of liability and the owner's right 
to recourse, as implemented and supplied by internal law, will apply in the case 
of oil pollution damage under the Bunkers Convention whenever Norwegian 
law is applicable. Due to the fact that the term «owner» refers to more persons 
under the Bunkers Convention than the CLC 92, the extension is however 
limited by the definition of owner in Section 185.1, second clause. This means 
that besides the registered owner, the injured party may also claim the 
«reder»
285
, the bareboat charterer, the manager and operator of the ship, or 
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others who are in charge of central functions relating to the operation of the 
ship for pollution damage within the meaning of the Bunkers Convention. 
Under the Spanish legislation, the supplement is found in the Real Decreto 
1795/2008, which deals with the coverage of the civil liability under the 
Bunkers Convention.
286
 According to its Article 10,  
«No claim for compensation for pollution damage caused by bunker oil within the 
meaning of the Bunkers Convention can be made against:  
a) Any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner or on 
the instructions of a competent public authority,  
b) Any person taking preventive measures, or  
c) All employees or agents of persons mentioned in subparagraphs a) and b), unless 
the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with intent to 
cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would 
probably result. » 
When the wording refers to the terms «pollution damage» and «preventive 
measures», it is not necessary to look for their definition in the Bunkers 
Convention itself. Article 3 of the Real Decreto provides its own list of 
definitions, in which any term deriving from the Convention is reproduced 
without amendment. 
The internal supplements to the rules on the channelling of liability, which 
are applicable whenever the Conventions are interpreted within the national 
context, do not only amend the original international regime; they also cause 
divergence between the Norwegian and Spanish rules on a third party's right to 
claim compensation from others than the owner for oil pollution damage 
caused by ships. The central question is however if these differences also affect 
their overall right to compensation. In order to provide an answer, it is 
necessary to consider all the differences between the Norwegian and Spanish 
legislation as a whole. This is what I will intend to do in Part V; Conclusive 
Remarks.  
Even though an injured party will be prevented from establishing claims for 
compensation against the persons covered under the channelling rules, neither 
of the Conventions «prejudice[s] any right of recourse of the owner (…) »287. 
This is also the case under Spanish law, which contains no supplements to the 
incorporated provisions in this respect. However, under Norwegian law, the 
owner's right to claim recourse from many of the persons protected under the 
channelling rules in respect of claims for compensation under both the CLC 92 
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and the Bunkers Convention depend the person having «caused the damage 
deliberately or through gross negligence and with knowledge that such damage 
would probably result».
288
 In relation to pollution damage governed by the 
implemented CLC 92, the only person available for recourse action without any 
other conditions applying than the ordinary legal principle in respect of 
recourse is «the rederi or manager if they do not own the ship, and any 
charterer, sender, shipper, owner or receiver of the cargo».
289
 The same rule 
applies to the owner's action for recourse under the Bunkers Convention.
290
 
However, as the definition of «owner» includes more persons under the 
Bunkers Convention than under the CLC 92, the application of the rule 
pursuant to Section 193.1 is once again limited in respect of the persons 
embraced by the definition of owner in Section 183.5.
291
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Table 9.3.1: Rules on the channelling of liability under the CLC 92 
«√» means that these persons are explicitly protected against all claims for compensation from 
the injured party, while «X» means that they are not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No claim for compensation for pollution 
damage shall be made against: CLC 92 Spanish L. Norwegian L. 
     
(a) 
The servants or agents of the owner or 
the members of the crew √  √  √ 
     
(b) 
The pilot or any other person who, 
without being a member of the crew,  √  √  √ 
  performs services for the ship.       
     
(c) 
Any charterer (howsoever described, 
including a bareboat charterer), √  √  √ 
  manager or operator of the ship.       
     
(c1) 
Any sender, shipper, owner or receiver 
of the cargo X X √ 
        
(c2) 
«Reder/ rederi» owning the ship 
(without being the registered owner), X X √ 
 
as well as others who are in charge of 
central functions relating to the    
  operation of the ship       
     
(d) 
Any person performing salvage 
operations with the consent of  √  √  √ 
  
the owner or on the instruction of a 
competent public authority       
     
(e) Any person taking preventive measures √  √  √ 
     
(f) 
All servants of agents of persons 
mentioned in subparagraph …  (c), (d), (e) (c), (d), (e)  (b), (c), (c1), (d), (e) 
     
     
Unless the damage resulted from their 
personal act or omission,  √  √  √ 
committed with the intent to cause such 
damage, or recklessly and     
with knowledge that such damage would 
probably result 
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Table 9.3.2: Rules on the channelling of liability under the Bunkers Convention 
«√» means that these persons are explicitly protected against all claims for compensation from 
the injured party, while «X» means that they are not. 
 
  
No claim for compensation for pollution 
damage shall be made against: Bunkers C Spanish L. Norwegian L. 
        
(a) 
The servants or agents of the owner or 
the members of the crew X X √ 
        
(b) 
The pilot or any other person who, 
without being a member of the crew,  X X √ 
  performs services for the ship.       
        
(c) 
Any charterer (howsoever described, 
including a bareboat charterer), X X              X 
  manager or operator of the ship.       
        
(c1) 
Any sender, shipper, owner or receiver 
of the cargo X X √ 
         
(c2) 
«Reder/ rederi» owning the ship 
(without being the registered owner), X X X 
  
as well as others who are in charge of 
central functions relating to the      
  operation of the ship       
        
(d) 
Any person performing salvage 
operations with the consent of  X √  √ 
  
the owner or on the instruction of a 
competent public authority       
        
(e) Any person taking preventive measures X √  √ 
        
(f) 
All servants of agents of persons 
mentioned in subparagraph …  X (d), (e)  (b), (c1), (d), (e) 
        
        
Unless the damage resulted from their 
personal act or omission,  X √  √ 
committed with the intent to cause such 
damage, or recklessly and       
with knowledge that such damage would 
probably result       
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10.3.1 Coordinating international and Spanish rules on liability  
Even though the Spanish incorporation of the Oil Pollution Conventions seems 
consistent with the uniformity of the international rules, problems have and 
may easily arise when claims for compensation under the Convention is to be 
tried before a national court. The court will not only apply the incorporated 
international rules, but also Spanish internal law within the fields of procedural 
law, tort law, administrative law and has history has shown; on many occasions 
also criminal law. These rules all have to be interpreted so that they can be 
applied in accordance with one another.  
After the oil spills of both the Aegean Sea (1992) and the Prestige (2002), 
criminal proceedings have been opened.
292
 The legislation governing this 
procedure is the Criminal Code (CP) and the Criminal Procedure Act 
(LeCrim)
293
. According to Article 109.1 CP, every person who is criminally 
responsible is also liable for the civil damages caused by commission of the 
offence.
294
 This rule also applied under the prior Criminal Code, which was 
applicable in the case of the Aegean Sea. Criminal liability is personal, and only 
the author of the offence can be held responsible. Nevertheless, civil liability 
arising out of the commission of a criminal offence can extend to persons other 
than the author of the crime.
295
  
On the basis that both types of liability derives from a injurious act or omission, independent of 
its characteristic as a crime,
296
 the division of civil liability into two separate sets of legislation is 
widely criticised in Spanish legal theory.
297
 Apparently there are only historical reasons for the 
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existence of two separate systems, but the legislator has not found it necessary to amend this 
regime.
298
 
 
In the case of the Aegean Sea, the master of the ship and the pilot in charge 
of ship's entry to the harbour were both found guilty of criminal negligence. In 
addition, they were declared jointly and severally liable, each of them on a 50% 
basis, for the losses suffered by third parties as a result of the incident.
299
 It was 
also held that the owner's insurer and the 1971 Fund were directly liable for the 
caused damage, and that this liability was joint and several.
300
 In the inevitable 
event that the master and the pilot could not satisfy these liabilities, the 
judgement also declared the subsidiary liability of the owner of the Aegean Sea 
and the Spanish State as their respective employers.
301
 The distribution of 
liability was interpreted differently by the Spanish State and the 1971 Fund; the 
main dispute was that they were of different opinions on how much each of 
them should pay. This led to a cumbersome process, which was finally solved 
out of court – but not before October 2002.
302
 
When criminal proceedings have been opened, the judge will first have to 
address the criminal aspects, the he or she can move on to the civil claims.
303
 
For those who do not wish to present their claims under the criminal 
proceedings, they must wait until the court has given its verdict.
304
 This means 
that the international system of compensation created by the Oil Pollution 
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Convention will be slowed down whenever the method of assessing the claims 
for compensation under criminal proceedings is applied.
305
 The final outcome 
did however seem to be in accordance with the Conventions. The owner's 
insurer and the 71 Fund were held directly liable within the limits established 
by the CLC 69 and the 1971 Fund Convention, while the only actual Spanish 
supplement to the compensation regime consisted of the unlimited liability for 
the State, generated by the fault of the pilot. 
Nevertheless, the method of using the particular Spanish criminal procedure 
to impose civil liability based on the incorporated Conventions is a 
questionable method. One of the reasons is that the court does not seem to fully 
respect the international provisions. Even though they applied internal, 
criminal law when they imposed liability on the master, this was definitely not 
in accordance with the channelling rules of the CLC 69. Its Article III.4, second 
clause States that no claim for compensation for pollution damage may be 
made against the servants or agents of the owner, whether under the 
Convention or otherwise, and it seems clear that the master should fall within 
this category. The 1971 IOPC Fund was aware of this breach, but chose not to 
address it in the Court of Appeal.
306
 The reason might have been that the 
liability of the master was transferred to the owner, and further to the owner's 
insurer, which is a distribution of liability in accordance with the international 
regime. Secondly, the liability deriving from the commission of a criminal 
offence can not be limited, as the rules on limitation pursuant to the CLC 69 
only covers the liability of the owner as the liable party in accordance with the 
Convention.  
This means that neither the insurer which eventually covers the liability 
incurred by the master, nor the State through the vicarious liability for the pilot, 
has the right to limit its liability. However, even though the judgement did not 
explicitly say anything about the owner's or the insurers right to limit their 
liability, the limits pursuant to the CLC 69 has been applied in the execution of 
the judgement. The liability of the State is not covered by the international 
rules, and remained unlimited. Another questionable aspect of the judgement 
was that the court found the 1971 Fund and the owner's insurer jointly and 
severally liable; even though the liability was based on two different 
conventions. This is not a direct consequence of the criminal procedure, but the 
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court's interpretation of the international rules clearly conflicts with the limits 
applying to the liability of each of these parties. A more appropriate solution 
could have been a proportional division of the liability (pro rata). Again, the 71 
Fund was aware of the problem, but did not address it in the appeal.
307
  
In relation to the Prestige which sunk in 2002, the final distribution of 
liability among the potential liable persons is yet to be completed.
308
 
Nevertheless, the Spanish State has contributed to a quicker process by 
providing the injured parties with advanced compensation as well as financial 
aid, grants and subsidies on a solidarity base.
309
 Admittedly, these measures 
partly compensate the delay caused by the criminal procedures. Still, it remains 
to see if the Spanish courts dealing with the Prestige case will apply a 
coordinated version of the international and internal legal framework.  
10.4 Liability outside the Conventions 
10.4.1 Exhaustive rules on the channelling of liability  
The CLC 92 contains rules on the channelling of liability which protect some, 
but not all persons other than the owner of a ship from being claimed for 
compensation. Throughout the analysis carried out in Chapter IV10.3, it is also 
demonstrated that the Bunkers Convention, which in its original form is silent 
in this respect, will be supplemented by national provisions whenever applied 
as a part of Norwegian or Spanish law. An aspect of these channelling rules is 
that an injured party may claim compensation from one of the protected 
persons if the damage «resulted from their personal act or omission» and was 
committed «with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such damage would probably result. »
310
 The question is 
however if any person or legal entity not mentioned in the channelling rules 
can be held liable based on general tort law or any other legal basis except the 
CLC or the Bunkers Convention. An affirmative answer would imply that an 
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injured party might be able to evade the liability limits under the Conventions 
by other means than proving the intent or recklessness of the owner or any of 
the protected persons.  
As for the Bunkers Convention, it must be clear that the Convention as such 
does not prevent an injured party from seeking compensation from others than 
the registered owner, bareboat charterer, manager and operator of the ship. 
Even though some exceptions will apply when the Convention is interpreted 
within the national context of the Contracting States (at least within Norway 
and Spain), it follows from a natural reading of the wording and the context of 
the supplementary provisions that they are only meant to embrace the explicitly 
mentioned persons. The result is thus that an injured party may present claims 
against any person besides the ones qualifying as «shipowner», except from the 
ones protected when applying the incorporated Convention in accordance with 
the supplements of internal law. Such an interpretation, which means that all 
parties not explicitly mentioned will be exposed to the claims of the injured 
party, is also supported by legal literature on the subject.
311
 
Nevertheless, the problem at issue does not so much relate to the application 
of the Bunkers Convention as to the interpretation of the channelling rules 
under the CLC 92. The question is if an injured party be entitled to present 
claims for compensation based on internal rules towards all natural or legal 
persons not explicitly mentioned under these rules for compensation. In 
accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VLCT), a 
convention should not only be «interpreted in good faith», but also «in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty, in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose. »
312
 The political tug of 
war which often will have been fought out before the adoption of the final text 
also indicates that one should avoid conclusions based on interpretation by 
negative implication. By applying these principles of interpretation, it does not 
seem natural to assume that the list is meant to cover other persons besides the 
one explicitly mentioned. Even though this is a controversial topic,
313
 the 
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prevailing doctrine seems to be the one that interprets the wording according to 
its ordinary meaning, and thereby accept that the only persons protected under 
the CLC 92, are the ones explicitly listed.
314
 On this background, I will base the 
further discussion on the interpretation that neither of the Conventions, even 
when incorporated, impedes the injured party from claiming compensation 
from any natural or legal persons not explicitly protected.  
When the extent of this right first is established, there are no restrictions on 
the type of bases for liability that a claim against these persons might be 
founded on. In the following subchapters I will however limit the discussion to 
two potential bases and subjects of liability. The first is the Directive (EC) 
75/442 by which a cargo owner might become liable as a producer of waste. As 
the provisions of this Directive is applicable in both Norway and Spain 
respectively as part of the EEA Agreement
315
 and through its incorporation in 
the Spanish Act on Waste 10/1998,
316
 it does not represent any particular 
national measure. This is however the case with the vicarious liability of the 
State, which will be discussed in Chapter IV10.4.2. The reason for discussing 
these and not other potential bases for liability such as ordinary culpa, product 
liability and third party liability of classification societies is that they both are 
topics of current interest due to their application in the Erika case and the cases 
of the Aegean Sea/Prestige
317
 and that they form part of the national legislation. 
The national provisions on State liability are additionally founded on two 
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different types of liability; strict under Spanish law and a combination of culpa 
and strict liability under Norwegian law.  
By applying the criteria of current interest, the liability of classification societies could also have 
been discussed due to the Spanish State's ongoing recourse action against the American 
classification society ABS for the costs incurred in relation to the Prestige incident, and the 
judgment imposing liability on the Italian classification society RINA  in the Erika case.
318
 
However, a thorough discussion of this topic would exceed the limit of this thesis, as it is not 
particularly connected to the national context provided by the Norwegian and Spanish legal 
regime. See however the reflections in Third-Party Liability of Classification Societies – A 
Comparative Perspective, by Jürgen Basedow and Wolfgang Wurmnest, in series Hamburg 
studies on maritime affairs,  volume 2; Berlin 2005.
319
 
10.4.2 Liability of the cargo owner as previous holder of waste 
under Directive (EC) 75/445 
As a consequence of the judgment delivered by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) on 24 June 2008 as a reference for a preliminary ruling
320
the owner of 
spilled oil cargo may in the future be held liable as the «previous holder » of 
«waste» under Community law, cf. (EC) Directive 75/442.
321
  
The reference
322
 to the ECJ concerned the interpretation of the Directive 
75/442 on waste, and was made in the course of proceedings between the 
Commune de Mesquer and Total France SA and Total International Ltd. 
concerning compensation for the oil pollution damage caused by the sinking of 
the Erika on 12 December 1999.
323
 The heavy fuel oil cargo that had been 
spilled had also been subject to a sale by Total International Ltd. to an Italian 
company for use as fuel for electricity production. In order to carry out its 
contract, Total Int. had purchased the oil from Total France SA, and had 
chartered Erika to carry it from Dunkirk, France to Milazzo, Italy.
324
 
Article 15 of Directive 75/442 refers to terms defined in Article 1, and States 
that «In accordance with the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the cost of disposing of 
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waste must be borne by/ the holder (…) and/ or the previous holders or the 
producer of the product from which the waste came. » Pursuant to Article 1, 
«waste shall mean any substance or object in the categories set out in Annex I 
which the holder discards or intends or is required to discard». The term 
«producer» refers to «anyone whose activities produce waste (original 
producer) », and «holder» means «the producer of the waste or the natural or 
legal person who is in possession of it».
325
 
The first question submitted to the ECJ; «whether heavy fuel oil sold as a 
combustible fuel may be classified as waste within the meaning of Article 1(a) 
of Directive 75/442, »
326
 was answered in the negative. However, to the second 
and third questions, which were related to the classification of heavy fuel oil 
accidentally spilled at sea and mixed with water and sediment as «waste», and 
the liability of the producer, seller and charterer as «producers» and «holders» 
of the oil for the costs of disposing such waste, the court answered 
affirmatively.
327
 The Court held that: 
« (…) hydrocarbons accidentally spilled at sea following a shipwreck, mixed with 
water and sediment and drifting along the coast of a Member State until being 
washed up on that coast, constitute waste within the meaning of Article 1(a) of 
Directive 75/442, where they are no longer capable of being exploited or marketed 
without prior processing. »
328
 
The Court further Stated that even though the oil was carried by a third party at 
the time of the incident by which the oil eventually was converted to «waste» 
within the meaning of the Directive, the Directive also provided that  
« (…) certain categories of persons, in this case the 'previous holders' or the 
'producer of the product from which the waste came, may in accordance with the 
'polluter pays' principle, be responsible fro bearing the cost of disposing of waste. 
That financial obligation is thus imposed on them because of their contribution to 
the creation of the waste and, in certain cases, to the consequent risk of 
pollution. »
329
 
As a result, it would be possible for a national court of an EU Member State to 
regard the seller-charterer as a previous holder of the waste in accordance with 
Article 15 if the necessary causal connection could be established between the 
actions or omissions of the seller-charterer and the risk of a shipwreck and thus 
pollution. The contribution to such a risk could, according to the Court, can in 
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particular consist of the seller-charterer failing to «take measures to prevent 
such an incident, such as measures concerning the choice of ship».
330
 
According to the 1992 Fund, this particular judgment on the possibility to 
impose liability on the cargo owner will not affect the application of the CLC 
92 and the IOPC Funds.
331
 It is not clear whether it might be a conflict of 
substantial rules between the Directive and the channelling rules of the CLC 92, 
but this was not discussed by the ICJ as they only gave a preliminary ruling of 
the presented question. They did not evaluate the relationship between the 
Directive and the CLC 92. 
On a different level, even though Directive 75/442 is applicable as both 
Norwegian and Spanish law,
332
 there seems to be a conflict between a cargo 
owner's liability according to this EU secondary legislation and the Norwegian 
rules supplementing the channelling rules of the CLC 92 and the Bunkers 
Convention. According to Section 193.2 c) NMC which supplement the CLC 
92 with internal rules on the channelling of liability, as well as Section 185.1 
NMC which refers to Section 192.2 in respect of oil spill covered by the 
Bunkers Convention, an oil pollution victim would be prevented from claiming 
«an sender shipper, owner or receiver of the cargo» for compensation. 
Nevertheless, as the Directive is applicable as Norwegian law according to 
Section 1 of the EEA Act, and provisions adopted to fulfil Norway's obligations 
pursuant to the EEA Agreement will prevail ordinary legislation in accordance 
with Section 2 of the Act, it might still be invoked by a third party seeking 
compensation from the cargo owner under Norwegian law. This result would 
however imply a restrictive interpretation of the supplementary protection 
provided by Section 192.2 c) NMC. 
10.4.3 State liability 
A State will often have intervened in the course of action leading towards a 
maritime incident causing oil pollution damage, and it is not unusual that a 
question of State liability arises in the wake of such an accident.
333
 Examples of 
such intervention can be the fault of a pilot in charge of the ships' entry to 
port,
334
 the decision to deny a fragile tanker port of refugee and tow it out to 
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sea,
335
 or the non-appearance of an underwater rock on an official marine 
chart.
336
 One of the central legal bases on which the liability can be established 
is the State's vicarious liability for its employees.
337
  
Under Norwegian law, the State or the Public Authority in question, will be 
vicariously liable for damage either intentionally - or by the fault or negligence 
of its employees within the course of employment and during the exercise of the 
function assigned to the employee, see Section 2-1 SKL. The liability will also 
cover anonymous or cumulative mistakes, which means that an injured party 
does not have to appoint the injurious action or omission to a specific person; 
the condition of fault or neglect is fulfilled if the fault can be ascribed to one or 
more of the employees.
338
 Within the expression «intentionally or by fault or 
negligence»
339
 there is also a reservation that the damage must be unlawful.
340
 
The crux of the matter usually relies on whether the person acting on behalf of 
the public authority has acted within the scope of employment, and particularly 
if he has complied with demands that «reasonably can be expected» of the 
authority in question.
 341
 In the evaluation of the latter aspect, one must take 
into account the general risk of damage being caused as a consequence of the 
operation or non-operation of the Public Authority in question, its available 
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economical resources, the type of damage caused and the possibility of the 
injured party to take out insurance to cover such damage.
342
 
In contrast to the Norwegian system, there are two sets of rules particularly 
governing the Spanish State's vicarious liability for extra-contractual damage;
343
 
the strict civil/administrative liability
344
 and the subsidiary civil liability for 
damage arising out of the commission of a criminal offence.
345
 In regard of the 
administrative liability, the rule is that a Public Authority may incur strict and 
direct liability for damage caused to a third party if the damage or injury inflicts 
with the injured party's individual rights or property, and the he or she did not 
have the legal duty to endure such damage.
346
 The damage must have been 
caused by an action or omission performed within the scope of employment, 
and not by force majeure. Neither can it result from the daily risks of life.
347
 The 
scope of employment does however embrace both the normal and the 
abnormal operation of the public services; a term widely interpreted so to cover 
all sections of the Public Authorities and all kinds of actions and omissions.
348
 
In order to separate the types of actions that gives rise to liability and those that 
will not in regard of the strict liability pursuant to LRJAP, the court will often 
resort to the question of causal connection between the act or omission and the 
damage, or whether the damage must be considered as a result of the daily risks 
                                           
342
 See Rt-2000-253 «Signpost» p. 265, cf. Rt-1970-1154 «Tirranna». It has traditionally been 
maintained that a particular, mild culpa standard applies to the service aspect of work 
performed by the Public Authorities, see Hagstrøm, Viggo. Offentligrettslig 
erstatningsansvar. Oslo, 1987 p. 391-397 and Lødrup (1999) p. 186-190. This point of view 
has recently met some criticism, see Liisberg, Bent. Erstatningsansvaret for offentlig 
servicevirksomhet. Kritikk av en juridisk vranglære. Bergen, 2005, pp. 667-670.  
343
 A third set governs the vicarious liability of private employers, see Article 1903.4 CC. The 
vicarious liability of other persons is governed by Articles 1903-1910 CC. 
344
 Arts 139 et seq. LRJAP (Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de Régimen Jurídico de las 
Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común. BOE núm. 285 de 
27/11/2002) 
345
 Arts 109 cf. 121 CP. See also Art 146 LRJAP. 
346
 Art 140 LRJAP. See Treviiano, Ernesto García. Sinopsis artículo 106 de la Constitución 
española (online). Diciembre 2003. http://narros.congreso.es/constitucion/constitucion 
/indice/index.htm   [1 June 2009] 
347
  See for instance STS 29/10/1998 in which a young girl drowned after jumping off a 
breakwater. As there were no signs marking the place as dangerous, her mother invoked 
administrative liability on the part the municipality. The Spanish Supreme Court found 
that the municipality could not be liable as a result of the fact that the sea always will 
constitute a risk, and that it would be impossible to place warning signs along the entire 
coast. 
348
 Novella (2002) p. 77 
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of life.
349
 According to some Spanish scholars, recent judgments from the 
Spanish Supreme Court indicate that the Court do not only consider these 
aspects, but also whether the employee has complied with the type of conduct 
that reasonably can be expected of the Public Authority in question.
350
 This has 
been interpreted as an introduction of fault into the scheme of strict liability.
351
 
Pursuant to Article 121 cf. Article 109 CP, the corresponding Public 
Administration may also incur (subsidiary) liability for any damage resulting 
from a crime caused by fault, negligence or intent within the scope of the 
perpetrator's position or functions as an employee.
352
  
Through a comparison of the national case law on the subject, it becomes 
clear that the Spanish State has incurred liability for damage caused by the 
non-appearance of underwater obstacles on a marine chart and the fault of a 
pilot,
353
 while the Norwegian State has yet to incur liability for similar 
scenarios.
354
 However, as the case law supporting this assertion dates back to 
the 1960’s, and the Swedish State was imposed liability for an oil spill caused 
by the non-appearance of a shoal on a marine chart in 1983,
355
 the situation 
might be another in the future. It will all depend on the negligence of the State, 
in terms of whether the action in question reasonably could have been expected 
to be carried out differently.
 356
 
In accordance with the current channelling rules,
357
 a pilot will be one of the persons explicitly 
exempted from liability under the incorporated CLC 92 in both Norway and Spain,
358
 and also 
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 See Coderch, Pablo Salvador and Antonio Fernández Crende. Causalidad y 
reponsabilidad, 3.ed. In: InDret 1/2006 (online). http://www.indret.com/pdf/329_es.pdf [1 
June 2009] [Coderch (2006) A] p. 11-12 with further references to case law. 
350
 See for instance STS 09/05/2002 «Isla de Hierro», STS 24/07/2001 «Guardia Civil» and 
STS 16/02/1999 «Rebound ball». 
351
 Martín (2003) p. 7 and Coderch (2002) B with further references 
352
 See Pérez (2007) p. 358 with further reference to judgments of the «Sala Penal» of the 
Supreme Court.   
353
 In connection with the shipwreck of Urquiola (1976) and Aegean Sea (1992); see footnotes 
334 and 336, as well as Chapter IV10.3.1. See also Pulido (2007) p. 165, Martín (2003) p. 9 
and Coderch (2003) p. 23. 
354
  See Rt-1963-622 «Prince Charles» and Rt-1965-1335 in regard of the Norwegian State’s 
repudiation of liability for a pilot’s fault. The Norwegian Supreme court did in both cases 
ascribe the fault to the shipowner (reder – se footnote 262 on p. 3) as the current 
employer. As for the question of liability for the non-appearance of obstacles on marine 
charts, see Rt-1966-351 in which the Court found that the State could not be blamed for 
not knowing about the shoal in question. 
355
 Nordiske Domme i Sjøfartsanliggender ND-1983-1/ Swedish Supreme Court NJA 1983-1 
356
 Section 2-1.1 SKL 
357
 In contrast to the expression «servants or agents of the owner» under Art III.4 CLC 69 
358
 Art 4 b CLC 92 cf. Sections 192.2  b)NMC 
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in respect of bunker oil spill from a non-tanker if the question is to be solved by the application 
of Norwegian law.
359
 
 Nevertheless, based on the presumption that the rule on State liability provided 
by Articles 139 et seq. LRJAP does not require the presence of fault of 
negligence while this is a minimum requirement under the corresponding 
Norwegian rule in Section 2-1 SKL, it seems like an oil pollution victim might 
have a better chance of obtaining compensation from the State under Spanish 
law.  
10.5 Limitation of liability 
Under the CLC 92 and the LLMC 76/96 (in relation to claims subject to the 
Bunkers Convention), the ship owner will usually be entitled to constitute a 
fund
360
 in order to limit his liability to an amount calculated on the basis of the 
tonnage of his ship. Even though this means that the injured party may not get 
full compensation for his loss, limitation will in most cases be justified if the 
limits are high enough to cover the loss, and because of the no-fault, strict 
liability imposed on the ship owner.
361
 It must also be noted that for pollution 
damage caused by tankers, the compensation from the IOPC Funds comes on 
top of the fund established by the owner. Even though history has proved that 
the limits have been to low on many occasions, the 2000 Amendments to the 
CLC 92 and the 1992 Fund Convention, as well as the entry in force of the 
2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol, are measures that drastically have raised 
the amount of funds available to parties who have suffered losses because of the 
oil pollution. 
Nevertheless, this does not apply to the third party victims of bunker oil spill 
from non-tankers. There are no supplementary tiers to the Bunkers Convention, 
so the funds available from the owner's insurer or the other people qualifying as 
owner must cover all the damage caused by the spill.  
The CLC 92 provides its own liability limits,
362
 while the Bunkers Convention 
refers to «any applicable national or international regime, such as the 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, as amended 
[by the Protocol of 1996 to amend the Convention on limitation of liability for 
                                           
359
 Sections 185.1 cf. 192.2 NMC 
360
 Art V.3 CLC 92, Art 11 LLMC 76/96, directly applicable in Spanish law, and implemented 
into Norwegian law through Sections 185.2 cf. 177 and 195.1 NMC 
361
 Carballo Calero (2006) p. 502 
362 
Art V.1 CLC 92 
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maritime claims, 1976] ».
363
 The only reason for which the ship owner cannot 
limit his liability under the CLC 92 is if the pollution damage resulted from «his 
personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or 
recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result».
364
 
When it comes to the liability established under the Bunkers Convention, the 
limitation rules depends on the selected regime. If the LLMC 76/96 was to be 
chosen, the conduct barring the limitation would be the same as in the CLC 
92.
365
  
As for the rules on limitation under the CLC 92, both Norway and Spain 
have implemented and incorporated these in accordance with the 
Convention.
366
 This means that applicable liability limits under the CLC 92 are 
4, 51 million SDR
367
 for a ship not exceeding 5 000 units of tonnage, while the 
owner or insurer of a ship exceeding this tonnage will be subject to a limit of 4, 
52 million SDR plus 631 for each additional unit of tonnage. However, liability 
under the CLC 92 will never exceed the total sum of 89, 77 million SDR.
368
 
In relation to the Bunkers Convention, the LLMC 76/96 has been chosen as 
the corresponding limitation regime under both Norwegian and Spanish law.
369
 
Since the LLMC 76/96 is a general convention on the limitation of maritime 
claims, it also contains particular limits on maritime claims relating to death 
and personal injury. These limits will not be applicable to claims under the 
Bunkers Convention, as such damage lies outside the scope of compensatory 
«pollution damage». The applicable liability limits are the ones pursuant to 
Article 6.1 (b) of the LLMC 76/96:  
                                           
363 
Art 6 Bunkers Convention 
364 
Art V.2 CLC 92. In the wake of the Hebei Spirit oil spill (Republic of Korea, 2007), there is 
currently an ongoing case related to the deprivation of the owner of the crane barge and 
the towing tugs, Samsung Heavy Industries, the right to limit it's liability because of 
negligence. See 92FUND/EXC.44/7. 
365 
Art 4 LLMC 76/96 
366
 See Section 194 NMC and the Spanish instrument of adhesion to the CLC 92 published in 
BOE núm 225 de 20/9/1995 which respectively implements and incorporates the liability 
limits and the conducts that will prevent limitation under the CLC 92.   
367
 Special Drawing Right as defined by the International Monetary Fund. According to 
Art 9 (a) of the CLC 92, the amount shall be converted into national currency on the basis 
of the value of that currency by reference to the SDR on the date of the constitution of the 
limitation fund.  
368 
Art V.1 CLC 92. These are the limits according to the 2000 Amendment, and will apply to 
incidents occurring after 1 November 2003, cf the resolution pursuant to Art 15.4 CLC 92 
of the IMO Legal Committee on 23 October 2000, see IMO Doc Leg.1(82). 
369
 Section 185.2 NMC refers to Chapter 9 of the NMC, which implements and supplies the 
LLMC 76/96. As for the Spanish legislation, the choice is expressed in R.D. 1795/2008 of 
3 November on the coverage of the civil liability under the Bunkers Convention 
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« (i) 1 million [SDR] for a ship with a tonnage not exceeding 2000 tons, 
(ii) for a ship with a tonnage in excess thereof, the following amount in addition 
that mentioned in (i): 
for each ton from 20001 to 30 000 tons, 400 [SDR] 
for each ton from 30 001 to 70 000 tons, 300 [SDR] 
for each ton in excess of 70 000 tons, 200 [SDR].»
370
 
With this said, it can be Stated that the international liability limits as such do 
not represent any national difference in relation to an injured party's right to 
compensation under Norwegian and Spanish law. However, the same 
conclusion cannot be made in relation to the types of pollution damage subject 
to limitation under the extern limitation regime of the Bunkers Convention. In 
contrast to the particular liability limits of the CLC 92, which will apply to all 
claims reckoned to be compensatory under the Convention, the owner's right to 
limit his liability for bunker oil pollution claims under the LLMC 76/96 
depends on whether or not each of these claims are subject to limitation under 
the external Convention. This problem arises because the LLMC 76/96 does 
not provide any general right of limitation for bunker oil pollution claims. Such 
claims might take different forms, and only those falling within the scope of 
Article 2.1 will be subject to limitation.
371
 Yet another aspect that might cause a 
difference in the amount of total funding available to injured third parties, is 
that even though claims relating to clean-up operations may be subject to 
limitation under Article 2.1 (d) and (e),
372
 the LLMC 76/96 allows its 
Contracting States to regulate the liability limits for such wreck removal claims 
under national law.
373
 Both Norway and Spain has taken this opportunity.
374
  
In relation to the bunker oil pollution clams subject to liability under the 
LLMC 76/96, the uncertainty is in particular related to pure, economic loss. 
The question is if Article 2.1 LLMC 76/96 includes pure economic loss in the 
sense of loss of earnings caused by the contamination of the environment if the 
injured party has not sustained any physical damage to his or her property.
375
 
                                           
370
 Art 6.1 (b) LLMC 76/96, see Section 175.3 NMC.  
371
 de la Rue (1998) p. 271 
372
 See Ot.prp.nr.77 (2006-2007) Om lov om endringer i lov 24. juni 1994 nr. 39 om sjøfarten 
(sjøloven) og om samtykke til ratifikasjon av den internasjonale konvensjon 2001 om 
erstatningsansvar for bunkersoljesølskade, p. 17 
373
 Art 18.1 of  the LLMC 76/96 
374
 Declarations on the excluding of the application of Art 2.1 (d) and (e) LLMC 76/96 was 
presented by Norway on 28 June 2002, se IMO doc LLMC/Circ.42 of 31 August 2002, and 
by Spain on  10 January 2005, se IMO doc LLMC.3/Circ.11 of 30 March 2005.  
375
 Zhu (2007) p. 156, Tsimplis (2005) p. 99; see also Colin de la Rue and Peter Murray. Oil 
Pollution from Ships – current legal issues. Discourse given at Shanghai International 
Maritime Forum, 5 July 2005. [de la Rue 2005] http://www.ukpandi.com/ 
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The answer depends on the interpretation of the wording in Article 2.1 (c), or 
more accurate whether pure economic loss qualifies as an «infringement of 
rights other than contractual rights. » This again depends on the national 
interpretation. As for Norway and Spain, the interpretation will probably 
include pure economic loss, as such loss in general is considered compensatory 
whenever there is a sufficient causal connection between the loss and the 
injurious action.
376
 
Nevertheless, a clear difference is created through the national regulation of 
claims subject to Article 2.1 (d) LLMC 76/96, which most probably involve 
claims for costs incurred through the undertaking of clean-up operations. While 
the Norwegian legislator opted for applying particular limits of liability to such 
claims under the LLMC 76/96,
377
 the Spanish legislator has decided that they 
shall not be subject to limitation at all.
378
 As the State often will be the entity 
that covers most of these costs,
379
 the most vulnerable injured parties, such as 
fishermen and hoteliers, will not be affected by this difference. When Section 
175 a NMC was adopted in 2005, the Ministry of Justice and the Police 
considered the limits as high enough to cover all incurred costs in relation to 
wreck removal and clean-up operations.
380
 However, already three years later, 
on December 5 2008, the Norwegian government submitted a bill to Parliament 
proposing to double the limitation amounts for liability for wreck removal and 
other clean-up costs related to maritime incidents when the ship in question 
has a tonnage larger than 2000.
381
 As of 1 June 2009, no amendments have been 
made. 
Yet another question is the insurance coverage of these costs. The Bunkers 
Convention only obliges the registered owner to take out an insurance that 
                                                                                                                               
ukpandi/Infopool.nsf/HTML/F81A0FF641364E0D802570360063D24E?Open&Highlight
=2,de%20la%20rue [1 June 2009] 
376
 Lødrup (1999) p. 353, Ponce de Léon (1999) pp. 314, 322.  
377
 Art 172 a, cf. Art 175 a NMC. This exception only applies to ships with a tonnage larger 
than 300, cf. Art 72 a. If the ship is smaller, the ordinary liability limits pursuant to LLMC 
76/96 will apply, see Art 172.1 NMC.  This solution is commented on in Ot.prp.nr.79 
(2004-2005) p. 23-26.  
378
 See the Instrument of Adhesion to the 1996 Protocol to the LLMC 76, BOE No. 50 de 
28/02/2005  
379
 See NOU 2002:15 p. 28. This was also the case in the Prestige incident, see 
92FUND/EXC.44/4 paragraph 4.1.1. 
380
 Ot.prp.nr.79 (2004-2005) p. 23 
381
 Ot.prp.nr. 16 (2008-2009). The amendment has been proposed following a maritime 
incident on January 12 2007, in which the bulk carrier Server grounded off Fedje in 
Hordaland, Norway and consequently broke apart. The governments clean-up costs have 
been estimated to be just below the current limitation amount, and has demonstrated that 
the liability limits pursuant to Section 175 a might be to low.  
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shall cover an amount «not exceeding» the liability calculated in accordance 
with the LLMC 76/96.
382
 This problem lies on the verge on the topic of this 
thesis, but will be briefly discussed below. 
10.6 Mandatory insurance coverage and direct action  
Both the CLC 92 and the Bunkers Convention contains provision obliging the 
registered owner of a ship of a certain size to take out sufficient insurance to 
cover their liability under the Conventions.
383
 Each ship within this category 
must also be in possession of a certificate attesting that this insurance or 
financial security is in force in accordance with the Conventions.
384
 
Even though the Bunkers Convention does not apply to pollution damage as defined in 
CLC 92,
385
 the exclusion of such tankers is not expressed in the definition of «ship» in Article 
1.1. The result is that the wording of Article 7.2 cf. 7.5, which States that «each ship» shall carry 
such certification, implies that even oil tankers subject to the CLC 92 must be in possession of 
an insurance certificate in accordance with the Bunkers Convention. This rule has not come to 
expression under Norwegian law, as Section 183.3 excludes ships embraced by the CLC 92 
from the definition of a «ship» under incorporated rules of the Bunkers Convention. According 
to Ot.prp.nr.16 (2008-2009),
386
 neither the Government nor the legislator was aware of this 
deviation, and a bill proposing to amend Section 183 so that the definition does not exclude 
tankers has been submitted to the Parliament. The exclusion of tankers subject to the 
incorporated provisions of CLC 92 from the application of Chapter 10.I NMC will appear in a 
separate provision.
387
 
The CLC 92 and the Bunkers Convention also provide all injured third parties 
with the right of direct action against the insurance company. 388 This is a 
feature that facilitates prompt and adequate disbursement of compensation. 
While the CLC requires the owner of an oil tanker registered in a Contracting 
State and carrying more than 2 000 tons in bulk as cargo to take out insurance, 
usually in an P&I Club,
389
 the same requisition applies to the registered owner 
of a non-tanker registered in a Contracting State if the ship has a gross tonnage 
greater than 1000. Each insured ship shall be in possession of a certificate 
attesting that insurance of financial security is in force in accordance with the 
                                           
382
 Art 7.1 Bunkers Convention 
383
 Art VII.1 CLC 92, Art 7.1 Bunkers Convention 
384
 Art VII.2 cf. Art VII.4 CLC 92, Art 7.2 cf. Art 7.5 Bunkers Convention 
385
 Art 4.1 Bunkers Convention 
386
 Ot.prp.nr.16 (2008-2009) paragraph 3 
387
 Ot.prp.nr.16 (2008-2009) paragraph 3 
388 
Art VII.8 CLC 92, Art 7.10  Bunkers Convention  
389
 Falkanger & Bull (2004) p. 182 
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Conventions.
390
 Under the Bunkers Convention, the owner's insurance 
represents the only guaranteed source for compensation, as no supplementary 
fund will be available. The only defences that might be invoked by the insurer 
are the reasons for which the owner himself would have been exempted from 
liability
391
 other than bankruptcy or winding up of the owner, as well as the 
wilful misconduct of the owner. Nevertheless, the insurer will never be liable 
for a higher sum than provided by the corresponding limits of limitation. Even 
if the owner have acted in a way that deprive him of the right to limit his 
liability under these rules, the insurer's right to limitation remains intact.
392
   
An insurance regime in accordance with the one established in the 
Conventions is established under Norwegian law through Sections 186-188 and 
197-200 NMC, and further developed through the Regulation on insurance and 
financial security for oil pollution liability under the Bunkers Convention and 
the CLC 92 of 17 June 2008 No. 607.
393
 
In Spanish law, the international provisions will be directly applicable as 
incorporated rules, and the insurance regime is further developed through two 
separate regulations; the R.D. 1795/2008 on the coverage of bunker oil liability, 
and R.D. 1892/ 2004 on the national execution of the CLC 92.
394
 
Even though many interesting problems of discussion can be addressed 
within the field of compulsory insurance and certificates,
395
 the principal 
problem in relation to an injured party's right to compensation concerns their 
right to direct action against the insurer for oil pollution claims outside the 
scope of the Conventions. These claims can be divided into two groups. The 
first group embraces claims subject to limitation under Article 2.1 (d) and (e) 
LLMC 76/96, as both Norway and Spain has reserved the right to regulate the 
limitation of costs incurred through wreck removal and clean-up operations of 
bunker oil from non tankers.
396
 The second group relates to oil pollution claims 
falling outside the scope of the Conventions. The question is whether the 
                                           
390
 Art VII.2 CLC 92, Art 7.2 Bunkers Convention 
391
 Art III.2 and III.3 CLC 92, Art 3.3 and 3.4 Bunkers Convention 
392
 Art VII.8 CLC 92, Art 7.10  Bunkers Convention  
393
 Forskrift om forsikring og annen sikkerhet for oljesølsansvar for skip etter 
Bunkerskonvensjonen 2001 og ansvarskonvensjonen 1992 of 17 June 2008 No. 607, 
adopted in accordance with Sections 186.4 and 198 NMC.  
394
 BOE núm. 226 de 18/9/2004. This R.D. has later been amended in order to correspond 
better to the rules of R.D. 1795/2008, see the R.D. 1795/2008, first final disposition. 
395
 For instance that it is only the registered owner, and not the other liable persons under the 
Bunkers Convention who is required to maintain a mandatory insurance; and whether the 
right to check relevant certificates in the territorial sea is prevented by the right to innocent 
passage pursuant to Art 17 UNCLOS.  
396
 See the previous Chapter on the limitation of liability (IV10.5) 
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national legislation provides the injured party with a right of direct action 
against the insurer in these cases.  
Under Norwegian law, it is assumed that the costs of bunker oil clean-up 
operations that exceeds the maximum limit of the LLMC 76/96 because of their 
particular regulation in Sections 175a cf. 172a, will be covered by the ship's 
ordinary P&I insurance.
397
 This presumption seems to be in accordance with 
the conditions of the two significant P&I Clubs Gard and Skuld.
398
 Due to the 
cooperation between the members of the International Group of P&I Clubs, 
the scope of coverage for wreck removal liability under P&I insurance is similar 
in all major P&I clubs.
399
 The Norwegian legislator has also extended the rules 
on direct action under the implemented provision of the Bunkers Convention 
to the part of the claim exceeding the mandatory insurance coverage under the 
Bunkers Convention.
400
 In the preparatory works it is Stated that this is 
considered to be an interpretation in accordance with the wording of Article 
7.10 of the Bunkers Convention, which provides that «any claim for pollution 
damage may be brought directly against the insurer or other person providing 
financial security for the registered owner's liability for pollution damage».
401
 
However, the conditions of insurance provided by the P&I Clubs will normally 
constitute a bar to this right of direct action through the «pay to be paid»-
rule.
402
 This rule implies that the assured will not be entitled to be paid by the 
Club until he himself has made payment to the third party,
403
 and will 
consequently also prevent claimants from presenting their claim directly against 
the insurer.
404
 Nevertheless; the right of direct action is also the general 
principle under Sections 7-6.1 cf. 7-7 of the Norwegian Insurance Contracts 
Act (FAL).
405
 Even though it is possible to contract out of this rule if the 
insurance relates to commercial activities concerning ships required to be 
registered according to the NMC, see Section 1-3.2 (c) FAL, the rule of direct 
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 Ot.prp.nr.77 (2006-2007) p. 17 
398
 Gard Rule 40 and SKULD Rule 15 provides that the raising, removal, destruction and 
marking of a ship, or the wreck of a ship or parts thereof are covered by the insurance, 
provided that such costs are legally recoverable from the owner of the ship. 
399
 Falkanger & Bull (2004) p. 502 
400
 Section 188.3 NMC 
401
 Ot.prp.nr.77 (2006-2007) p. 17 
402
 See Gard Rule 87.1 and SKULD Rule 28.5.1 
403
 Zhu (2007) p. 181, Carballo-Calero (2006) p. 515, Arroyo (2005) p. 630 
404
 This problem will not arise in relation to the right of direct action pursuant to the CLC 92 
and the Bunkers Convention for claims within the corresponding liability limits, see 
Carballo-Calero (2006) p. 517 
405
 Forsikringsavtaleloven av 16. juni 1989 nr. 69 (FAL). See Falkanger & Bull (2004) p. 506 
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action would in any case apply should the assured be insolvent, cf. 
Section 7-8.2. This rule is compulsory, and may not be deviated to the 
detriment of the injured party, cf. Section 7-8.3.
406
 As a consequence, the «pay 
to be paid»-rule cannot be invoked under Norwegian law.
407
 A prerequisite for 
these rules to apply is however that Norwegian law can be applied pursuant to 
rules on choice of law.
408
 This would also be the solution for the second group 
in terms of claims related to oil pollution damage falling outside the scope of 
the Conventions. 
Under Spanish law, direct action against the insurer is also the general 
principle pursuant to Article 76 of the Spanish Insurance Contracts Act 
(LCS).
409
 According to Article 2 LCS this is also a mandatory rule unless other 
wise is expressed. There are no particular rules on the coverage of the unlimited 
liability for costs incurred through bunker oil clean-up operations exceeding the 
ordinary limit of liability pursuant to the LLMC 76/96.
410
 In result, the P&I 
Club providing insurance for the owner will be bound to compensate the entire 
amount, as there is usually no limitation on such insurance.
411
 It is the risk as 
such that is insured.
412
  The right to direct action will however depend on the 
applicability of Spanish law – or any other national law allowing this concept. 
10.7 Compensation from the IOPC Funds 
Due to the limited liability of the ship owner and his insurer, their contribution 
might not cover the cost of compensating all the damage caused by the oil spill. 
In the case of an oil spill caused by bunker oil from a non-tanker, the injured 
parties themselves will have to cover the remaining costs.
413
 However, for 
pollution damage caused by oil from a tanker within the meaning of Art I.1 
                                           
406
 Falkanger & Bull (2004) p. 507 
407
 Falkanger & Bull (2004) p. 505 
408
 See ND-2002-306/ Rt-2001-180 «Leros Strength» 
409
 Ley 50/1980 de Contrato de Seguro (LCS), de 8 de octubre, BOE núm. 250 de 
17/10/1980. See Arroyo (2005) p. 630. The LCS supplies the general rules on marine 
insurance pursuant to the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio 1885), Book III, Title 
III, 3rd Section, see the doctrina jurisprudencial reiterated in STS 03/07/2003. 
410
 R.D. 1795/2008 does not supply the Bunkers Convention in any way in this respect, as 
Art 1.1 only repeats the content of Art 7.1 of the Convention.  
411
 Some limits will usually apply in relation to the liability for oil pollution damage and 
overspill costs of a catastrophe claim; see Falkanger & Bull (2004) p. 503 with reference to 
Gard Rules 53 and 51B. 
412
 Arroyo (2005) p. 628 
413
 Note that the liability limit for costs incurred in relation to the clean-up operation and thus 
subject to limitation under Art 2.1 (d) and (e) LLMC 76/96 may be governed by more 
restrictive internal rules such as under Norwegian and Spanish law. See Chapter IV10.5. 
 83
CLC 92, the funds available under the CLC 92 will only constitute the first layer 
of three.  
Just as the CLC, the question whether the 1992 Fund Convention and/ or the 
2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol apply to a claim will primarily depend on 
whether pollution damage has been sustained in a Contracting State and on 
each claim's fulfilment of requisitions concerning scope of application and 
compensatory losses.
414
 The claims will usually be assessed by the Fund itself, 
but in the case of a proceeding before a Norwegian or Spanish court, the prior 
analysis has shown that the national interpretation of definitions, the 
geographical limits and the requisitions on the scope of application of the IOPC 
Conventions seems to correspond to those of the CLC 92. This means that 
claims for pollution damage or preventive measures will be admissible to the 
same extent against the IOPC Funds as they are against the owner and his 
insurer under the CLC 92.
415
 
As both Norway and Spain are Contracting States to the IOPC Funds, 
claimants within these jurisdictions will in principle have the same right to 
compensation from the Funds. Since the 1992 Fund and the 2003 
Supplementary Fund are two independent, international organizations, a 
Contracting State cannot extend their liability beyond the in-court 
interpretation of the term «pollution damage». However, as both the 
Norwegian and the Spanish interpretation seem to be in accordance with the 
international definition, this will not cause any divergence between Norwegian 
and Spanish injured parties. One issue that perhaps could affect a claimant's 
access to compensation from the Funds, is the delay caused by judicial 
proceedings. Nevertheless; this is not a difference of a national character. Even 
though the opening of time-consuming proceedings seems to be the norm in 
Spain, there is no guarantee that the same thing would not happen in Norway.  
Based on these observations, it can be concluded that the Norwegian and 
Spanish law provides national claimants with the same right to compensation 
from the IOPC Funds. The amounts of supplementary funding that becomes 
available to victims in Contracting States, shows that the real difference 
remains between third parties in States that have ratified the IOPC Funds 
Conventions and those who have not: In stead of a total amount of 89, 77 
million SDR for tanker with a tonnage larger than 14 000 under the CLC 92,
416
 
the maximum compensation available from the 1992 Fund, included the 
                                           
414
 de la Rue (2009) p. 144 
415
 de la Rue (2009)  p. 144-145  
416
 Art V.1 CLC 92 
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amount actually paid by the owner or his insurer under the CLC 92, will be 
203 million SDR.
417
 For claimants in Contracting States to the 2003 
Supplementary Fund Protocol, which includes Norway and Spain, the total 
amount; including the compensation actually paid under the CLC 92 and the 
1992 Fund Convention will come to 750 million SDR.
418
  
Even though the IOPC Conventions are identical with the CLC 92 when it 
comes to the scope of application and compensatory losses, they also contain 
additional rules on the eligibility of compensatory claims. The 1992 Fund will 
pay compensation to a claimant if he or she has been «unable to obtain full and 
adequate compensation» under the CLC 92, and this is due to either (a) 
«because no liability for the damage arise under the [CLC 92]», (b) because the 
owner who is liable under CLC 92 is «financially incapable of meeting his 
obligations in full», and the mandatory, financial security «does not cover or is 
insufficient to satisfy the claims for compensation for the damage», or (c); 
«because the damage exceeds the owner's liability under the [CLC 92] (…) or 
under the terms of any other international Convention (…)».
419
 Should the total 
amount of compensation from the 1992 Fund be insufficient to cover the 
amount not covered by the owner and his insurer under the CLC 92, or there is 
a risk that the established claims will exceed the applicable limit of 
compensation under the 1992 Fund Convention, the 2003 Supplementary Fund 
will cover the remaining damage, at least up to the total limit of 750 million 
SDR.
420
 
The 1992 Fund may however invoke some defences in order to be exonerated 
from paying compensation. As the 2003 Supplementary Fund only pays 
compensation to a claimant who has been unable to obtain full compensation 
under the 1992 Fund Convention «because the total damage exceeds, or there 
is a risk that it will exceed the applicable limit of compensation»,
421
 the 
exoneration of the 1992 Fund's obligation to pay compensation will also apply 
to the 2003 Supplementary Fund. The reasons for why the Funds may be 
exonerated are in principle the same as the ones that may be invoked by the 
owner and his insurer under the CLC 92, and includes situations in which the 
                                           
417
 Art 4.4 1992 Fund Convention. These amounts apply to incidents occurring on or after 1 
November 2003, cf the resolution pursuant to Art 33 1992 Fund Convention of the IMO 
Legal Committee on 23 October 2000; IMO Doc Leg.2(82). 
418
 Art 4.2 (a) 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. The elevation will most probably result in a 
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oil pollution was caused by war risks,
422
 by non-commercial State ships
423
 and 
the contributory negligence of the claimants.
424
 The Funds will neither incur any 
obligation to pay compensation if the claimant cannot prove «that the damage 
resulted from an incident involving one or more ships».425 In relation to damage 
wholly or partially caused by the claimant's his own «negligence», or resulting 
from an «act or omission» on his part «done with the intent to cause damage», 
the scope of the exoneration of the IOPC Funds differ from the one applicable 
to the owner or his insurer: Even though the Funds in any event may be 
exonerated «to the extent that the shipowner may have been exonerated» under 
the corresponding provision of the CLC 92,
426
 such exoneration will not apply 
in regard to «preventive measures».
427
 
The competence of national courts in respect of claims against the IOPC 
Funds will be discussed in Chapter IV10.8. 
An aspect worthy of a short comment, even though it lies on the verge of the current topic, is 
the relationship between the 1992 Fund Convention and the Collision Convention 1910. The 
problem is that when the wording in Article 4.1 (c) of the 1992 Fund Convention States that 
the 1992 Fund shall pay compensation if the «damage exceeds the owner's liability (…) under 
the terms of any other international Convention», it also seems to open up for an unintended 
exoneration of the ship owner and his insurer if the oil spill resulted from a collision between to 
ships.
428
 This effect is the result of the liability regime under the Collision Convention being 
based on fault or negligence, and not strict liability like the CLC 02. Spain denounced the 
Collision Convention 1910 with effect from 19 January 2006,
429
 but the convention remains in 
force under Norwegian law.
430
  
                                           
422
 Art 4.2 (a) 1992 Fund Convention. Any liability incurring to a State as the owner of a State 
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Figure 9.7.1: Three tiers of liability; the CLC 92 and the IOPC Funds Conventions  
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.7.2: Apportionment of the maximum available compensation under the CLC 
92 and the IOPC Funds Conventions for incidents occurring after 3 March 2005 (the 
date on which the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol entered into force in Norway 
and Spain) 
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10.8 Competence of courts 
All the Oil Pollution Conventions contain particular rules on jurisdiction as 
well as on the recognition and enforcement of judgements given in relation to 
oil spill damage governed by the international regime. 
In relation to jurisdictional issues, the Conventions State that actions for 
compensation under all the Oil Pollution Conventions may only be brought 
before the courts of one or more Contracting States which have sustained 
pollution damage within its territory or EEZ, or preventive measures have been 
taken within this area.
431
 When the owner of a tanker subject to the CLC 92 has 
constituted a limitation fund in accordance with Article V.3, the courts of that 
State will have exclusive competence to determine all matters relating to the its 
apportionment and distribution. In relation to action brought before a court in 
a Contracting State to the CLC 92 which also has ratified the 2003 
Supplementary Fund Protocol, this court will have «exclusive jurisdictional 
competence over any action against the Supplementary Fund for compensation 
(…) in respect of the same damage. » However, if this State is not a party to the 
2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol, any action against the Supplementary 
Fund «shall at the option of the claimant be brought either before a court of the 
State where the Supplementary Fund has its headquarters or before any court 
of a Contracting State to this Protocol competent under article IX of the 1992 
Liability Convention [CLC 92] ».
432
  
The Conventions also provide rules on recognition and enforcement in 
relation to legal action taken after a spill covered by the regime. The principal 
rule is that «a judgement given by a Court with jurisdiction [according to the 
respective Conventions], which is enforceable in the State of origin where it is 
no longer subject to ordinary forms of review, shall be recognized in any 
Contracting State.» The judgement will be enforceable in each Contracting 
State «as soon as the formalities required in [the State of origin] have been 
complied with. »
433
 
The rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgements relating 
to the Oil Pollution Conventions are implemented in Norwegian law through 
Sections 203, 294 and 205 NMC, and are in principle directly applicable in 
Spain. However, this material is also covered by the Brussels Convention of 
                                           
431 
Art IX.1 CLC 92, Art 9.1 Bunkers Convention, Art 7.1 1992 Fund Convention. A claim 
made against the 1992 Fund is also regarded as a claim made by the same claimant against 
the 2003 Supplementary Fund, cf. Art 6.2 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol 
432 
Art 7.2, 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol 
433 
Art X CLC 92, Art 8 1992 Fund Convention, Art 8 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol, 
Art 10 Bunkers Convention. 
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1968 on International Jurisdiction and Recognition of Decisions in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (Brussels Convention), its replacement the EC Council 
Regulation 44/2001
434
 (Brussels I Regulation) and the Lugano Convention on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
of 1988 (Lugano Convention); which is a parallel convention to the Brussels 
Convention between EC/EFTA States.
435
 Both the Conventions and the 
Regulation contain provisions dealing with the relationship to other 
conventions concerning jurisdiction and judgements. The difference is however 
that the Lugano Conventions does not establish any rules on exclusive 
competence within the EEA,
436
 while the Brussels I Regulation – in accordance 
with the «AETR-doctrine», results in the exclusive competence of the 
Community in as much as the international provisions affect the rules laid 
down in the Brussels I Regulation.
437
  
If any of the Oil Pollution Conventions should diverge with material within the EEA, it would 
be in relation to a conflict between substantial rules. For instance, there might be a conflict 
between the Directive (EC) 75/445 on waste through which the cargo owner might incur 
liability for oil pollution damage caused during the transport of the goods
438
 and the 
channelling rules in the CLC 92.
439
 As this Directive forms part of the EEA Agreement, this 
substantial conflict might affect States within both the EEA and the EU. 
The Brussels I Regulation elaborates on the judicial cooperation in civil matters 
within the meaning of Art 65 EEC Treaty (Treaty on European Community) 
and applies in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or 
tribunal, cf. its Art 1. According to the «AETR-doctrine» established through a 
line of cases and opinions of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
beginning with the «AETR judgement»
440
, Member States no longer have the 
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78, p. 22) 
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  See Chapter IV10.4.2 
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Case 22/70 «AETR» [1971] ECR 263, see  paragraph 17-22 
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right to undertake obligations with non-member countries if such obligations 
will affect the Community secondary legislation.
441
  
In spite of the Community's exclusive competence in the field of jurisdiction, 
recognition and enforcement of judgements, both the Brussels Convention and 
the Brussels I regulation implicitly State that a Member State may enter other 
conventions covering this material; and that these convention will be given 
precedence if it governs jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of 
judgements in «particular matters».
442
  
As long as the rules on jurisdiction in civil matters governing the EU Member 
States were kept within the Brussels Convention, there was nothing except the 
condition of «particular matter» preventing the Member States from entering 
new Conventions containing jurisdictional clauses. Because this was a 
multilateral convention acceded by State Parties only, its material was kept 
outside the Community's secondary legislation. However, due to the «AETR-
doctrine», this all changed the day the Brussels I Regulation entered into force, 
on 1 March 2002
443
.  
When Spain became party to the 1992 Protocols of the CLC and the Fund 
Convention in 1997, the Community had no exclusive competence, as the 
acceding dates were prior to 1 March 2002. However, any ratification of the 
Bunkers Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol on a Member 
States own initiative would have been inconsistent with the Brussels I 
Regulation.
444
  
The exclusive competence could have been maintained within the EU if the 
Community as such could ratify the Conventions. As the Conventions were 
only open to «States»,
445
 this was not an alternative. Under the Diplomatic 
Conference on the adoption of the 1992 Protocol to the CLC 69, Sweden 
proposed a new provision that would enable the EU to become party to the 
Convention and hereby solve the lack of competence of the Member States. 
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The proposal was not adopted.
446
 The solution came through two Council 
Decisions authorising the Member States to sign, ratify and accede the Bunkers 
Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol «in the interest of the 
Community».
447
  
In relation to the international regime on compensation for oil pollution 
damage as interpreted within a national context, this seems to be the only 
aspect in which Spain's membership to the EU may divergence between the 
Norwegian and Spanish rules.  
There is currently an ongoing process within the EU in which it is suggested to establish a 
procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of bilateral agreements between Member States 
and third countries concerning sectoral matters and covering applicable law in contractual and 
non-contractual obligations.448  
The object of the proposal is «to establish a procedure for the Community to make an 
assessment of whether there is a sufficient Community interest in the conclusion of proposed 
bilateral agreements with third countries, and in the absence thereof authorise the Member 
States to conclude these agreements with third countries in certain fields concerning judicial 
cooperation in civil and commercial matters falling under the exclusive competence of the 
Community. »449 As it is proposed «to limit the procedure in question only to sectoral issues 
related to matrimonial matters, parental responsibility and maintenance obligations on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, to the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual 
obligations»450, the adoption will not have direct effect on the jurisdictional rules of the IMO Oil 
Pollution Conventions. However, if adopted, it might not be too far fetch to consider the 
enacting of a similar procedure on multilateral treaties with third countries involving rules on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgement.  
10.9 Limitation of action  
The right to compensation is not only limited by rules on the limitation of 
liability; the time passed without legal action being taken can also prevent an 
injured party from obtaining compensation.
451
 The Oil Pollution Conventions 
all draw up the same rule, and State that the right to compensation «shall be 
extinguished unless an action is brought there under within three years from 
                                           
446
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the date when the damage occurred» - or at most «six years from the date of 
the incident which caused the damage. (…)»
452
  
This rule is directly applicable under Spanish law, and implemented in 
Norwegian law through Section 503 NMC. A difference may however arise 
between Norwegian and Spanish law when it comes to the injured party's right 
to claim compensation for oil pollution damage not covered by the CLC 92 or 
the Bunkers Convention. This difference is caused because the Norwegian 
regime extends the international rules, including the ones on time bar, to such 
damage,
453
 while the same types of damage would be subject to the general rules 
of extra-contractual liability under Spanish law. The limitation of action for 
such claims depends on the applicable basis of liability: In relation to claims 
subject to the general provision on fault-based liability in Article 1902, and to 
Art 139 LRJAP on vicarious State liability, the time bar is one year from the 
date on which the injurious action occurred, or from the day the damage 
appeared.
 454
 However; in relation to civil liability arising out of the commission 
of a criminal offence, the principal rule is that such claims are subject to a time 
bar of 15 years.
455
  
This means that pollution damage not covered by the Oil Pollution 
Conventions will be subject to a time bar of three years from the date when the 
damage or occurred, or at most six years from the date of the incident which 
caused the damage under Norwegian law, while it will be extinguished under 
Spanish law after only one year if the basis of liability is of a purely civil nature, 
but not before 15 years have passed if the damage is the result of a criminal 
offence. 
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V  
Conclusive remarks 
Throughout this thesis I have compared the Norwegian and Spanish legal 
regime in relation to the common factor made up by the IMO Oil Pollution 
Conventions. I have sought to provide consecutive comments on the differences 
in respect of each of the discussed topics, and at this point I will only draw 
some final lines. The question is whether, and if so – in what way - the national 
incorporation and interpretation of the Oil Pollution Conventions cause 
divergence between the Norwegian and Spanish rules on a third party's right to 
compensation for oil pollution damage caused by ships. 
On one hand the analysis has shown that there is some divergence between 
the two States in respect of applicable legal method, the connection with the 
EU, the relation between national and international law in terms of monism 
and dualism, the status of incorporated, international provisions and the 
legislative tradition within maritime law. But on the other, it does also imply 
that the interpretation and application of the Oil Pollution Conventions 
remains quite the same under both Norwegian and Spanish law. The main 
divergence between the two legal regimes within this legal area actually seems 
to be found in relation to the rules governing the right of a third party to claim 
compensation for oil pollution damage that falls outside the scope of the 
Conventions.  
However, there some aspects related to the incorporation and interpretation 
of the Conventions might cause divergence between the Norwegian and 
Spanish rules. These include the different hierarchical status of incorporated 
international provisions within the national legislation, the impact of 
substantial law on channelling rules and the liability limits of the LLMC 76/96, 
as well as the Spanish tradition of assessing many of the pollution claims within 
a criminal process before a domestic court.   
In regard of the different hierarchical status, the problem lies in the 
theoretical risk of the incorporated provisions being derogated by a more 
recent, national provision covering the same material. This risk is caused within 
Norwegian law as incorporated provisions are given the same status as their 
implementing provision, which usually will be an ordinary act of law. Under 
Spanish law, the problem is avoided through constitutional rules that assigns 
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incorporated provisions with higher status than ordinary legislation.
456
 However 
- even though an application of the principle of lex superior could result in the 
prevailing of an internal provision at the sacrifice of the incorporated 
international provision, one must also consider the minimal risk of 
contradictory provisions as a result of the Norwegian legislator's aim to adopt 
laws in conformity with the State's international obligations. Another thing is 
that the incorporated provisions often will provide particular regulation within 
a limited area, and that the application of the principle of lex specialis would 
give them precedence over any general internal rules.
457
  
As for the impact of substantial law on the channelling of liability,
458
 the 
difference is a result of the Norwegian supplementary rules that extends the 
protection to cover more persons than mentioned under the CLC 92, and also 
add channelling rules to the Bunkers Convention. Even though there are some 
Spanish regulations that supplement the Bunkers Convention with  channelling 
rules protecting the persons participating in salvage operations and those taking 
preventive measures, these are not as extensive as the Norwegian rules, which 
also cover the «sender, shipper, owner or receiver of the cargo».
459
 In 
consequence, more people are protected against claims for compensation for 
damage caused by both tankers and non-tankers under Norwegian law.
460
 Yet 
another aspect that could cause divergence in this respect is the applicable, 
national rules of liability.
461
 Even though an injured party could seek 
compensation outside the Convention in both States, the applicable rules might 
not facilitate such an action. An example is the rules on vicarious State liability, 
which require that the damage was caused by fault or negligence under 
Norwegian law, while the corresponding rule under Spanish law impose strict 
liability independent of fault.
462
 Nevertheless; this difference will only cause 
diversion if the applicable limits of liability are to low to cover all the damage. If 
all claims can be settled within the 750 million SDR that is the total amount 
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footnote 142 on p. 3. 
458
 See Chapter IV10.3 
459
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460
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 See Chapter IV10.4 
462
 See however Chapter IV10.4.3 
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available under the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol, there will be no need 
to seek compensation elsewhere.  
Another difference consist of divergent limits of liability in regard of claims 
relating to costs of wreck removal and clean-up operations pursuant to Article 
2.1 (d) and (e) LLMC 76/96 under Norwegian and Spanish law.
463
 While the 
Norwegian legislator has established particular limits,
464
 these claims are not 
subject to any limitation at all under Spanish law.
465
 If the limitation under 
Norwegian law actually covered all types of clean-up costs this would not be a 
problem. However, as the current limits provided just enough compensation to 
cover the costs incurred by the Norwegian Government through the clean up 
operation in the wake of the shipwreck of the bulk carrier Server in 2007,
466
 
this might not be the case. Nevertheless; due to a legislative proposal on the 
elevation of these limits by 50%, it is probable that the situation will change in 
the near future.
467
 It is also clear that the Norwegian legislator did not mean to 
provide a limit that did not cover the potential costs in the first place.
468
 The 
elevation of the Norwegian limit and the original intention of the legislator are 
both factors that reflect that the right to compensation for such damage is 
intended to be the same under both Norwegian and Spanish law. Neither of the 
tax-payers should have to cover the costs of the polluter.  
The third and last aspect that impacts on a third party's right to 
compensation under the Conventions is the use of time-consuming court 
proceedings to assess claims that are covered by the Oil Pollution 
Conventions.
469
 One thing is that the Spanish courts earlier have ignored the 
channelling rules under the CLC 69 and thus imposed an unlimited liability on 
other parties than the owner, his insurer and the IOPC Funds.
470
 Even though 
such a practise might generate more funding to cover the claims, it is also a 
threat to the uniformity of the international regime. Besides, if the channelling 
rules do not prevent such claims, they might be handled independently of the 
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claims entitled to compensation under the Conventions. However, in relation to 
a third party's right to compensation, the most important thing is the time 
consumption resulting from the need to first address the criminal aspects before 
the court may move on to the civil claims in a criminal procedure.
471
 
Nevertheless; as a significant incentive behind such procedures seems to be the 
possibility of obtaining enough compensation to cover all the claims by 
imposing liability on other parties than the ones liable under the Conventions, 
this practise might change now that the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol is 
in force and a part of both Norwegian and Spanish law. 
Other than these, no aspect of the national legislation seems to affect the 
interpretation and application of the Conventions as such. This includes the 
exclusive competence of the EU within the area of jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement of judgments
472
 as the Member States are urged to ratify the IMO 
Conventions,
473
 and were given the Council’s consent to ratify the Bunkers 
Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol.
 474
  
The rest of the differences relate to third parties right to compensation for oil 
pollution damage falling outside the scope of the Conventions. This category 
includes damage caused on the high sea wherever national tort law is 
applicable including the continental shelf situated outside the EEZ,
475
 damage 
caused by State ships on Government non-commercial service
476
 and damage 
resulting from the escape or discharge of non-persistent types of oil from an oil 
tanker.
477
 Whether any compensatory damage actually may arise on the high 
sea or on the part of the continental shelf outside the 200 nautical miles of the 
EEZ is uncertain. So is the risk of harm of the escape or discharge of non-
persistent oil, as this type has been left out of the CLC 92 and the IOPC Fund 
Conventions due to its tendency to evaporate quickly, without requiring any 
clean-up operation.
478
 However, the exception of liability on the part of a flag 
State which ship on Government non-commercial service has caused oil 
pollution damage might be a problem for the injured party who is prevented 
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from seeking compensation under the CLC 92 and in some States also the 
Bunkers Convention.
479
 Either way, the problem does not relate to the 
practicality of these types of damage, but the national legal basis on which a 
claimant may obtain compensation. 
The divergence between Norwegian and Spanish law within this material is 
mainly a result of the extension of the rules on strict liability, its limitation and 
compensatory losses under the CLC 92 and the Bunkers Convention to non-
covered oil pollution damage caused by the escape or discharge from a tanker 
or non-tanker under Norwegian law,
480
 while the Spanish legislator has opted 
not to adopt any particular rules that could have supplemented the 
Conventions in this respect.
481
 The liability for such damages will depend on the 
ordinary provisions on tort law
482
 and be subject to the limits provided for in 
regard of pollution damage from non-tankers. Because of the exception in Art 3 
(b) LLMC 76/96, damage caused by tankers will not be subject to limitation at 
all. However, should the new Spanish Maritime Code be adopted without 
amendments to its Chapter V,
483
 the applicable Spanish legislation will in most 
cases – except for damage caused by non-commercial State ships, also consist 
of identical rules as the Conventions in respect of strict liability, compensatory 
losses, and mandatory insurance.
484
 In that case, the difference will lie in the 
applicable limits of liability, as the Norwegian legislation provides identical 
limits of liability as provided for in the CLC 92 in respect of pollution damage 
caused by tankers,
485
 while the Spanish regime will operate by the limits 
pursuant to LLMC 76/96 in regard of damage caused by both tankers and non-
tankers.
486
 In regard of oil pollution damage caused by State ships on 
Government non-commercial service, both Norwegian and Spanish rules 
establish strict liability for the State.
487
 Foreign State ships will be subject to the 
same rules as national ships under Norwegian law, while their liability is not 
                                           
479
  If the State in question has opted not make the Bunkers Convention applicable to oil 
pollution damage caused by a non-commercial State ship, see its Art 4.3.  
480
 Sections 207 and 208 NMC – including compensation for costs incurred as a result of 
preventive measures. See Chapter IV10.1.1 and Chapter IV10.1.2. 
481
  See Chapter IV10.1 
482
  Art 1902 CC, Arts 139 et seq. LRAJP, Arts 109 cf. 119-121 CP 
483
  See Chapter II7.3 
484
  Chapter V PLGNM  
485
 Section 207.2 cf. 194.1 NMC. Claims deriving from pollution damage caused by non-
tankers will be subject to the limits in the implemented LLMC 76/96, see Section 208.1 cf. 
208.3 NMC. 
486
  Art 417.2 cf. 421 PLGNM 
487
  See Sections 190.3, 207.1 cf. 206.3 NMC and Arts 139 et seq. LRJAP 
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explicitly regulated by Spanish law. The time bar applying to claims not covered 
by the Oil Pollution Conventions will also differ between the two States. As 
these claims will be subject to the same limits as the Conventions under 
Norwegian law - and ordinary limits under Spanish law, legal action must be 
taken within three years from the date the damage occurred, or at most six from 
the date of the incident under Norwegian law, and one or fifteen years under 
Spanish law; depending on whether the damage is of purely civil nature, or the 
result of a criminal offence.
488
 
All in all it can be said that the principle divergence between Norwegian and 
Spanish rules within this legal area is not caused by the national incorporation 
and interpretation of the Oil Pollution Conventions, but as a consequence of 
diverging provisions regulating to the liability for oil pollution damage outside 
the scope of these Conventions. Yet another aspect is that the importance of 
the existing differences in regard of a third party's right to compensation under 
the Conventions most probably will diminish as a result of the elevated limits of 
liability.  
                                           
488
 See Chapter IV10.9 
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Annex I 
Spanish measures in the wake of the Prestige 
 
On 30 October 2002, the distribution of liabilities between the Spanish State 
and the 1971 Fund for the damage caused by the shipwreck of Aegean Sea in 
the port of La Coruña in 1992 finally found its solution in an out of court 
agreement.
489
  
Then, on 19 November 2002, the tanker Prestige, with a gross tonnage of 
42 820 and laden with 76 972 tonnes of heavy fuel oil broke in two 130 miles 
off the Galician coast in the north-western Spain. When this happened, it had 
been denied a port of refugee in both Portugal and Spain, and was currently 
being towed out to the Atlantic Ocean by order of the Spanish Government.
490
 
Some of the discharged oil leaking from the tanker reached the coast of 
Galicia/ La Coruña on 16 November, and the following day the City Council of 
La Coruña imposed a state of emergency, and all fishing activities in the zone 
were prohibited.491 The coastline of Galicia is one of the riches fishing areas in 
Europe, and the fishing bans were to cause widespread economic impact to 
thousands of people.492   This was not the first oil spill in the area, but the last of 
many affecting the rocky shore of «Costa da Morte», or the Death Coast. 
Popular movements wanting compensation and punishment arouse.
493
 These 
might also have been one of the reasons for which criminal proceedings were 
opened. 
 
                                           
489
  See 71FUND/AC.10/2 of 9 January 2003 which includes the final agreement on the 
proportion of liabilities, and Coderch (2003) p. 21-26. The main principle of the agreement 
was that the ship owner, his insurer and the 1971 Fund would provide compensation in 
accordance with the maximum limitation applicable under the CLC 69 and the 1971 Fund 
Convention, while the The Spanish State would compensate the exceeding claims. 
490
 92FUND/EXC.44/4 of 27 February 2009, paragraph 2.1, and Pulido (2007) p. 151 
491
 Crónica de la catástrofe. El Mundo (undated) http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/ 
2002/11/ecologia/prestige/cronologia.html [1 June 2009] 
492
 92FUND/EXC.22/8 of 7 October 2003, paragraph 3.1, Caballero, María Jose. The Prestige 
Disaster – One Year On. Oceans Campaign, Greenpeace Spain, November 2003, p. 21-22. 
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/the-prestige-disaster-one-
yea.pdf  [1 June 2009] and Negro … [et al.]. Compensating system for damages caused by 
oil spill pollution: Background for the Prestige assessment damage in Galicia, Spain. In: 
Ocean & Coastal Management Vol. 50, Issues 1-2 2007, p. [57]–66. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/ [1 June 2009] p. 59 
493
 Pulido (2007) p. 152 
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Figure A.1: Spanish areas affected by the Prestige oil spill in November 2002 
Source: European Environment Agency494 
 
 
 
      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2: Major oil spills in Spain 
Source: the Spanish Ministry of Environment, Rural and Seaside Areas
495
 
 
                                           
494
 http://dataservice.eea.europa.eu/atlas/viewdata/viewpub.asp?id=798 [1 June 2009] 
495
 http://www.mma.es [1 June 2009] 
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Some early measures were adopted to diminish the negative impacts of the 
oil spill. On 23 November 2002, the Real Decreto-Ley
496
 7/2002 regarding 
measures of restorations in relation to the incident of the Prestige was 
published in BOE.
497
 It contained provisions on local tax reduction,
498
 labour 
law measures,
499
 Government grants to fishermen, shellfish farmers and others 
affected by the suspension of activity, the promotion of fish products from the 
Galician Autonomous Community, as well as preferential lines of credit in 
anticipation of the reparation or reposition of the infrastructure of the fishing 
industry. 
On 14 December, the scope of R.D.L 7/2002 was extended through the 
adoption of Real Decreto-Ley 8/2002.
500
 In its preamble it was stressed that the 
R.D.L 7/2002 had been adopted to provide the necessary urgent and immediate 
means required to deal with the needs caused by the Prestige incident.
501
 
Through communication with the 1992 Fund, it also became clear that the 
Spanish Public Authorities and the Fund agreed on the importance of avoiding 
the difficulties faced in connection with the Aegean Sea incident.
502
 After a slow 
start, the Government now seemed determent to compensate all damage caused 
on Spanish grounds by the Prestige incident in a prompt and adequate manner, 
with or without the help of the ship owner, his insurer and the 1992 Fund. 
Nevertheless; an important aspect of all the adopted financial measures was 
                                           
496
 Real Decreto-Leyes (Royal Decree Laws) are temporary, legislative provisions that may be 
issued «in case of extraordinary and urgent need». Their substantial content may not affect 
«the legal system of the basic State institutions, the rights, duties and freedoms of the 
citizens contained in Part 1 [CE], the system of Self-governing Communities, or the general 
electoral law.», cf. Art 86.1 CE 
497
 R.D.L 7/2002, de 22 de noviembre, sobre medidas reparadoras en relación con el 
accidente del buque «Prestige», BOE  núm. 281 de 23/11/2002  
498
 Municipal bodies facing a loss of income because of the tax reduction were to receive 
compensation through the State budget, see Art 3.3  
499
 These measures referred to the right of an employer to suspend or terminate contracts of 
employment, or to reduce the daily working hours based on the classification of the 
pollution damage as an incident of force majeure, cf. Art 5.1.1. Employers were also 
granted a waiver of social security contributions, cf. Art 5.1.2. As for the affected 
employees, the R.D.L. ordered that they would receive payments of unemployment benefits 
even though they had not worked up sufficient grounds for the general rules on this matter 
to apply, cf. Art 5.1.3.  
500
 R.D.L. 8/2002, de 13 de diciembre, por el que se amplían las medidas reparadoras en 
relación con el accidente del buque «Prestige» a las Comunidades Autónomas del 
Principado de Asturias, Cantabria y País Vasco, y se modifica el Real Decreto-Ley 7/2002, 
de 22 de noviembre, BOE núm. 299 de 14 de diciembre de 2002 
501
 « (…) a fin de articular con la urgencia e inmediatez necesarias las actuaciones precisas 
para atender las necesidades surgidas de los daños provocados por el citado accidente.»  
502
  92FUND/EXC.22/8 of  7 October 2003, paragraph 7.3 
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that the Spanish State did not assume any liability for the damage, but reserved 
the right to recourse from the liable parties.
503
 
In the course of 2003 and 2004, two additional financial measures were 
adopted; R.D.L 4/2003 of 20 June
504
 and the R.D.L. 4/2004 of 2 July
505
. This 
regime represented three different systems for assessing and paying advance 
compensation for pollution damage caused within a three-year span beginning 
the day the oil first started to leak from the Prestige on 13 November 2002, and 
ending in March 2005. By accepting the terms of the Government, oil pollution 
victims would be conceded full compensation for their claims as assessed by the 
State,
506
 and thus avoid long legal procedures and the risk of a low percentage 
disbursement
507
 from the 1992 Fund. The assessment of the claims would follow 
the criteria applied under the CLC 92 and the 1992 Fund Convention.
508
 On the 
other hand; the terms laid down in Article 6 of the R.D.L. 4/2003 included the 
signing of a settlement agreement with the Spanish State by which the claimant 
would renounce on any pending or future judicial or extrajudicial action related 
to disaster caused in relation to the Prestige incident.
509
 Another term was that 
the claimant would have to transfer his rights of compensation to the Spanish 
Government.
510
   
The first system was designed to cover the further loss of profit (lucrum 
cessans) of those who had received direct assistance under the acts adopted in 
November 2002 when the incident occurred. Their loss would be assessed by 
the use of objective estimates.
511
 The second system was applicable to the rest of 
the claims, except claims from the Autonomous Communities and towns as 
                                           
503
 Art 1.2 R.D.L. 7/2002, Art 1.2 R.D.L. 8/2002 and Art 1.3 R.D.L. 4/2003 
504
 R.D.L. 4/2003, de 20 de junio, sobre actuaciones para el abono de indemnizaciones en 
relación con los daños ocasionados por el accidente del buque «Prestige»; BOE núm. 148 
de 21 de junio de 2003; further elaborated in R.D. 1053/2003 de 1 de agosto (BOE núm. 
184 de 2 de agosto de 2003) 
505
 R.D.L. 4/2004, de 2 de julio, por el que se adoptan determinadas medidas relacionadas con 
los daños ocasionados por el accidente del buque «Prestige», BOE núm. 160 de 3 de 
agosto de 2004; further elaborated in R.D. 276/2005 de 11 de marzo (BOE núm. 61 de 12 
de marzo 2005. 
506
  Art 6.1 a) R.D.L. 4/2003 
507
 Art 4.5 1992 Fund Convention 
508
  Art 4 R.D.L. 4/2003 
509
 Art 6.1 b) R.D.L. 4/2003 
510
 Art 6.1 c) R.D.L. 4/2003 
511
 Art 3 R.D.L 4/2003 cf. Art 3.1 R.D. 1053/2003. By October 2004, this system had 
practically come to an end and involved the payment of approximately 86, 2 million €, cf. 
92FUND/EXC/26.8/2 of 12 October 2004 paragraph 3.3.  
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such which were subject to the third system.
512
 The claims falling within this 
second category would undergo an individual assessment of the suffered 
damage conducted by the Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros; a public 
corporate entity attached to the Ministry of Economy through the Directorate 
General of Insurance and Pension Funds, but also a legal entity in its own right 
with full operational capabilities.
513
 The ship owner’s insurer (London Club
514
) 
and the 1992 Fund helped out in the process.
515
 When the R.D.L. 4/2003 was 
adopted in June 2003, it was stated that the global limit would not exceed 
160 million €, and that the payment would depend on prior disbursements from 
the 1992 Fund. These conditions were repealed in R.D.L. 4/2004, and a new 
limit of 249, 5 million € was established. However, this unlimited funding would 
only cover damage occurred until 31 December 2003. Damage occurred from 
1 January 2004 and until the claims had to be presented on 31 March 2005, 
would be compensated within a global limit of 3 million €.516 
The third system provided for the signing of agreements with public 
administrations different from the central administration; the Autonomous 
Communities and the City Councils.
517
 This system does not seem to have been 
subject to any form for global limitation.   
In a Note by the Director of the 1992 Fund of 27 February 2009,
518
 it is 
accounted for the claimed, assessed and compensated claims from injured third 
parties in Spain, France and Portugal. By middle February 2009, the total 
amount of claims submitted to the 1992 found came to a total of 
1 134 704 893 €. While only 0, 38 % of the claimed amount derived from 
Portuguese claims and 9, 67 % from the French, an entire 90 % was made up by 
Spanish claims.
519
 The total amount of compensation available under the CLC 
92 and the 1992 Fund was 135 million SDR, which corresponded to 
171 520 703 € on 7 February 2003.520 This corresponded to 15 % of the total 
amount submitted by all claimants. However, the claims were only assessed to a 
                                           
512
 «Las comunidades autónomas y las corporaciones locales», First Additional Provision of 
the R.D.L. 4/2003.   
513
 Art 3 R.D.L. 4/2003 cf. Art 4 R.D. 1053/2003, see http://www.consorseguros.es [23 May 
2009] 
514
 London Steamship Owners' Mutual Insurance Association  
515
  92FUND/EXC.29/4 of 9 June 2005, paragraphs 5.8 – 5.10 
516
 Art 2 R.D.L. 4/2004 
517
 First Additional Provision of R.D.L. 4/2003 
518
 92FUND/EXC.44/4 
519
  Figures from 92FUND/EXC.44/4 
520
 92FUND/EXC.22/8 of  7 October 2003, paragraph 14.4 
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total of 359 million €, by which interim payments between 15 and 30% has 
been made.
521
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3: Claimed, assessed and compensated damage (Prestige, 2002) 
 
In respect of the Spanish claims it is interesting to notice that out of the 844 
submitted claims totalling to an amount of 1 020 704 893 €; 14 claims from the 
Government came to a total of 968 500 000 €, and thus corresponded to 95 % 
of the entire amount. These claims relate to costs incurred in respect of at sea- 
and on shore clean-up operations, removal of oil from the wreck, treatment of 
the oil residues, administration costs, tax reliefs for businesses affected by the 
spill, costs incurred by local authorities and paid by the Government, costs 
related to publicity campaigns, and compensation payments made in the basis 
of the R.D.L. 4/2003 and 4/2004.
522
 Among the parties who signed agreements 
with the State on advance compensation pursuant to these R.D.L, are 19 500 
workers in the fisheries sector, other claimants whose claims have been 
assessed by the Consorcio, sixty-seven towns and the Autonomous 
Communities of Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria and the Basque Country.
523
  
Besides the compensatory measures, the costs of removing oil from the 
sunken tanker came to a total of 109, 2 million €. This cost has not been 
undertaken entirely by the Spanish State, as it was partly compensated through 
a funding of 84 million € from the EU Solidarity Fund.524 As a result, the claim 
                                           
521
 Figures from 92FUND/EXC.44/4 
522
 92FUND/EXC.44/4 paragraph 4.1.1 
523
  92FUND/EXC.44/4 paragraph 4.1.1 
524
 92FUND/EXC.34/8 of 18 September 2006, paragraph 7.1, cf. COM(2004)0397 final 
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presented to the 1992 Fund only reached a total of 24, 2 million €. The 
treatments of oil residues came to an additional cost of 896 533 €.525 As a total, 
the costs for clean-up operations only constitute 1 % of the overall costs 
submitted to the Claims Handling Office by the Spanish Government. The 
apportionment on the different type of measures undertaken by the Spanish 
Government is illustrated in Figure 10.2.  
The total amount of costs incurred under the financial measures adopted in 
November 2002 by means of tax reliefs, waivers of social security payments, 
promotion of fish products from the affected areas and daily grants of 40 € to 
fishermen, shellfish farmers and others affected by the fishing bans, is not clear. 
It is however presumable that these costs have raised the percentage of costs 
incurred by the Government for undertaking compensatory measures. 
According to a Note submitted to the 1992 Fund by Spain, the Government 
had spent more than 70 million € on «Value Added Tax (VAT), tax concessions, 
and rebates on Social Security contributions» by February 2008.
526
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.4: 
Apportionment of claims submitted by the Spanish Government527 
 
                                           
525
 92FUND/EXC.40/5/1 of 26 February  2008, paragraph 1.2 
526
 1992FUND/EXC.40/5/1 of 26 February 2008 paragraph 1.5 
527
 Figures obtained from 92FUND/EXC.26/8/2 of 12 October 2004, 92FUND/EXC.34/8 of 
18 September 2006, 92FUND/EXC.34/8/1 of 4 October 2006 and 92FUND/EXC.40/5 of 
18 February 2008. 
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The measures undertaken by the Spanish Government did for one provide for 
a temporary expedient in the months after the oil reached shore. They have also 
permitted every injured party finding who found it reasonable to accept the 
offers to obtain compensation. In addition it can be said that they have 
contributed to simplify the judicial process by inserting the State as the 
principal plaintiff, and thus avoid having hundreds of injured parties appearing 
before court.
528
 A claimant would get full compensation to the extent calculated 
by the use of objective estimates or individual assessment carried out by the 
Consorcio in cooperation with the London Club and the 1992 Fund. As the 
individual assessment was based on the criteria applied under the CLC 92 and 
the 1992 Fund Convention and in cooperation with entities familiar with such 
operations, it is likely that the assessment was similar to the one applied by the 
P&I Clubs and the Fund themselves.  
While the general opinion seems to be pleased with the established system,
529
 
it has also been subject to criticism and accused of being a hidden intent to 
shield the State from further liability.
530
 
However, the main problem lies in the fact that the CLC 92 and the 1992 
Fund Convention did not provide enough compensation to cover all the claims. 
As claimants are entitled to the same proportion of the available funding under 
these Conventions, the compensation was distributed throughout interim 
payments between 15 and 30%.
531
 Nevertheless; since 2002 the limits of the 
CLC 92 and the 1992 Fund Convention have been subject to a 50% increase, 
and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol has entered into force providing 
yet another tier of compensation. If an accident like the sinking of the Prestige 
should happen again, about eight times as much compensation will be available 
under the Oil Pollution Funds. As for oil spill under the Bunkers Convention, it 
is important to remember that the ordinary limits provided for under the LLMC 
76/96, does not apply to the clean-up operation within neither Norwegian nor 
Spanish law.
532
  
 
 
 
                                           
528
 Castro Rey (2006) p. 7 
529
 Represented by Castro Rey (2006) p. 7 and Pulido (2007) p. 168 
530
 Puig, Antoni Rubí i.  El blindaje del Gobierno en la crisis del «Prestige». Comentario al 
Real Decreto Ley 4/2003, de 20 de junio, de ayudas a los damnificados. In: InDret 4/2003 
(online). http://www.indret.com/pdf/169_es.pdf  [1 June 2009] 
531
 As of 27 February 2009 
532
 See Chapter IV10.5 
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Figure 10.5: A comparison of the available funding in 2009 and 2002 (based on the 
exchange rate as of 27 March 2003) 
 
 Nevertheless, more funding does not equal full compensation for all 
types of claims. This was pointed out by the Spanish Government in the above 
mentioned note of 26 February 2008 in relation to costs incurred through 
payments of Value Added Tax, tax reductions and waivers on Social Security 
contributions.
533
 In such a perspective, it can be said that the Spanish 
Government has undertaken to provide the injured parties with a right to 
compensation exceeding the rights that would have been available to 
Norwegian claimants under similar circumstances.  However, these measures 
were taken as a response to one incident, and do not represent a general set of 
rules.  
 
 
                                           
533
 1992FUND/EXC.40/5/1 of 26 February 2008 paragraph 1.5 
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Abbreviations 
 
1971/ 1992 Fund The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, 
1971/1992 
1971/1992 Fund Convention International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, 1971/1992  
2003 Supplementary Fund The International Oil Pollution Supplementary Fund, 2003 
2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 
BOCG Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales 
BOE Boletín Oficial del Estado (Official State Gazette) 
Bunkers Convention International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil 
Pollution Damage (2001) 
CC Código Civil, 1889 (Civil Code) 
CCom Código de Comercio, 1885 (Commercial Code) 
CE La Constitución Española, 1978 (Spanish Constitution) 
CLC 69/92 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage (1969/1992) 
CP Código Penal, 1995 (Criminal Code)  
ECR European Court Reports (official reports of the judgements 
of the European Court, English version)  
EEA European Economic Union 
EFTA The European Free Trade Association 
FAL Forsikringsavtaleloven 1989 (The Norwegian Insurance 
Contract Act) 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
IOPC Funds 1992 Fund and 2003 Supplementary Fund  
LCS Ley de Contrato de Seguro (1980) 
LLMC 76/96 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 
(1976/1996) 
LOTC Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional, 1979 
(Constitutional Court Act) 
LPEMM Ley de Puertos de Estado y de la Marina Mercante, 1992 
(State Ports and Merchant Shipping Act) 
LRJAP Ley de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas 
y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común, 1992 (the 
Spanish Public Administrations Act) 
NC Den norske Grunnlov, 1814 (The Norwegian Constitution) 
NMC Sjøloven, 1994 (Norwegian Maritime Code) 
NPCA Forurensningsloven, 1981 (The Norwegian Pollution 
Control Act) 
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OJ Official Journal (L = legislatio, C = communicatio) 
OPA 90 Oil Pollution Act (1990) USA 
PLGNM Proyecto de Ley General de la Navegación Marítima 
R.D. Real Decreto  
R.D.L. Real Decreto-Ley 
Rt. Retstidend (Supreme Court Report) 
SDR Special Drawing Right 
SKL Skadeserstatningsloven, 1969 ([Norwegian] Act relating to 
compensation in certain circumstances) 
STOPIA Small Tankers Pollution Indemnification Agreement 
TOPIA Tankers Pollution Indemnification Agreement 
UN United Nations 
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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Besl.O.nr.79 (2008-2009) Lov om endringar i lov 24. juni 1994 nr. 39 om sjøfarten (sjøloven) 
mv. 
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